KARZAI AND SPANTA ON FM KASURI VISIT ON JIRGAS: NO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005823

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI AND SPANTA ON FM KASURI VISIT ON JIRGAS: NO
PROGRESS

REF: ISLAMABAD 22417

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (S) President Karzai believes the Pakistanis are having
trouble accepting the idea of large cross-border jirgas, due
to their deep fear of the Pashtuns, and that we have to work
to remove these fears. During his recent meeting with
Pakistani FM Kasuri, Karzai did not accept the GOP proposal
for a series of small jirgas on separate sides of the border,
as he thinks they would have no impact on eliminating the
Taliban. Karzai's approach now seems to be to push Pakistan
to accept the large jirga and offer whatever guarantees
Islamabad needs to do so. FM Spanta described his meeting
with Karsuri as making "no progress". He described the
disagreement simply: Pakistan wants to hold a series of small
jirgas, while Afghanistan wants two cross-border jirgas, one
on each side, with participation at both representing all
Afghans and at least all Pashtuns in Pakistan (representing
all Pakistan would still be better). Spanta believes
Pakistan fears that by accepting the jirgas it would be
tacitly acknowledging its interference in Afghan internal
affairs. Their other fear is that a "Pashtunistan" concept
could develop and spread in Pakistan. Afghanistan will wait
a few days for the GOP response but understands the
importance of continuing the conversation with Pakistan,
regardless of whether the jirgas are held. According to
Spanta, Karzai was "very angry" as the Pakistanis did not
give "one inch" and believes the two countries have moved
backwards. Nevertheless, the two sides appear ready to
continue the discussion, which is beginning to get at core
issues. Interestingly, neither Karzai nor Spanta made
mention of any Pakistani willingness to move to a "national
jirga" as described reftel. END SUMMARY


2. (S) President Karzai told Ambassador Neumann December 10
that Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri asked for a separate
meeting with Karzai and FM Spanta but with none of the
Pakistani team present. Karzai said that it is apparent the
Pakistanis are really afraid of the Pashtuns. They are
"terrified" that the Pushtunistan and the Durand Line issues
will come up. The casual observation in Islamabad by UNAMA
Deputy Chris Alexander that someone is likely to raise the
subject of the Durand line has reinforced GOP fears. Karzai
said that, especially after the large Pashtun Jirga held in
Pakistan to repudiate the Taliban, the Pakistani's are afraid
of both secular and Muslim Pushtuns. Karzai also noted what
he called Pakistani fears of the Pashtun and Taliban
dominance in Quetta which appears quite separate from the
Pakistani government presence or control. Karzai said
several times that we have to work to remove Pakistani fears
and pursuade them that good relations with Afghanistan are in
their interest.


3. (S) That said, Karzai did not accept the Pakistani notion
of a series of small Jirgas. He said they would have no
impact on getting rid of the Taliban. At this point,
Karzai's approach seems to be to push the Pakistanis to
accept the big Jirga and give them whatever guarantees they
need so that their fears will not be realized. Karzai said
Afghanistan would be a guarantor and that if someone raises
the difficult issues, Karzai believes he can shut them down.
Karzai also said that with the Pashtuns in Pakistan who are
known to the Afghans, the GOA can help ensure that the Durand
Line and Pashtun issues do not come up. However, Karzai said
there are also others, particularly among the more radical
Pashtuns, with whom Afghanistan has no contact.


4. (S) Karzai noted that the Pakistanis had turned over a
document. The Afghans were working on a document (which was

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sent to the Pakistanis on December 10). Copies of both were
provided by Foreign Mininster Spanta and are being
transmitted separately.

Meeting with FM Spanta
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5. (S) Foreign Minister Spanta told Ambassador December 11
that the meeting with FM Kasuri had two parts. The first
dealt with normal conversations among Foreign Ministers on
trade transit, refugees, and the like. Two usually sensitive
issues -- the number of Indian Consulates in Afghanistan and
accusations of Afghan interference in Pakistani affairs --
did not come up. Neither did the issue of Bughti. The
second part focused on the jirgas in two separate meetings
(in addition to the one described by President Karzai),one
with the two delegations and the other with a smaller group
at the Jirga Preparatory Commission.


6. (S) Spanta said that "no progress was made", as both
sides had fully different interpretations of what was agreed
to in Washington. He said Kasuri believed the GOA would
accept a concept similar to the North Waziristan Agreement,
using smaller jirgas in different parts of Afghanistan.
Pakistan's proposal was to have the tribes that are on each
side of the border conduct jirgas "here and there", tribe by
tribe. Spanta said Pakistan wants to hold small jirgas only
in the tribal Pashtun areas of Pakistan. Kasuri suggested
that Afghanistan do the same on its side. Notables from each
country would also participate, Kasuri proposed.


