KHOST SECURITY AGREEMENT NOT LIKE MUSA QALA:

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 005734

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB,
S/CT, EUR/RPM,INL/FO
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO EAID PGOV AF
SUBJECT: KHOST SECURITY AGREEMENT NOT LIKE MUSA QALA:
AMBASSADOR NEUMANN'S NOVEMBER 25 MEETING WITH KHOST
GOVERNOR JAMAL

REF: A. KABUL 5604

B. KABUL 5435

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann; reasons 1.4(
b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Governor Jamal underlined that the November
23 Khost Security Resolution was "totally different" from the
Musa Qala agreement, and that there was nothing in the
resolution that would limit the operation of ISAF/Coalition
forces or Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). He asked
when USG-funded construction on the Khost-Gardez road would
begin. The Ambassador explained that funding for the
construction was available, but that some additional
sub-contracting and surveying were required. Governor Jamal
asked whether it would be possible for the USG to identify
specific U.S. development funding that the Khost provincial
government could co-manage with USG counterparts. He said
that the Afghan Border Police (ABP) deployed in Khost faced
significant equipment shortages, and concurred with the need
to respect tribal/ethnic balance in ANAP recruitment.
Governor Jamal expressed concern that some operations by
Coalition Forces (CF) -- specifically, the apprehension of
terrorist suspects -- were not properly coordinated with
Afghan officials. End Summary.


2. (U) Ambassador Neumann met with Khost provincial Governor
Arsala Jamal at the Governor,s compound in Khost City on
November 25. MG Freakley (CJTF-76),MG Layfield (ISAF
DCOM-Security),and Carl Rahmaan (D/USAID Mission Director)
accompanied the Ambassador. Afghan Minister of
Communications Engineer Amirzai Sangin also was present
during lunch.

--------------
Khost Security Resolution
--------------


3. (SBU) The Ambassador asked Governor Jamal about the Khost
Security Resolution signed by provincial tribal elders and
religious leaders on November 23 (reftel A). Jamal
underlined that the resolution was "totally different" from
the Musa Qala agreement, and that there was nothing in the
resolution that would limit the operation of ISAF/Coalition
forces or Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The
Ambassador encouraged Jamal to explain to the media why the
Khost resolution was different than the Musa Qala agreement,
observing that the Khost resolution draws the local people
closer to the GOA in working to improve security, rather than
creating more distance (as in the Musa Qala arrangement).
The Governor indicated that he already was reaching out to
the media on the issue, including the BBC.


4. (SBU) Governor Jamal thanked the Ambassador for his visit
to Khost, saying that such visits are important for boosting
the confidence of the people of the province in the face of
the difficult security situation. He said that he had held a
number of security-related jirgas, emphasizing that suicide
bombings are contrary to Islam. Jamal suggested that these
efforts had borne fruit, citing an example in which locals
identified and surrounded a would-be suicide bomber who ended
up detonating his bomb-laden vest (killing only himself),
rather than surrender. The Governor also mentioned another
recent case in which locals had alerted ANSF to someone who
was seeking to plant a mine in a mosque. He added that
province officials were doing quite well in locating IEDs
prior to attacks.

--------------
Khost-Gardez Road
--------------


5. (SBU) Governor Jamal asked when USG-funded construction on
the Khost-Gardez road would begin, lamenting that "everywhere

KABUL 00005734 002 OF 004


other provinces are getting roads -- we hope construction on
this road will begin in 2007." The Ambassador explained that
funding was available, but that some additional
sub-contracting and surveying would be required before work
could begin in 2007. Jamal said that, due to snow, it would
not be possible to begin construction from the Gardez end of
the road until late April; however, weather would present no
barrier to beginning construction on the Khost end. At the
Ambassador's quest, USAID agreed to provide monthly status
reports on the road that could be conveyed to the people by
the Khost government.

--------------
Reconstruction/Development Funding
--------------


6. (SBU) In the context of discussing the Khost-Gardez road
project, Governor Jamal said that he had been considering
trying to support some smaller projects that would complement
the construction of the road. He wondered whether it would
be possible for the Provincial Development Council (PDC) to
use Governor,s funds for such a purpose. The Ambassador
commented that the idea was an interesting one, but that the
GOA budget machinery might not be flexible enough to support
such an effort. Deputy USAID Mission Director Rahmaan
reported that the Ministry of Finance was planning pilot
projects in three provinces aimed at increasing the GOA,s
ability to extend such funding resources more effectively
into the provinces, but that these pilot projects probably
would not be funded in the current budget year.


7. (SBU) Continuing on the funding theme, Governor Jamal said
that he had been thinking of establishing a special kind of
Governor,s fund, similar to the CERP funds used by U.S.
PRTs, that would allow him to support quick impact projects.
He remarked that the people of Khost currently go directly to
the PRT to request project support, which, he observed, does
not increase the authority of the GOA. He asked whether it
would be possible for the USG to identify specific U.S.
funding that the Khost provincial government could co-manage
with USG counterparts. Jamal emphasized that this would help
to put an "Afghan face" on the projects while enhancing the
image and the budget planning skills of the PDC.


