Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL5751
2006-12-09 11:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:
DEC 6 PAG: NAC SHOULD TEST MUSA QALA
how-toVZCZCXRO0975 OO RUEHDBU DE RUEHBUL #5751/01 3431107 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 091107Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4659 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3363
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005751
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC PASS TO NSA FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: DEC 6 PAG: NAC SHOULD TEST MUSA QALA
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005751
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC PASS TO NSA FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: DEC 6 PAG: NAC SHOULD TEST MUSA QALA
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) The December 6 PAG continued to negotiate the tests
necessary to determine whether Musa Qala district is
operating under the control of the central government. A new
document was issued but remains flawed as it still misses the
essential ingredient needed to test the agreement )- a small
force of ANP from outside Musa Qala that would be stationed
in the district.
2. (C) COMISAF Richards pushed there (but may now be
shifting) to test the agreement against the 14 points agreed
to between the Governor and the tribal elders, rather than
against the larger question of whether or not central
authority has been established. This question is essential
and larger than whether the terms of the Musa Qala agreement
itself are being complied with.
3. (C) COMISAF Richards, view is that in testing the
agreement by stationing forces from outside the district, we
would be violating the agreement, specifically point 3 which
refers to &using locally recruited police8 to maintain
security. He argues that if we are going to violate the
agreement, President Karzai will need to be consulted, the
locals will have to be acclimatized to build up confidence,
and we would need to sequence the test with practical steps.
This approach seems reasonable but we believe it needs to be
done by January 15 or the end of ISAF IX at the lastest.
Test 2 (right to transit the town and 5KM radius zone) should
be completed by December 31 as called for in the PAG
proposal, although the full sixty Musa Qala ANAP will
probably not be finished training and in place until January
11. Of course, if Test 2 fails, then Test 3 (stationing an
outside force) is unnecessary as the agreement itself will
have failed.
4. (C) Without a small, permanent outside security force, we
will not be able to lay to rest the question of whether the
agreement has created a secure base for the Taliban and drug
traffickers. Other districts are beginning to look at Musa
Qala as a model for similar arrangements. Musa Qala thus
becomes a political issue that cannot be confined to just
this agreement. If we create a situation where the GOA can
only enter the district under the terms of the agreement,
then we are setting up a very different kind of state. The
Ambassador has been pressing the above line of argument hard
with General Richards, ISAF staff, President Karzai, and
other key players. Karzai seems to agree but has not forced
the issue.
5. (C) In a further exchange between General Richards and
Ambassador Neumann, Richards said he was willing to try to
add the "third test" of outside forces during ISAF IX. That
issue has been referred back to ISAF staff. We do not/not
count this as an absolute commitment; ISAF has to come up
with a course of action and the decision will still have to
go to Karzai. We will keep pressing. Failing progress in
another week or two, we should consider whether discussion in
capitals or the NAC would be useful.
6. (SBU) Text of PAG Proposal on Musa Qala (dated December 5,
distributed at December 6 PAG):
Begin Text:
PROPOSAL FOR TESTING THE MUSA QALA AGREEMENT
ISSUE
1. The PAG tasked the IACT to develop tests for the Musa
Qala (MSQ) Agreement.
DEADLINE
2. This proposal is to be delivered to the PAG on Wed 6 Dec
KABUL 00005751 002 OF 003
06. Tests are to be implemented by 31 Dec 06.
RECOMMENDATION
3. Test 1. The MOI is to confirm to the PAG, through the
IACT, that Point 3 of the Agreement has been met by ensuring
that law and order is being maintained in the town of MSQ,
wihtin the agreement zone of 5km from the District Centre,
through the use of locally recruited and properly led members
of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police under the overall
command of the ANP Provincial Chief of Police. This process
is to be supported by the ANA and ISAF as necessary.
4. Test 2. ANP/ANA/ISAF are to confirm to the PAG, through
IACT, that Point 9 of the Agreement has been met by testing
their right to transit the town of MSQ and surrounding 5km
zone with a force from outside MSQ. This force should remain
in the zone for a length of time sufficient to prove it has
freedom of maneuvre.
5. Wider Progress. In addition, and also by 31 Dec, the
IACT, assisted as appropriate by Governor Daud, NDS, MOI,
MOD, MOE, MRRD, UNAMA, and ISAF, as well as the MSQ tribal
elders, is to produce a report for the PAG on wider progress
against the other points in the Musa Qala Agreement. Any
shortcomings are to be explained and solutions offered.
6. Reporting Responsibility. The implementation of the
tests is to be undertaken by MOI, assisted by those actors
detailed above. Reports on progress against the tests are to
be made to the IACT. The main report is to be briefed by the
IACT and MOI to the PAG immediately following 31 Dec.
