Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL5678
2006-12-04 11:51:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PAG NOVEMBER 30: TESTING MUSA QALA

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF MOPS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5398
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #5678/01 3381151
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041151Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4413
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3332
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005678 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF MOPS
SUBJECT: PAG NOVEMBER 30: TESTING MUSA QALA

REF: KABUL 5584

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005678

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF MOPS
SUBJECT: PAG NOVEMBER 30: TESTING MUSA QALA

REF: KABUL 5584

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (S) SUMMARY: The November 30 PAG focused on the Musa Qala
agreement and the need to reach a PAG common line. The PAG
reviewed an ISAF paper but put off any decision on it for the
following week. We think the paper does not reflect recent
intelligence showing that the Taliban are seeking to
replicate it. U.S. and ISAF intelligence analysts will
discuss the issue further. The PAG agreed to test the
agreement based upon a set of GOA-established minimum
standards or benchmarks for demonstrating government
authority which the government will prepare for the next PAG
meeting. Discussion revolved around what to include as
benchmarks, with several members cautioning against setting
too high a bar. The Ambassador pressed for an Afghan force
from outside of Musa Qala to test the agreement and for the
GOA to set its own benchmarks for whether the GOA has control
independent of the 14-point agreement between Governor Daud
and the district elders. The PAG also welcomed the creation
of a National Communications Coordination Center to bolster
the PAG strategic communications pillar. DCM confirmed that
the U.S. would provide resources for the Center. Under the
reconstruction and development pillar, Minister Atmar
explained that projects were being held up in Musa Qala, not
due to a lack of resources, but because Afghan procurement
rules require 28 days for tender. COMISAF briefed on
preparations for the Kandahar PAG which is intended to bring
the message to the people that the GOA is focused on the
problems in the South. END SUMMARY

Testing Musa Qala: Seeking a PAG Common Line

--------------


2. (S) At the November 30 PAG, NDS provided a briefing on
the current security situation in the south, focusing on Musa
Qala. NDS presented a mixed picture of increased insurgent
activity in the South combined with an uneasy ceasefire in
Musa Qala where the situation appears to be relatively
peaceful but at the expense of GOA authority.


3. (S) COMISAF Richards called for the PAG to issue a common
line on the Musa Qala agreement and circulated a paper for
endorsement at next week,s PAG meeting. Richards stressed
the necessity of having a common PAG view because there were
&those who were trying to undermine it prematurely8. He
reported that 60 recruits from Musa Qala were now in ANAP
training and would be reporting for duty there by the end of
December, &doing what we and President Karzai want them to
do8. Richards urged the PAG to let the agreement run a bit
longer, test it, and then decide. Richards added that he
thought the first force of auxiliary police from
inside/inside Musa Qala would be ready by the end of
December.


4. (S) The Ambassador reminded the PAG that President Karzai
had previously stated that we need to test the agreement. He
said the PAG should therefore do so in a clear and
transparent manner and make its decision public. If the
police force going into the district is from Musa Qala, that
is acceptable in part, but it should also include some
outsiders with arms, representing the authority of the
national government, e.g., ANP officers, the Ambassador
argued. He said we had to be absolutely clear that we had
tested it to demonstrate that it was truly &national8. The
Ambassador reiterated the need to augment the ANAP in some
manner with those from outside the district. He said it may
take some time for this to be decided, since the individuals
need to be acceptable to the people of Musa Qala (e.g., not
members of a tribal faction with which they were fighting
previously),but the key element needs to be clear external
presence. If ISAF is six kilometers out, but the Taliban are
circling one kilometer inside, then the PAG will need to
reserve judgment, he cautioned. The Canadian Ambassador

KABUL 00005678 002 OF 002


agreed and added that since the ANAP are not a force onto
themselves, ANP from outside Musa Qala will need to lead the
ANAP force.


5. (S) The MOI Deputy Minister explained that the District
Police Chief had already been appointed and was from Musa
Qala. MOI was now waiting for the list of ANAP recruits from
the elders. COMISAF Richards said the process would take
three weeks, which meant that we could test the agreement at
the end of December and take one month to &prove it8. The
EU suggested that the PAG should set a bar, but one not too
high compared to other districts. Education Minister Atmar,
who was chairing the PAG, proposed that the key benchmark
should be &who rules the district8. Other benchmarks would
include the judge, police chief, and district administrator,
he said while noting that not all districts have judges of
their own and this might be asking that Musa Qala reach a
level other districts can't. Presidential Palace Chief of
Staff Jawed Ludin added that another benchmark should be when
the Governor would be able to visit the district.


6. (S) The Ambassador emphasized the importance of setting a
minimum standard that would enable us to determine that GOA
national authority had been established and urged that this
be decided upon at the next PAG meeting based on GOA
developed minimum indicators to demonstrate authority, which
should not be excessive. Minister Atmar agreed that a set of
minimum benchmarks would be developed for the next PAG
meeting.


7. (S) Richards said that the PAG needed to look at the
14-point agreement between the Governor and the elders as our
reference point. The Ambassador said he hoped Richards was
not asserting that the GOA cannot test the agreement outside
the 14 points or that any action not covered by the agreement
needed to be negotiated. If that was the case, then we would
be giving quasi-sovereignty to individual districts.


NEUMANN