Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL5698
2006-12-06 01:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

MUSA QALA ELDERS RETURN TO EMBASSY TO PROVIDE

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7225
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #5698/01 3400118
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060118Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4457
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3348
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3383
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 005698 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR HARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: MUSA QALA ELDERS RETURN TO EMBASSY TO PROVIDE
ASSURANCES AND AND APPEAL FOR ASSISTANCE

REF: KABUL 5584 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 005698

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR HARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: MUSA QALA ELDERS RETURN TO EMBASSY TO PROVIDE
ASSURANCES AND AND APPEAL FOR ASSISTANCE

REF: KABUL 5584 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) Six representatives of the Musa Qala Local
Authority (LA) returned to the Embassy (Ref) on November 30
to report on recent developments and appeal for support for
development projects in the district. The elders reported on
their meeting with President Karzai on November 29, saying
they had answered his questions about murders in a
neighboring village (which they attributed to a family feud)
and impressed him with their report on the situation in Musa
Qala. They highlighted that, since the Agreement, new
district officials had replaced corrupt warlords, 20
locally-hired police were being trained by the Ministry of
Interior, four schools had opened, a government-sponsored
vaccination program had taken place in the district, and a
representative of Afghanistan's Human Rights Commission had
been welcomed in Musa Qala. They denied there were any
foreign Taliban in the district, conceded there were local
Taliban present (but denied Musa Qala was being used as a
staging area),acknowledged that a local justice system was
in operation, and admitted that only those who were willing
to submit to the locally-established judicial system were
welcome in the district. They underlined the Musa Qala
Agreement had been a reaction to violence and corruption that
was destroying their district. The spokesman for the
delegation volunteered that the LA wanted to end poppy
production but insisted eradication would not work. If the
international community would build an irrigation dam which
would allow for the production of other crops, the elders
could guarantee there would be no more poppy production.
Responding to an appeal for USG support and assistance,
PolCounselor reiterated the Ambassador's view that there must
be evidence that the Agreement would ensure there were no

Taliban in Musa Qala and that the national government is
accepted in the district. This must include authority
expressed through security arrangements as well as acceptance
of assistance through official channels. The Embassy could
not support any arrangement that operates outside
Afghanistan's constitution. As far as the U.S. is concerned,
the jury is still out. The Embassy will continue to make the
point that requiring too little from the LA in Musa Qala will
set a precedent that will weaken the central government and
undermine the war on the Taliban. In a separate meeting with
Ambassador Neumann on December 5, President Karzai showed
growing discomfort over the Musa Qala agreement as a result
of recent fighting in the area. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Meeting with President Karzai: Hard Questions and Hard Sell
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) Representatives of the Local Authority (LA) set up
under the Musa Qala Agreement who had met with PolCounselor
on November 9 (Ref) returned to Kabul to meet with President
Karzai on November 29. In their meeting at the Embassy the
following day, they reported Karzai had asked them to explain
murders in a neighboring district -- and that they had
assured the president the murders were "personal" not
political. The LA had outlined steps they had taken to
establish a local government and provide services in Musa
Qala and appealed for support -- for offices for officials,
for schools, and for weapons for the local police. The LA
authority said they felt Karzai was happy with their
explanations.

--------------
Seeking to Reassure; Looking for Assistance
--------------

KABUL 00005698 002 OF 004




3. (SBU) The spokesman for the group, Haji Sha Agha, began
the November 30 meeting with PolCounselor by outlining
progress in establishing services in Musa Qala. A new
district governor and police chief had been installed, four
schools had been opened, 20 locally-hired police and
commander were mid-way through a training program provided by
the Ministry of Interior, and a government-sponsored
vaccination program had reached all the children in the
district. He claimed a journalist and a representative of
the Afghan Human Rights Commission had visited Musa Qala, and
insisted that ISAF forces had visited the district. Asked if
the (British-led) PRT was providing any assistance, Agha said
the commander had informed him that new projects would be
provided. (Note: We understand the British are funding the
rebuilding of three mosques and may fund a road project,
possibly channeling money through the Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitation and Development but using local contractors.
Reports suggest the LA is becoming more receptive to funds
coming from international donors or ISAF, though they still
insist that it be "Afghan delivered" even to the extent of
insisting on exclusively local contractors. End Note)


