PRT/KHOST: KHOST EAGER TO CONVERT ARBAKI INTO ANAP

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005853

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMIT
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER AF MARR SNAR
SUBJECT: PRT/KHOST: KHOST EAGER TO CONVERT ARBAKI INTO ANAP

REF: KABUL 5632


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Provincial and Ministry of Interior (MOI)
officials had selected the first 460 members of a future
Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) force for Khost, but
MOI, implementing a November 11 agreement under the direction
of the Policy Action Group (PAG),has since told Khost Afghan
National Police (ANP) leadership to cease recruiting until
further notice. The final number of Khost's future force
remains in question, but will range between 460 and 920.
Governor Arsala Jamal is frustrated Khost was not included in
the first round of ANAP deployments and continues to make the
case that Khost has more at stake than other approved
provinces. Provincial leaders are optimistic locally
recruited ANAP, like the tribal Arbaki, can draw local
communities closer to the government. Khost's ANAP forces
will be as broadly representative as logistically possible
and will be deployed outside of the districts they are
recruited from as needed, according to the Khost ANP
leadership. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Governor Makes Case for Expedited ANAP Deployment
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) Khost Governor Arsala Jamal told PRTOff December 3
he was disappointed Khost did not make the priority list for
expediting deployment of Afghan National Auxiliary Police
(ANAP). Jamal requested PRTOff press the urgency of a Khost
ANAP deployment with the Embassy, stressing the province's
importance as a regional center and security lynchpin. He
said the symbolic value of losing control of Khost, outside
of the Taliban's traditional southern strongholds, would hit
the country much harder than isolated districts in other
prioritized provinces. Jamal said the 460 selected ANAP
candidates would "not wait forever" to be called to duty,
adding that if MOI waited too long they would have to start
the selection process over again, although he did not specify
how long that would be. Jamal said some overzealous district
ANP commanders were encouraging candidates to show up for
work and take uniforms under the assumption they would be
paid out of the Governor's emergency fund used to pay Arbaki
until MOI ANAP funding begins. "I had to tell them to stop
and keep only the existing Arbaki force and send others home."

-------------- --------------
MOI Mixed Signals to Khost: Slow Down, Increase Force Size
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) An MOI-commission toured selected districts to
screen the first 460 Khost ANAP candidates from mid-October
to mid-November, according to Deputy ANP Commander Colonel
Zaman on November 29. The Khost ANP submitted paperwork on
this first round of ANAP, but MOI contacted Khost ANP in late
November to "slow down" and not call any candidates to duty
prior to securing of funding to ensure salaries. "The last
thing we need is problems from the start with wages and
people walking off the job," said Zaman. This has also put
on hold plans to recruit an additional 190 ANAP Governor
Jamal claimed he had convinced MOI in writing to provide
(Zaman claimed it was 150 additional). Jamal and Zaman
confirmed ANP Commander Gen. Ayub was in Kabul lobbying MOI
for a total 800-man ANAP force. Jamal added MOI also agreed
to approve an additional 100-plus ANAP for security on the
Khost-Gardez Road once construction begins. This would be a
special force that would not count against either Khost,s or
Paktia,s official roles. Neither Jamal nor Zaman could
explain if the increased Khost total would be taken from
other provinces or added to the national 11,271 total. Jamal
was likewise at odds to reconcile conflicting signals from
MOI about the size and speed of the deployment. "We need
help, who gets what and when is still a fluid thing," he said
December 3, in contrast to a more assured posture he had
following an October 28 meeting at MOI, when he told PRTOff
Khost was on the fast track to first-round consideration.

KABUL 00005853 002 OF 003


(Comment: In response to mounting international community
concern that the expedited ANAP force-generation program was
failing to attract recruits representative of the tribal and
clan balances of the districts to which they will be deployed
as well as in recognition that limited training resources
should be concentrated for best effect, MOI, at the direction
of the Policy Action Group (PAG),ceased recruitment in other
than the &six priority provinces,8 Farah, Ghazni, Helmand,
Kandahar, Uruzghan and Zabul. MOI will resume recruiting
outside the initial six priority provinces when a Combined
Security Transition Command ) Afghanistan (CSTC-A)-led Joint
Planning Group develops program expansion criteria that
reaffirm ethnic balance as a guiding principle of ANAP
recruitment. End Comment.)

-------------- --------------
ANP Plans to Transplant Arbaki Legitimacy to ANAP
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) Provincial leaders are overwhelmingly supportive of
converting existing tribal elder-backed and -selected Arbaki
("village defenders") being used by ANP and paid by the
Governor into ANAP. They believe international community
fears that the force constitutes rearming militias do not
apply to Khost or neighboring provinces with historic
tribal/regional Arbaki traditions -- in contrast to provinces
where militias have traditionally been strong with loyalty
vested in personalities. General Ayub said he hoped to
transplant the built-in local credibility of the Arbaki to
the ANAP, to which he expected all existing Arbaki to
transfer. Zaman discounted concerns of a couple of district
commissioners that some Arbaki would object to working
directly for the GOA instead of through their village elders.
He said Arbaki were among the ample interested candidates,
many of whom had to be turned away. Zaman said the fear of
stripping Arbaki of the local legitimacy they enjoy by
converting them into ANAP was mitigated by a selection
process that requires candidate sponsorship from both a GOA
official and two village elders. He was confident the
selection board, which also includes an NDS representative, a
Kabul MOI general, and various MOI personnel officials, would
produce a quality force.

-------------- --------------
Deployment vs. Recruitment; Arbaki Shopping Rumors
-------------- --------------


5. (SBU) Zaman said the 460 selected candidates represented a
broad swath of tribes, noting even some Kuchis had applied in
Tere Zayi District, although they were still
underrepresented. He said MOI was responsible for picking
the districts from which people are recruited, including 160
from a single district (Sabari) and none from others, such as
troubled Spera District. General Ayub explained November 4
that ANAP would not necessarily be stationed from where they
were recruited, although this would be optimal, and he would
assign ANAP "wherever I need them most," including Spera. He
also rejected rumors the disproportionate Sabari numbers were
due to significant numbers of Arbaki moving to Ghazni, where
Governor Pathan was paying Arbaki more than ANAP or Arbaki in
Khost. Jamal said this was a rumor generated to sour his
relationship with Pathan, who was the Khost governor until
August.

-------------- --------------
District Feedback: Ready for Any Help, But Will They Stay?
-------------- --------------


6. (SBU) Hazrat Mir, District Commissioner of Jaji Maidan,
told PRTOff November 30 the entire 10-man Arbaki force at the
district center had applied for 40 district ANAP positions.
He said authorities tried to get a good geographic mix of
district locals in the new force, but ended up with a
disproportionate number of applicants from the area
immediately surrounding the District Center due to commuting

KABUL 00005853 003 OF 003


challenges. District ANP Commander Nobad Khan said the ANAP
will inherit the advantages and limitations of the locally
employed Arbaki but that whatever the ANAP shortcomings, the
Arbaki offers at least a base of a security force to build on
and the extra numbers ANAP will bring will be a welcome
improvement. He sardonically added the ANAP would also face
the same retention problems his underpaid and under-equipped
regular ANP force faces.
NEUMANN