8. (SBU) The Ambassador explained that much work was ongoing
to try to make the GOA more responsive to PDC funding needs.
He encouraged Jamal to contribute to defining a way forward,
based on an Afghan model that would be sustainable. MG
Freakley said that limitations on CERP fund authorities would
not allow for the transfer of CERP fund control to the Khost
government. However, the PRT could work in support of the
Governor, coordinating closely on near-term priorities
identified by the PDC.

--------------
Governor Says ABP in Khost Lack Equipment
--------------


9. (S) Referring to notes, Governor Jamal said that the
Afghan Border Police (ABP) deployed in Khost faced the
following equipment shortages:

-- 373 AK-47s
-- 94 PK machine guns
-- 74 RPGs
-- 990 RPG rounds (out of 1,000 requested, only ten were
received)
-- 47 trucks

(CSTC-A Comment: A solution is in sight. There is one
inaccuracy in which CSTC-A only shows a shortage of 14 RPGs.
CSTC-A expects that the shortages in AK-47s, RPGs, RPG
ammunition and Light Tactical Vehicles will be partially
addressed by the end of December. CSTC-A is starting to

KABUL 00005734 003 OF 004


realize a tremendous influx of equipment due to the recently
committed additional USG funds. Nationwide ANP equipment
shortages will begin to be addressed in the immediate future
and the following equipment will be provided in December to
the 2nd ABP Brigade in Khost: 200 AK-47s, 5 RPGs, and 30
more trucks. Ammunition is constantly ordered and supplied,
and shortages or surpluses vary from day to day. End CSTC-A
Comment)


10. (S) Jamal said that he had written a letter to the MOI
outlining these shortages, but that thus far there had been
no response. He went on to mention that, three days before
the Eid-al-Fitr holiday, nearly the entire ABP force in Khost
deserted their posts. (Comment: The actual number of ABP
desertions in Khost was somewhere in the neighborhood of 20
percent, and the majority subsequently returned; see also
reftel B. End Comment) The Ambassador remarked that he had
heard this was partially the result of a conflict between the
Khost ABP Commander and the Commander,s Deputy. Jamal
replied that the real problem was the equipment shortages,
arguing that, "if I have a poorly-functioning AK-47 and only
60 bullets, I will not stay at my ABP post, no matter how
good my commander is." (CSTC-A Comment: The 2nd ABP Brigade
in Khost has over 400,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, with
50,000 more rounds scheduled to be delivered in December, and
112,000 rounds of pistol ammunition -- which is 150 percent
of the authorized amount. End CSTC-A Comment)


11. (C) MG Freakley said he would get a full list of the
equipment needs from the Provincial Coordination Committee
(PCC) and would work on any problems. The Ambassador assured
Jamal that no one was discriminating against Khost in the
distribution of equipment, but that some shortages were
inevitable. Jamal said that he did not feel that Khost was
receiving unfair treatment, but emphasized the need for the
equipment, arguing that Khost is a province with security
challenges on a par with Kandahar and Uruzgan, given Khost,s
location.

--------------
ANAP Recruiting
--------------


12. (SBU) The Ambassador explained to Governor Jamal that the
Afghan National Auxiliary Police program currently was being
restricted to six provinces (Farah, Helmand, Kandahar,
Uruzgan, Zabul, and Ghazni). The emphasis was on quality
over quantity, with particular care to be given to ensuring
that the ANAP are recruited locally and reflect the
tribal/ethnic balance of the local area. This was to avoid
creating a "hollow force" that would only exacerbate the
security situation. Governor Jamal said that he was aware of
these issues and that Khost province was conscious of the
need for tribal balance as it conducted its ANAP recruitment.


--------------
Coordination of CF Operations
--------------


13. (C) Governor Jamal expressed concern that some operations
by Coalition Forces (CF) -- specifically, the apprehension of
terrorist suspects -- were not properly coordinated with
Afghan officials. While perhaps some operations would occur
without the knowledge of Afghan officials, "not every
operation should be that way." Jamal remarked that he does
not mind "getting calls in the middle of the night" informing
him of such operations, noting that it is easier for him to
deal with press and public queries after an operation if he
knows what happened.


14. (C) The Governor advocated involving Afghan officials,
such as National Directorate of Security (NDS) personnel, in
such operations, suggesting that they could work with the

KABUL 00005734 004 OF 004


local people to smooth things over, turning "hard knocks"
into "soft knocks". In this context, he referred to a recent
incident in which he had been informed by Afghan officials
that Coalition Forces had held NDS personnel at gunpoint to
keep them away from the scene of an ongoing operation.
NEUMANN