4. (SBU) Agha (who had been a member of the loya jirga that
wrote the Afghan constitution) underlined that the LA was not
trying to operate under a separate legal framework. He said
a local, shura (elder)-based justice system was in operation
in Musa Qala but volunteered that it does not write its own
laws and "there are no prisoners in Musa Qala." There are
clear rules (no bribery, no forced marriages, no corruption),
and people are rewarded for turning in those who violate
them. The shura considers all complaints and deals with them
peacefully or can refer a case to the police chief. Asked
what kinds of punishments might be invoked by the shura, Agha
said they would be "appropriate." He underlined that elders'
decisions cannot be contradicted or overruled -- "not even by
the police chief." The result, he said, is a situation in
stark contrast to before the Agreement -- where "there is no
longer any corruption or injustice."


5. (SBU) Asked about the situation for women, Agha
underlined that in traditional Afghan culture, women are
protected by their families and usually do not leave the
home. He stressed the importance of protecting women from
forced marriages, asked for assistance for health services to
address women's health issues, and said "someday" it might be
possible to open schools for girls in Musa Qala. Agha dodged
the "hypothetical" question if assistance for schools would
be accepted if the condition were one school for girls being
established. He responded that local tradition has never
allowed women or girls to go out in public. Thus, for the
time being, "tradition and custom won't allow it." (Note:
The Ministry of Education confirms that there were no girls
schools operating in Musa Qala before the Agreement, so the
lack of girls schools operation at this point does not
actually represent a step backward. The fact that public
schools even for boys -- rather than only madrasses -- are
opening is offered by some as evidence of the limits of
Taliban influence. Others caution that it may be a
calculated decision. End Note)

-------------- --------------
One More Time: No to Taliban; Yes to Government Authority
-------------- --------------


6. (SBU) PolCounselor assured the delegation the Ambassador
was following the situation in Musa Qala very closely and
reiterated the criteria being used in assessing whether it
was consistent with the principles of the Afghan
constitution. There could be no Taliban governing or
influencing the governance of Musa Qala, and the local
government would have to accept the presence of central
government authority -- expressed as the presence of security
forces and acceptance of assistance through normal government

KABUL 00005698 003 OF 004


channels. It would be not enough for the LA to simply
welcome visits by government authorities; government must be
able to express its authority. The Ambassador had not said
he rejects the agreement or that the U.S. would not be
supportive. He will be monitoring the situation carefully to
see if the standards have been met.


7. (SBU) While the delegation had assured us November 9 that
there were no Taliban in Musa Qala, in this meeting they
conceded there were some Taliban present -- from the local
area. They are in several villages and they are armed, but
they are sitting quietly and "we are in control." (Comment:
The report of intense fighting between Danish ISAF forces and
Taliban outside Musa Qala overnight on December 3 may belie
this claim. The incident was reported 16 km outside of Musa
Qala, so the LA authority may claim it was outside the
exclusion zone. They may also defend the action as a result
of ISAF having breached the Agreement by its actions. End
Comment) Agha offered assurances that there are no longer
any Arabs, Chechens, or Pakistanis in the district. Asked
about reports that the Taliban are being given sanctuary in
Musa Qala and using it as a staging area for activities
elsewhere, Agha said "this is not true." He asserted such
claims came from people from the previous administration who
oppose the agreement, and insisted that "the Musa Qala
Taliban are not moving out. If we find they do so, we will
kill them on the spot."


