MUSA QALA AGREEMENT: OPPOSING INTERESTS AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 KABUL 005584

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, SCA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR HARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MARR EAID AF
SUBJECT: MUSA QALA AGREEMENT: OPPOSING INTERESTS AND
OPPOSING VIEWS, BUT ONE WAY FORWARD

REF: A. KABUL 4369

B. KABUL 5388

C. KABUL 5399

D. KABUL 5442

E. KABUL 5452

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Two delegations of Helmand Province
elders and residents affected by the Musa Qala Agreement,
each reflecting opposing forces fighting for control of the
district, offered PolCounselor and Lashkar Gah PRTOFF very
different assessments of the impact of the Agreement. The
first group, representing the Local Administration (LA)
established by the Agreement, were adamant that no Taliban
remained in Musa Qala. They defended Governor Daud, said
they would welcome development assistance, training for their
locally-established police force, and visits by outside
government authorities. They would not commit to deferring
to central government authority, accepting other than
locally-hired security forces, or supporting eradication (and
particularly spraying) as a means to address the poppy
problem in Helmand. The second group, some of whom were
former Musa Qala officials who claimed to have been driven
out of town for opposing the Agreement, asserted the LA
represented the interests of smugglers and drug lords and
operated at the pleasure of the Taliban. They hold Governor
Daud responsible for the Agreement and demanded his
dismissal. They claimed to welcome poppy eradication and the
return of ISAF (they specified U.S. Forces) and central
government authority. They share what they see as President
Karzai's view -- that the preferred solution to Helmand's
problems would be the return of former Governor of Helmand
(and warlord) Sher Mohammed.


2. (S) Senior UNAMA and EU officials argue the LA should be
given the opportunity to prove it can hold the Taliban at
bay. They support testing the LA's willingness to accept
central government authority, but also highlight Taliban
violence, tribal warfare, and the absence of any effective
governance in Musa Qala prior to the Agreement. There are
mixed views within the GOA itself. There is concern,
expressed by President Karzai personally (Ref B),that the
Agreement gives poppy growers the time they needed to get
this year's crop in the ground. We continue to argue against
further agreements until it is established that the Musa Qala
Agreement will not lead either to expanded Taliban influence
or greater resistance to central government authority. This
includes the introduction of outside security forces.
Assistance channeled through official channels will also
reinforce central government authority. Meanwhile, an
agreement approved by tribal leaders in Khost Province on
November 23 offers potentially another model, whereby the
local population works with Afghan security forces to deflect
Taliban influence (Septel). End Summary.

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Two Delegations and Two Stories from Musa Qala
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3. (SBU) On November 9 and 12 PolCounselor and Lashkar Gah
PRTOFF met with two groups of Afghans from Helmand Province
to discuss Musa Qala Agreement (Ref C). The first
delegation, representing the newly-established Local
Administration (LA) in Musa Qala, defended the agreement.
The second included officials and individuals driven from
Musa Qala as a result of their opposition to the Agreement as
well as representatives from other Helmand districts,
including three women -- one a member of the Wolesi Jirga,
another of the Helmand Provincial Council. They asked that
the Agreement be rolled back and not replicated elsewhere.
The two groups agreed that the Agreement resulted from the
inadequacy of the combined ISAF-Central Government response
in the face of the months of violence, which one elder
characterized as &bloodshed, brutality and losses.8 They

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offered different assessments of the role the Taliban is
currently playing in Musa Qala and of the steps needed to
normalize governance in the troubled district.

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Facts on the ground: Who,s really in control?
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4. (SBU) Representatives of the Local Authority (LA)
established as part of the Musa Qala Agreement (Ref C) used
their November 9 meeting at the Embassy with the PolCounselor
and Helmand PRTOff to defend the Agreement and ask for
support for local security forces and development projects.
Haji Sha Agha, who highlighted his services at Afghanistan's
constitutional jirga, spoke on behalf the ten-member
delegation. He reported strong local support for the LA,
underlined that the Afghan flag is flying over the district
center, noted that schools and mosques have opened, and
invited international community, central government
representatives, and journalists to visit Musa Qala. &Our
doors are open, our district is open.8


5. (SBU) PolCounselor underlined U.S. support for
developments consistent with the Afghan constitution and laid
out the criteria that we would use to assess the Musa Qala
Agreement. First, it must not facilitate Taliban presence or
influence in the district. Second, it must lead to
expressions of central government authority in the district
-- for example through the introduction of police drawn from
outside the district. As a complement to this second point,
assistance to the district would be channeled through the
government. The U.S. would not recognize or support an
independent local authority unwilling to accept central
government authority.