BACKGROUND
7. The aim is to test the effectiveness of the MSQ
agreement, specifically the actions of the MSQ elders against
their responsibilities as set out in the agreement. It is
not intended to impose a higher standard of performance than
is expecte elsewhere in the country. Nor is this test
intended to examine the separate, though related issue, of a
determination of the consequences of the agreement, in terms
of gains and losses for GOA, local people and IC on one side
and the insurgents, criminals and opponents of GOA on the
other side.
8. The test must focus on issues which can reasonably be
measured objectively and which also show the actions and
intent of the MSQ elders. Issues, which can not be properly
assessed or do not reflect the actions of the MSQ elders,
will not be part of the test, though they remain important
parts of the agreement.
9. It will be important to gather not only factual evidence,
but also the context and reasons behind the evidence, in
order to determine whether the credit or fault for any
particular action lies with the MSQ elders or an external
actor.
10. There is some confusion about the exact details of the
agreement, which has not been distributed freely; partly from
translation between Pashtu and English and also because
different versions of the agreement have arisen from copying.
There are also reports of additional agreements and clauses.
A key condition, which is not specified below but is
mutually accepted, is tha the agreement applies to the area
within 5km of the District Centre: MSQ elders are responsible
for security and actively within this limit; ANA and ANP can
operate within this limit (though none are currently there);
ISAF forces remain and operate freely outside of this limit
but may transit through it. The version below is that
distributed to the PAG and the one that should be tested.
11. Terms of the Agreement. Listed below is HQ ISAF's
understanding of the 14 points on which the agreement is
KABUL 00005751 003 OF 003
based. It demands that the Musa Qala local administration:
i) Run all offices under the flag of the Government of
Afghanistan to serve the people of the district.
ii) Try their best to avoid illegal acts and follow the
Afghan constitution.
iii) Prefer to maintain security and law and order in the
district and avoid any disturbance of security using locally
recruited police who should become members of the Afghan
National Auxiliary Police and be under the overall command of
the ANP Provincial Chief of Police.
iv) Play a positive role in support of development and
reconstruction.
v) Collect according to government regulations local
electricity, transport and bazaar taxes and will propose to
the Provincial government how to spend it.
vi) Try to keep open all schools.
vii) Facilitate free movement of equipment from GoA, security
companies and NGOs.
viii) Keep open the main roads.
ix) Guarantee the transit of national and international
forces.
x) Not allow by any means the use of the district to attack
other districts or establish bases.
xi) Not allow any armed person to walk or travel in the
center of town (except local administration police).
xii) Facilitate the return of IDPs and NGOs to support them.
xiii)Require the approval of the Governor for all local
administration staff appointments.
xiv) Adjust terms and conditions by mutual agreement only.
End Text.
NEUMANN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC PASS TO NSA FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: DEC 6 PAG: NAC SHOULD TEST MUSA QALA
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C) The December 6 PAG continued to negotiate the tests
necessary to determine whether Musa Qala district is
operating under the control of the central government. A new
document was issued but remains flawed as it still misses the
essential ingredient needed to test the agreement )- a small
force of ANP from outside Musa Qala that would be stationed
in the district.
2. (C) COMISAF Richards pushed there (but may now be
shifting) to test the agreement against the 14 points agreed
to between the Governor and the tribal elders, rather than
against the larger question of whether or not central
authority has been established. This question is essential
and larger than whether the terms of the Musa Qala agreement
itself are being complied with.
3. (C) COMISAF Richards, view is that in testing the
agreement by stationing forces from outside the district, we
would be violating the agreement, specifically point 3 which
refers to &using locally recruited police8 to maintain
security. He argues that if we are going to violate the
agreement, President Karzai will need to be consulted, the
locals will have to be acclimatized to build up confidence,
and we would need to sequence the test with practical steps.
This approach seems reasonable but we believe it needs to be
done by January 15 or the end of ISAF IX at the lastest.
Test 2 (right to transit the town and 5KM radius zone) should
be completed by December 31 as called for in the PAG
proposal, although the full sixty Musa Qala ANAP will
probably not be finished training and in place until January
11. Of course, if Test 2 fails, then Test 3 (stationing an
outside force) is unnecessary as the agreement itself will
have failed.
4. (C) Without a small, permanent outside security force, we
will not be able to lay to rest the question of whether the
agreement has created a secure base for the Taliban and drug
traffickers. Other districts are beginning to look at Musa
Qala as a model for similar arrangements. Musa Qala thus
becomes a political issue that cannot be confined to just
this agreement. If we create a situation where the GOA can
only enter the district under the terms of the agreement,
then we are setting up a very different kind of state. The
Ambassador has been pressing the above line of argument hard
with General Richards, ISAF staff, President Karzai, and
other key players. Karzai seems to agree but has not forced
the issue.
