Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL559
2006-02-08 11:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRT/GHAZNI:NAWA, GHAZNI'S LOST DISTRICT

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER KDEM PINR AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000559 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR QUINN, S/CT, SA/A
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KDEM PINR AF
SUBJECT: PRT/GHAZNI:NAWA, GHAZNI'S LOST DISTRICT

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Mary Townswick for reasons
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000559

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR QUINN, S/CT, SA/A
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KDEM PINR AF
SUBJECT: PRT/GHAZNI:NAWA, GHAZNI'S LOST DISTRICT

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Mary Townswick for reasons 1.
4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Geographically isolated and largely ignored
by the Afghan government and the international community, the
southern district of Nawa is one of Ghazni's most troubled
security environments and is vulnerable to infiltration by
anti-government forces from neighboring Paktika and Zabul
provinces. The government's presence in Nawa is limited to
an embattled police chief who has one vehicle and 29
untrained police, and a district governor too frightened to
travel back and forth between Nawa and Ghazni City. Nawa is
a weak link in the front between relatively stable Ghazni and
the more volatile environments of Logar, Paktia and Paktika
to the east. In order to bring the district into the fold of
the central government, a coordinated security and
development effort by the provincial government, PRT Ghazni,
and the maneuver force responsible for southern Ghazni is
needed. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) PRT Ghazni has made several trips to Nawa in recent
months, and thus has spent far more time there than Ghazni's
provincial officials. Most recently, the PRT and the
maneuver unit responsible for security in southern Ghazni met
in Nawa on January 21-22 to receive an air drop of
humanitarian supplies, which are intended to be stored in the
district government center for distribution to needy families
over the course of the winter. The PRT's Police Training and
Assessment Team (PTAT) distributed weapons and clothing to
the Nawa police in fall 2005, and the PRT is improving the
main 40-kilometer access road from Gelan (on Route 1) to the
Nawa district center, but has not initiated other projects
due to security concerns and lack of an adequate government
presence to work with.

CONTEXT
=======


3. (U) Nawa District Center is about a five-hour drive
southeast from Ghazni in good conditions. About an hour of
that drive is along paved Route 1; the remainder is on a dirt

road which passes through Nawa District Center and continues
on to Waza Khwa in Paktika Province. The road is the only
good route into Nawa. Nawa covers approximately 3,300 square
kilometers (14 percent of Ghazni's land mass) and has a
population of about 48,000 (19 percent of the Ghazni total).
The population is almost exclusively Pashtuns from the Taraki
tribe, which is also the dominant tribe in Gelan district to
the north. Nawa, which is connected to the rest of Ghazni by
a narrow neck of land, borders Paktika province to the east
and Zabul province to the south and west; it has much in
common with these provinces, which are primarily Pashtun and
more tribal in structure than ethnically mixed and generally
more stable Ghazni.

HEALTH & EDUCATION
==================


4. (U) Nawa has several schools, but at the time of the
PRT's most recent visit, all of them were closed. Some
villagers claimed this was because of Taliban pressure;
others said it was simply because schools are closed for two
months in the winter. There is at least one report of a
school burning in Nawa, but in neighboring districts,
villagers themselves have burned schools because they did not
want their daughters educated. There are no girls' schools
in Nawa. On the health front, Nawa has one clinic adjacent
to the district center which was built by the European Union
and is staffed by one doctor. The clinic is open six days a
week and sees 30-40 patients per day. Medicine and equipment
are seriously lacking, however; the doctor told us
complicated deliveries are one of his biggest problems.

SECURITY & GOVERNANCE
=====================


5. (SBU) The Provincial Government has let the problem of
Nawa simmer on a back burner, claiming the security situation
does not allow the placement of a full slate of district
officials there. Governor Sher Alam and other key officials
have never visited Nawa. Nawa Police Chief Dawlat Khan has
been in place for over three years, since he was appointed by
previous Ghazni governor Asadullah Khalid (now governor of
Kandahar). For much of those three years, he has been the
only government official there. A slate of district
officials (Education Director, Health Director, etc.) exists
for Nawa, but these officials reside in Ghazni and do no real
work because of Nawa's forbidding security environment, and
lack of appropriate office space or living quarters. A new
district governor, Ramazan, was appointed in October and
moved into the district center. He is so concerned about his
own security that he has not visited the provincial capital
once since he was appointed. Although he is from Nawa and
has a home a few villages over from the Nawa district center,
he has not slept at home in months because he is afraid of
being attacked by anti-government forces and only feels safe
at the district center under the protection of the police.