6. (SBU) Agha was adamant in assuring PolCounselor there are
currently no Taliban in Musa Qala. He said that, prior to
the Agreement, there had been two types of Taliban in the
district: foreign and local. The foreigners had been driven
out, and the local Taliban had agreed to remain outside an
exclusion zone 10 kilometers from Musa Qala. Local police,
whose wages were paid by LA members and had three weapons
between them and no vehicles, were providing security. The
district had welcomed the Governor's offer of Ministry of
Interior training for this 60-member police force and
appealed for assistance to build clinics, roads, and wells.


7. (SBU) In the November 12 meeting, Abdul Wali Kawka, the
former Chief of Police of Musa Qala speaking for the
delegation of ten who are opposed to the agreement, painted a
different picture. Kawka scoffed at assertions there is a
ten-kilometer Taliban-free zone around Musa Qala, claiming
the Taliban maintains a jail one kilometer from the district
office building and has monitors in the town. The delegation
claimed that, following the Agreement, two elders and a
mullah who had objected were beheaded, with the latter,s
body being dragged through town. They produced a packet of
receipts issued at 'toll points' set up around Musa Qala, Naw
Qala and other districts, stamped with the authority of the
"Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan." (Note: Translated text of
receipts e-mailed to SCA/A. End Note) Kawka's delegation
insisted that LA officials operate at the pleasure of the
Taliban and have no authority beyond the doors of their
homes. The three women in the delegation claimed that the
situation of women in particular had become more difficult
since the agreement. They reported they had received
telephone threats warning them not to return to Helmand from
Kabul.

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The Flag Flies, But Is The Government Welcome?
-------------- -


8. (SBU) Both groups went on record as supporting the
central government, but each had its own ideas on how the

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government should assert its authority. While reiterating
the Afghan flag flies in Musa Qala and welcoming visits,
training, and assistance, Agha made it clear the LA is not
prepared, at least at this point, to cede authority over the
police or other functions to the central government. Pressed
about whether the LA will accept security forces from outside
the district, Agha hedged. He said the LA would welcome
Ministry of Interior training for local security forces, but
resisted the idea of outside police in Musa Qala. (Note: The
first round of training for the Afghan National Auxiliary
Police has commenced in Helmand. The next two rounds are
expected to include locals from Musa Qala. End Note.) Agha
allowed that "in the long run8 the district would send its
guards to serve elsewhere and would bring outsiders in. At
this point, he said, the LA is focused on two things:
obtaining training for the local security force and working
on the &big, important project8 of negotiating with local
Taliban in the hope that, "in the long run,8 they will put
down their weapons and join the government. While the LA is
currently holding its own, it would not hesitate to call on
ISAF for assistance if that were needed.


9. (SBU) Speaking for the Agreement's opponents, Kawka
denounced not only the LA, which he described as made up of
smugglers, thieves, and drug lords, but also Governor Daud,
whom he accused of being "weak and a pro-Taliban thief."
Kawka derided the LA,s refusal to allow Afghan National
Police (ANP) in Musa Qala, and also the exclusion of ISAF and
non-Afghan assistance organizations. What is needed, he
said, is a central government authority strong enough to
stand up to the Taliban and the drug interests Kawka claimed
were backing the LA. He reported on the delegation's recent
meeting with President Karzai.

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What do these groups want for Helmand?
--------------


10. (SBU) Agha and the other representatives from the Musa
Qala LA were focused on consolidating their authority in Musa
Qala. Infusions of assistance for the locally-hired police
and social projects were their first priority. The
delegation expressed hope that other districts would follow
Musa Qala,s example. Agha claimed that he and others are
working with leaders from other districts, including Naw Zad
and Sangin. He said they have Governor Daud's support.


11. (SBU) Kawka's delegation highlighted their concern that
Musa Qala serves as a dangerous precedent for other
districts. Kawka focused on Governor Daud's role in the
process, noting that, when Governor Daud took power last
December, the government operated in all thirteen districts.
Less than a year later the government barely controls three.
Kawka's delegation was adamant that Daud must be removed.
Asked who they wanted as a replacement, they resisted
offering a name, but did outline what they were looking for.
The qualifications ("a strong figure, someone from Helmand,
drawn from the muhajadin, who would lead the battle -- show
the people how to fight8) suggest ex-Governor (and warlord
-- removed early this year at the insistence of the
international community) Sher Mohammed would be top of the
list. The delegation left a copy of the demands that they
had presented to President Karzai (see para 20 for text; copy
of original e-mailed to SCA/A). They include ISAF's return,
with Kawka saying they hoped for U.S. rather than British
troops.