7. (S) According to Spanta, Kasuri explained that Pakistan
had no tradition of jirgas, except for the Pashtun areas, and
therefore could not accept the idea of a broader national
Pashtun jirga. Spanta stressed that Afghanistan's
precondition for any jirga meeting was that all Pashtuns in
Pakistan should have a chance to participate. Spanta
summarized the disagreement -- Pakistan wants to hold a few
jirgas only on the Pakistan side, while Afghanistan wants two
cross-border jirgas, one on each side, with participation
representing all Pashtuns in Pakistan. Spanta stressed again
there was "no consensus". Spanta said that since Kasuri was
not prepared to engage on the framework of a large jirga,
Spanta did not surface his fallback position of accepting
national representation from Afghanistan and only Pashtun
representation from Pakistan.


8. (S) Spanta said the GOA gave its written proposal to
Pakistan on December 10. Pakistan's initial response was
that it was not the idea agreed to in Washington, i.e., a
national jirga outside the tribal context. The GOP
counter-proposed multiple tribal meetings. Ambassador
Neumann recalled his understanding was that two common jirgas
was the agreement, so that each side would have a chance to
host, but the size and representation was not discussed in
Washington. Spanta believed that Pakistan was afraid of two
things. First, Pakistan feared the actual realization of the
jirgas because agreeing to hold them would indicate Pakistani
acknowledgement of its inteference in Afghan affairs. It was
late in coming, but the GOP has now recognized this point.
Second, the GOP was afraid that the concept of Pashtunistan
could develop its own dynamic and spread in Pakistan. Spanta
reassured the Ambassador that the GOA had no interest in this
happening.


9. (S) In terms of next steps, Spanta said that the GOA
would wait a few days for the Pakistani response to its
proposal. Spanta stressed the importance of continuing the
conversation with Pakistan, even though he expects much
criticism if the jirgas don't materialize. He said
Afghanistan would continue the intelligence exchange,
economic discussions, tripartite military talks, and other
bilateral exchanges regardless of what happens with the
jirgas. He indicated that Afghanistan plans to be more

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focused on crisis management, for example, by discussing more
proactively with the international community how to deal with
the issue of interference in Afghanistan's affairs by other
countries. He believes that the GOA was not active enough on
that front as it was too focused on the jirgas.


10. (S) Spanta said that earlier he had a long conversation
with the Pakistani Ambassador who fully agreed with the
concept of holding two full jirgas, so he was surprised that
the Pakistani side could not accept that this was the
proposal agreed upon in Washington. Spanta said that
President Karzai was "very angry" as he did not see "one
inch" from Pakistan, and believes the two countries have
moved backwards.

COMMENT
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11. (S) The perceptions of the two sides are radically
different. Some of the Afghan view derives from their belief
that the jirgas need to happen soon. This is because all
intelligence predicts a major Taliban offensive in the
Spring/Summer controlled from Pakistan. Karzai believes the
only way this can be averted or mitigated is by action in
Pakistan and that the massive tribal repudiation of violence
is the tool most likely to achieve the desired result. While
the Pakistani proposal to work through several small tribal
meetings could conceivably reach its culmination in something
larger, that would not happen within the time needed to head
off the summer offensive. Given the suspicious nature of the
relationship, Karzai naturally assumes the worst intentions
behind GOP actions. And, suspicions aside, as things now
stand the offensive will come and it will be directed from
inside Pakistan.


12. (S) The good news is that the two sides are holding
detailed discussions and slowly getting to the core of their
differences, which are rooted in (mis)perceptions as much as
politics. The two proposals, however, need more time to play
out, and the GOA's target date of January appears unlikely to
be met. If different interpretations of the Washington
agreement persist, we may need to revisit with both sides the
original concept and motivation that led to the agreement in
Washington. Ambassador Neumann recalls that two cross-border
jirgas were agreed to, in order that each side would have an
opportunity to host. Meanwhile, we will continue to press
the GOA to work with Islamabad on a mutually acceptable
formula for the jirgas and support the GOA's willingness to
continue to engage the GOP at multiple levels.


13. (S) Regarding reftel comment that a national jirga would
include Pakistanis like MMA leader Fazel Rehman, Karzai has
said explicitly that the latter should be present. END
COMMENT


NEUMANN