8. (SBU) PolCounselor asked Agha what would happen if the
people from Musa Qala who opposed the agreement wanted to
return to the district. He answered that criminals --
corrupt officials who had hurt the people of the district --
would not be allowed to come back. If they had simply
opposed the agreement but were willing to live under the new
administration, they would be welcome. Agha stressed that
the Local Authority is in favor of negotiation and talks. It
wants to convince opponents and a wider audience that it is
made up of human beings committed to having a local
government that responds to the needs of the people rather
than simply trying to line its own pockets.


9. (SBU) As he had done on November 9, Agha hedged on the
question of the government's authority in the district. He
noted that the Ministry of Interior and the Governor had
approved individuals to serve as district governor and police
chief and was providing training for 20 locally-hired
auxiliary police and their commander as a unit. He asserted
that "no one else has so many doubts," and challenged the
U.S. to demonstrate the Local Authority and newly-established
officials were less satisfactory than the "warlords and
criminals that the international community had allowed to be
in office" previously. He noted that Musa Qala was the only
district in Helmand Province where school were being opened,
and he asked for U.S. help in providing services and "keeping
the criminals and destroyers out of our district." "Unlike
those with big cars, we have no interest in fighting...please
don't doubt us anymore."

--------------
Give Us a Dam and We Can Guarantee No Poppies
--------------


10. (SBU) During their November 9 meeting, PolCounselor had
pressed Agha on the issue of poppy production. This time,
Agha raised the issue, saying the LA was committed to end
poppy production but needed help. He reiterated that
counternarcotics programs now in place were not working -- in
part, he claimed, due to corruption among the local officials
and contractors the programs relied on. He drew a map to
demonstrate how an irrigation dam would allow farmers to grow
other crops and said that if the international community
would build the dam, the elders of the community could
guarantee there would be no poppy production. Asked to
clarify if the elders would have the ability to make and

KABUL 00005698 004 OF 004


guarantee compliance with an agreement to halt poppy
production, Agha answered yes, no one would dare violate an
agreement signed by the elders. This would be possible if a
dam were built. (PRT Note: Governor Daud is also pushing the
idea of an irrigation channel for the north of Helmand, and
also defending that proposal as a good way to encourage a
licit economy and stability in the province. End Note)

--------------
Karzai Uneasy
--------------

11. (C) In a December 5 meeting, President Karzai was
distinctly uneasy about the Musa Qala agreement. He noted
the recent fighting with the Danes as evidence that the area
is becoming a Taliban strong hold. He and NSC head Rassoul
continue to be bothered by the destabilizing effect the
agreement has had on other parts of Afghanistan.

--------------
Comment
--------------


12. (C) There is no doubt that contempt for the corruption,
bad governance and violence that has plagued the district was
a motivation for the Musa Qala Agreement. This does not
mean, however, that the LA meets the standards of acceptable
governance or that we are obligated to support it. We will
continue to argue that the arrangements put in place by the
Agreement can and should be tested to ensure they neither
allow for Taliban control nor prevent the assertion of
government authority. We believe we are engaged in a useful
dialogue with the leaders of the LA, that they understand our
concerns, and that they want us to believe they are being
addressed. We have made it clear that we are not yet
satisfied.


13. (C) The LA's willingness to accept assistance channeled
through line ministries is a first step in the right
direction, but does not go far enough. The jury is still out
on whether the LA will be willing to take the critical steps
needed, including accepting government security forces from
outside the district. If this and other critical steps are
taken, it would provide leverage for establishing and
enforcing higher standards for other possible agreements, as
are being proposed. The recent Agreement in Khost Province,
where elders agreed to support Afghan and international
forces in dealing with the insurgency is an example of one
which is acceptable. (The Musa Qala elders were unaware of
the Khost Agreement.) Helmand Province will continue to be a
particular challenge, but the cost of lowering the bar there
is a precedent that will further weaken the government in
Kabul and the fight against the Taliban.
NEUMANN