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What To Do About Helmand's Poppy Problem
--------------


12. (SBU) Musa Qala is not the center of Helmand's poppy
production, but, according to the UNODC, in 2006 cultivated
6,371 hectares of opium or 9.2 percent of the poppies grown
in the province. The delegation from the newly-installed

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Local Authority acknowledged that poppy production poisons
the community, but insisted that the only effective antidote
was to build a small local irrigation dam which would allow
farmers to grow other crops. Agha rejected the possibility
of eradication, claiming it would impoverish local farmers
(and blamed spraying for poor wheat crops in the province
over the past year). Kawka's delegation painted a different
picture, at one point claiming that "those who are the LA are
just there to plant poppies." Kawka charged that part of the
earnings from poppy production made possible as a result of
the Agreement would be shared with the Taliban. The
delegation repeated to the Embassy its demand (made in the
written demarche to President Karzai) for a poppy eradication
program -- targeted at both large and small growers and
complemented by redevelopment assistance.

--------------
UNAMA and EU Views on Musa Qala
--------------


13. (SBU) UNAMA and EU officials in Kabul highlight the
violence and lack of governance in Musa Qala before the
Agreement and contrast it with the stability since. They
point to other provinces (EU Deputy Michael Semple cites
Kunar) where they say tribal leaders have an understanding
with government authority which allows them to function
largely autonomously. UNAMA Deputy SRSG Chris Alexander
urges that the LA be given time to prove it can operate
independently of the Taliban and respond to the local
community's needs. He agrees with the need to test the
Agreement, both by pressing for the introduction of Afghan
National Security forces drawn from outside Musa Qala and
also by requiring that all assistance to the district be
channeled through central and provincial government
institutions. Neither UNAMA nor the EU highlights the role
of poppy cultivation in the district.

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Comment
--------------


14. (S) Long-term tribal competition, warlord influences, the
recent Taliban insurgency, central government weaknesses,
ISAF miscalculations, and the interests of poppy growers all
contributed to the situation that led to the Musa Qala
Agreement. The situation post-Agreement is, at best,
ambiguous. While the community is enjoying relative calm,
the Afghan flag is flying, and mosques and schools
(reportedly only for boys) are opening, some assert the
Taliban are allowing these developments. On November 8,
Foreign Minister Spanta told Assistant Secretary Boucher he
was still uncertain whether the agreement was with elders or
with the Taliban (Ref E). Others ask the same question, and
there is nervousness, particularly in Kandahar Province, that
the Agreement signals a willingness on the part of the
government to make concessions to the Taliban. In a
conversation with the DCM on November 26, Deputy NSA Ibrahim
acknowledged there is an uncertainty about the Taliban's
role, but also highlighted the government's weak position.
He noted the Agreement was the result of the local community
being fed up with corrupt governance and violence, and he
expressed hope that, with support, the LA will be able to
function independently from the Taliban. Finally, while not
widely discussed, there is also concern, including on the
part of President Karzai (Ref B) that the relative calm
produced by the agreement was deliberate -- creating a window
to allow this year's poppy crop to planted.


15. (S) President Karzai is not happy with the Agreement,
but we would not be prepared to accept his alternative. He
has linked the deterioration of the security situation before
the Agreement to the removal of former Governor Sher Mohammed
and told NSA Hadley that, if the international community had
allowed it, he would have reinstalled Sher Mohammed to bring
the situation back under control (Ref B). As Governor, Sher

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Mohammed was in fact able to keep the province somewhat
quiet, but he was also a ruthless and corrupt warlord. There
was no governance presence in southern Helmand during his
period in control, and there is evidence that his
misgovernance and favoritism pushed opponents into joining or
rejoining the Taliban. While his supporters give him credit
for keeping the Taliban in check -- and blame Daud for
failing to do so, others argue that spike in Taliban activity
was a reaction to aggressive British operations earlier this
year rather than Sher Mohammed's departure. We continue to
make it clear that sending Sher Mohammed back is not an
option.


16. (S) It would be difficult to find someone acceptable to
replace Daud as Governor at this point, and that gives him
certain leverage with the central government. He is
reportedly talking to other districts about similar
arrangements, and, in a recent meeting with President Karzai,
said he would not return to Lashkar Gah until Sher Mohammed's
brother, Amir Mohammed, was removed as Deputy Governor.
Satisfied with Karzai's promise that he would do so, Daud
returned to Helmand before coming to Kabul to participate in
a meeting with Prime Minister Blair on November 20. Karzai
told Ambassador Neumann that Amir Mohammed would be removed,
but only after Karzai is able to negotiate some form of
compromise beween supporters and opponents of Sher Mohammed.