5. (C) In a further exchange between General Richards and
Ambassador Neumann, Richards said he was willing to try to
add the "third test" of outside forces during ISAF IX. That
issue has been referred back to ISAF staff. We do not/not
count this as an absolute commitment; ISAF has to come up
with a course of action and the decision will still have to
go to Karzai. We will keep pressing. Failing progress in
another week or two, we should consider whether discussion in
capitals or the NAC would be useful.
6. (SBU) Text of PAG Proposal on Musa Qala (dated December 5,
distributed at December 6 PAG):
Begin Text:
PROPOSAL FOR TESTING THE MUSA QALA AGREEMENT
ISSUE
1. The PAG tasked the IACT to develop tests for the Musa
Qala (MSQ) Agreement.
DEADLINE
2. This proposal is to be delivered to the PAG on Wed 6 Dec
KABUL 00005751 002 OF 003
06. Tests are to be implemented by 31 Dec 06.
RECOMMENDATION
3. Test 1. The MOI is to confirm to the PAG, through the
IACT, that Point 3 of the Agreement has been met by ensuring
that law and order is being maintained in the town of MSQ,
wihtin the agreement zone of 5km from the District Centre,
through the use of locally recruited and properly led members
of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police under the overall
command of the ANP Provincial Chief of Police. This process
is to be supported by the ANA and ISAF as necessary.
4. Test 2. ANP/ANA/ISAF are to confirm to the PAG, through
IACT, that Point 9 of the Agreement has been met by testing
their right to transit the town of MSQ and surrounding 5km
zone with a force from outside MSQ. This force should remain
in the zone for a length of time sufficient to prove it has
freedom of maneuvre.
5. Wider Progress. In addition, and also by 31 Dec, the
IACT, assisted as appropriate by Governor Daud, NDS, MOI,
MOD, MOE, MRRD, UNAMA, and ISAF, as well as the MSQ tribal
elders, is to produce a report for the PAG on wider progress
against the other points in the Musa Qala Agreement. Any
shortcomings are to be explained and solutions offered.
6. Reporting Responsibility. The implementation of the
tests is to be undertaken by MOI, assisted by those actors
detailed above. Reports on progress against the tests are to
be made to the IACT. The main report is to be briefed by the
IACT and MOI to the PAG immediately following 31 Dec.
BACKGROUND
7. The aim is to test the effectiveness of the MSQ
agreement, specifically the actions of the MSQ elders against
their responsibilities as set out in the agreement. It is
not intended to impose a higher standard of performance than
is expecte elsewhere in the country. Nor is this test
intended to examine the separate, though related issue, of a
determination of the consequences of the agreement, in terms
of gains and losses for GOA, local people and IC on one side
and the insurgents, criminals and opponents of GOA on the
other side.
8. The test must focus on issues which can reasonably be
measured objectively and which also show the actions and
intent of the MSQ elders. Issues, which can not be properly
assessed or do not reflect the actions of the MSQ elders,
will not be part of the test, though they remain important
parts of the agreement.
9. It will be important to gather not only factual evidence,
but also the context and reasons behind the evidence, in
order to determine whether the credit or fault for any
particular action lies with the MSQ elders or an external
actor.
10. There is some confusion about the exact details of the
agreement, which has not been distributed freely; partly from
translation between Pashtu and English and also because
different versions of the agreement have arisen from copying.
There are also reports of additional agreements and clauses.
A key condition, which is not specified below but is
mutually accepted, is tha the agreement applies to the area
within 5km of the District Centre: MSQ elders are responsible
for security and actively within this limit; ANA and ANP can
operate within this limit (though none are currently there);
ISAF forces remain and operate freely outside of this limit
but may transit through it. The version below is that
distributed to the PAG and the one that should be tested.
11. Terms of the Agreement. Listed below is HQ ISAF's
understanding of the 14 points on which the agreement is
KABUL 00005751 003 OF 003
based. It demands that the Musa Qala local administration:
i) Run all offices under the flag of the Government of
Afghanistan to serve the people of the district.
ii) Try their best to avoid illegal acts and follow the
Afghan constitution.
iii) Prefer to maintain security and law and order in the
district and avoid any disturbance of security using locally
recruited police who should become members of the Afghan
National Auxiliary Police and be under the overall command of
the ANP Provincial Chief of Police.
iv) Play a positive role in support of development and
reconstruction.
v) Collect according to government regulations local
electricity, transport and bazaar taxes and will propose to
the Provincial government how to spend it.
vi) Try to keep open all schools.
vii) Facilitate free movement of equipment from GoA, security
companies and NGOs.
viii) Keep open the main roads.
ix) Guarantee the transit of national and international
forces.
x) Not allow by any means the use of the district to attack
other districts or establish bases.
xi) Not allow any armed person to walk or travel in the
center of town (except local administration police).
xii) Facilitate the return of IDPs and NGOs to support them.
xiii)Require the approval of the Governor for all local
administration staff appointments.
xiv) Adjust terms and conditions by mutual agreement only.
End Text.
NEUMANN