6. (C) Police Chief Dawlat Khan, who has been the only
constant government presence in the last few years and is
more influential than Ramazan, gained the favor of a
succession of U.S. maneuver commanders because of his
willingness to actively engage anti-government forces and put
his own safety on the line. He calls U.S. forces regularly
with intelligence and suggestions for operations, and then
leads the charge with his one Hilux pickup full of police,
cordoning off and searching compounds and detaining suspects.
This is in stark contrast to many other police chiefs in
Ghazni, who always seem to have an excuse for not
participating in a proposed operation. Dawlat's brother and
cousin were reported to have been killed by Taliban, which
may explain his dedication. However, concrete results of
these operations are not clear. It is difficult to assess
the intelligence value of detainees, many of whom are
subsequently released by the provincial government. Thus, it
is hard to know how useful Dawlat Khan's intelligence has
been, or whether he is using Coalition Forces to help settle
personal scores.


7. (C) On the negative side of the balance sheet, Dawlat
Khan is minimally educated and seems to employ a bandit
mentality in his relationships with villagers. PRT
representatives have heard reports from multiple sources,
including directly from Nawa residents, that Dawlat Khan
takes money and supplies from local shopkeepers with a vague
promise to pay the money back later. (NOTE: His men are
surviving on salaries of 600 Afghanis/month (about USD 12),
and he has no operating budget, so Dawlat may feel extortion
is his only option. END NOTE.) Villagers tell us that
Taliban passing through Nawa do pay for the food and services
they receive. In a meeting with PRT on January 30,
Sub-Governor Ramazan repeated many of the criticisms we have
heard of Dawlat Khan. He said Dawlat told him when he
arrived that he would be all right as long as he cooperated
with Dawlat, but if not, Dawlat would have him removed.


8. (SBU) Since winning hearts and minds is as key a part of
counter-insurgency strategy as conducting military operations
against the enemy, it may be that Dawlat Khan has reached a
point where he is doing more harm than good and is actually
deterring people from supporting the government. Dawlat was
informally appointed by Governor Asadullah, who wanted a
loyal deputy in Nawa; he was never officially approved by the
Ministry of Interior, and in recent weeks Ghazni Governor
Sher Alam and Deputy Police Chief Colonel Ali have talked of
replacing him with a more professional officer. PRT and
maneuver commanders recommended against removing him at this
time, but suggested monitoring and mentoring him more
closely.

A STRATEGY FOR NAWA
===================


9. (SBU) Although the Ghazni government feels the security
situation prohibits a full government presence at this time,
PRT has argued that the security situation is exactly why a
broader government presence is needed. Nawa residents who
are on the fence about supporting the government may be
swayed if they realize the government is aware of their
needs, and is working to improve schools, roads, and health
care. Getting the Ghazni provincial government to engage
Nawa more effectively will require a concerted effort by the
PRT and the maneuver forces responsible for Nawa.

SUJECT: PRT/GHAZNI:NAWA, GHAZNI'S LOST DISTRICT

10. (C) PRT Ghazni and maneuver Task Force Fury are
requesting air support to fly Governor Sher Alam and other
key provincial officials to Nawa in mid-February to meet with
elders and discuss what the government can do for Nawa. An
important message will be that the government (and PRT) can
and will help address Nawa's needs, but these efforts must be
in tandem with improving security and the denial of shelter
to anti-government forces. This visit could kick off a more
robust government program for Nawa. PRT will continue to
push for positioning at least a handful of district officials
(perhaps health and education directors) in Nawa, and will
encourage the government to develop Sub-Governor Ramazan as
an effective district leader. Governor Sher Alam is already
beginning to focus on the security situation in Nawa, and is
proposing operations there.


11. (SBU) Another key piece of the government campaign
should be professionalizing the police force in Nawa -
whether this means removing Dawlat Khan or training and
mentoring him to be more effective. The PRT is pursuing the
idea of a dedicated, 150-person police training course for
Ghazni at the Gardez Regional Training Center; some of these
trained police should be pushed out to Nawa.
NEUMANN