17. (S) Although Governor, Daud does not control most of the
province. The Southern border districts are currently under
Taliban control. The fact that Daud is prepared to sign Musa
Qala-like agreements in other districts in the north of the
province highlights his tenuous hold on even those areas.
Given the pressures he faces, he may find it hard to resist
doing so, but we will continue to argue that there should be
no more agreements until it has been established -- by
deliberate testing -- that the Musa Qala agreement does not
allow the Taliban authority or enhanced influence in Helmand
and that the central government will be able to assert it
authority the district -- including by the introduction by
Afghan National Security forces from outside the district.
We will look for ways to offer much needed assistance to the
community -- using government channels -- to reinforce the
importance we attach to the institutions set up under the
constitution. (Note: The UK Ambassador Evans has shared that
the British have quietly made available to the Governor funds
for the rebuilding of mosques in Musa Qala. End Note)
Finally, we will argue that Musa Qala should not be given
immunity from counternarcotics initiatives undertaken in
Helmand Province. If the Musa Qala LA is able to work within
these requirements, it could serve as a bridge toward normal
governance in the district. Meanwhile, an agreement approved
by tribal leaders from across Khost Province offers
potentially another approach whereby the local population can
work with Afghan security forces to deflect Taliban influence
(Septel).


18. (S) CFC-A Comment: The current situation in Musa Qala
could be viewed as an opportunity to test the Agreement by
increasing investment in those areas that are antithetical to
the Taliban aims ) schools for all children, clinics, roads,
government centers. Pressing ahead quickly with construction
of such facilities and confirming that the citizens really
are providing the protection as promised is one way we can be
more assured that the agreement is sound and achieving the
desired state. Governor Daud has provided a list of projects
requested by the Musa Qala Local Authority. Unfortunately,
we know of no development work by the GOA or NATO-ISAF or the
international community yet underway, since the agreement was
reached. One goal could be to separate the moderate Taliban
and their opportunistic supporters from the extreme
leadership. But there are fewer and fewer indications that
the Agreement has exposed a true seam.


19. (S) CFC-A Comment Continued: NATO-ISAF sees some
benefit of the Agreement in freeing up previously fixed UK

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forces to maneuver and fulfill other pressing operational
requirements in an AO that lacks enough forces. Regardless,
as time goes by, the agreement's larger strategic impacts beg
louder and loader for the agreement to be tested. COMISAF is
developing a plan to do so. It will likely include asking
for pressure on Governor Daud to fulfill those aspects of the
agreement not currently being enforced, and injecting
reliable security forces into the area. Current intelligence
indications point to significant Taliban presence and
influence in Musa Qala, and Musa Qala being use as a waypoint
for movement of insurgents. In a broader sense, we remain
concerned, however, that such a locally-devised agreement is
having negative strategic repercussions on President Karzai
and the GOA. Militarily, we believe the Alliance needs to
pursue a campaign that maintains pressure on the enemy. END
CFC-A COMMENT.


20. (U) What follows are the 13 demands presented to
President Karzai (as provided in English -- with some editing
to facilitate understanding) by the delegation opposed to the
Musa Qala Agreement. Begin Text:

&These are our demands of all heads of districts and Chiefs
of police to President of Afghanistan

In our opinions these are very important things and best ways
for bringing security in Helmand province which we have
mentioned below.

- Governor of Helmand province Mohammad Daud must (be)
removed from governor post.
) In those districts which have been occupied and
controlling by Talibans in during this year period, the
government should do a big operation to capture those
districts again so NATO forces and national army as well as
national police should take part together in this operation.
) The (current) Helmand Chief of Police and Chief of
Administration must be removed from posts.
) In every districts we should have fifty elders council
from different tribes. The government should provide their
expenditures.
) We should open courts in all districts to bring justice
properly and give punishment to criminals.
) The government should select as Governor and Chief of
Police as well as Chief of Administration for Helmand
province persons know the culture tradition of Helmand
people. That person should have experience about military
affairs and should have big personalities.
) Every district should have 200 police. The government
should give salary and materials to these police on the exact
time it is due. Heads and chiefs of all districts should be
responsible for selecting good persons as police.
) The NATO forces should control the border areas in Helmand
province. NATO forces should destroy the Al-Queda and
smugglers centers in border areas. NATO forces should follow
or control the areas using helicopters or aircraft in border
areas. NATO should have airbases in sandy region.
) Poppy should be eradicated in all districts. In
eradicating opium officials should not discriminate between
poor and rich persons. The government help people, including
with financial assistance and begin reconstruction in every
district.
) Helmand Province needs a trained stand-by force in
headquarters to help police in serious situation.
) There should be held in every province a session in
headquarters quarter every month. Ten elders of every
district should participate in this session to discuss all
issues. The government should compensate these elders
expenditures.
) The NATO forces and national army should take part in
every operation with national police.
) In every district there should be a propaganda department,
with clerics managing and arranging the programs. The
government should give high salaries to members of this
department.

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(Signatures of approximately 30 elders followed the text)
NEUMANN