PRESIDENT KARZAI WITH A/S BOUCHER ON SECURITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005452

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMIT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KARZAI WITH A/S BOUCHER ON SECURITY
SITUATION, JIRGAS, AND SPRAYING

REF: A. SECSTATE 182909

B. KABUL 5387

C. KABUL 5394

D. KABUL 5388

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary for South and Central
Asian Affairs Richard Boucher used his November 8 meeting
with President Karzai to report on his discussions in
Islamabad on the cross-border jirgas, and urged early direct
discussions before differences on expectations and plans
become set. Karzai agreed to begin the process, sought U.S.
views on the role of the UN, and hoped for a January-February
timeframe for the jirgas. Karzai sympathized with President
Musharraf's position relating to Waziristan and welcomed
further military strikes which would "please Afghans very
much". The Afghan Government's position on Musa Qala,
particularly that it was not a deal with the Taliban, is not
clear to many Afghans. Karzai is becoming aware of the need
to communicate better. Boucher explained ongoing U.S.
efforts to obtain greater assistance for Afghanistan which
could result in greater capacity to link military action to
reconstruction, development and governance efforts. Karzai
agreed to ground spraying in Helmand but insisted that
security come first. End Summary.

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Need for Early Discussions on Cross-Border Jirgas
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2. (S) Afghan President Karzai used his November 9 meeting
with Assistant Secretary Boucher to ask what he had heard in
Islamabad regarding Pakistan's plans for the cross border
jirgas. Boucher reviewed his November 7 discussion with
President Musharraf, noting that Pakistan was still deciding
what it wanted from the jirgas. It was considering concepts,
the scope of the meeting, participants, and what decisions to
make. Governor Orakzai is leading Pakistan's preparations,
but his focus is on a border/tribal vision rather than a
national view and thus does not represent national scope.
Boucher said the Pakistani side was still working this out
and encouraged Karzai and his government to start working
together with Pakistani counterparts to bridge differences in
thinking before positions became set.


3. (S) Karzai agreed that the government needed to move
forward more deliberately, and promised that "our group will
contact the other side." Karzai informed Boucher that Pir
Gilani, former Supreme Court judge Shinwari, and
Parliamentary leader Mohaqqeq will lead a commission for
policy guidance. Farouk Wardak would serve as the Secretary
General and lead the Afghan Secretariat as the "best point
man" on day-to-day work. Foreign Minister Spanta would
continue preparations on a national basis.


4. (S) Boucher concurred that Karzai's basic goals for the
jirgas (fighting terrorism and ensuring security) needed
national support, but he encouraged the focus be on tribal
leaders in order to build their authority. Karzai said he
was happy to let the other side propose whatever it wanted
from the Afghan side. Karzai's interest is in getting a
broad representation of Pakistani moderates. He is confident
the Pakistani business community and secular leaders would
support Afghanistan's desire to confront the issue of
terrorism. Karzai said he if he has enough of such people
would he welcome "spoilers and radicals" being present at the
jirgas, as he could then confront and "crush" them. Boucher
suggested that Pak-Afghan consultations take place first
before becoming fixed on the configuration. Karzai
reiterated that the issues were larger than just tribal and
asked if Pakistan was also focusing on the national
perspective. Boucher responded that the Pakistan's focus was

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on the tribal areas.


5. (S) Assistant Secretary Boucher reminded Karzai that
Secretary Rice had made clear that the U.S. was willing to

SIPDIS
help. He asked Karzai for his view of the role of the U.S.
and UN in the jirgas. Karzai said he would take inspiration
from the tripartite meeting in Washington where President
Bush made clear that the U.S. would not be the judge but a
participant. Without U.S. participation, Karzai stressed,
there will be few expectations and Afghanistan will not be
able to achieve what it wants. Karzai can accept a role for
the UN but recognizes that the Pakistanis may not be happy
about it. Boucher noted that the Government of Pakistan was
somewhat mystified by the UN's role, including The UN
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan's delivery of a letter from
Kabul on the jirgas. Karzai said no written text was given
to the group to deliver (later confirmed by UN officials,
they passed a "non-paper" of their understanding of
then-current Afghan views). In response to Karzai's question
about the proper role for the UN, A/S Boucher suggested that
the UN facilitate but not be involved in shuttle diplomacy.



6. (S) Karzai asked if the Pakistanis had indicated to
Boucher any timeframe for the jirgas. Boucher responded that
no particular dates were proposed, but the period after
Foreign Minister meetings in January or February seemed most
likely. Karzai agreed.

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North Waziristan Agreement
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7. (S) Turning to the North Waziristan Agreement, Boucher
reported that while Musharraf understands that it has
problems, he is not ready to call it a failure. Instead he
is determined to make it effective. This includes taking
serious military action, if necessary. Boucher had agreed
with Musharraf's assessment, including that it is too early
to make a final judgement on its effectiveness.


8. (S) Kazai saw no let up in the killing on the Afghan
side. He sympathized with Musharraf whom he sees as under
increased pressure since the Washington meetings. Karzai
made reference to the November 8 suicide bombing against
Pakistani soldiers and the gathering of thousands of Pashtuns
against Pakistan military operations against madrassas.
Karzai hoped that Musharraf would carry out more military
strikes as this would "please Afghans very much."

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Musa Qala
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9. (S) The Ambassador raised the recent Musa Qala agreement
between the local shura and Governor Daud in Helmand
province, noting that it had stirred much discussion and
strange speculation, including e.g., that Karzai was now
negotiating with Hekmatayr. Boucher mentioned that he had
heard repeated Afghan nervousness about what political
arrangements were being considered. The Ambassador suggested
that President Karzai consider issuing a statement before
Parliament or on television/radio to explain what was
happening in Musa Qala and to reiterate basic principles of
government authority. The Ambassador said the truth was not
getting around the country and there is a gap between the
facts and what the public thinks is happening.


10. (S) Karzai agreed he needed to explain the situation,
not just nationally, but to the areas around Musa Qala as
well. Boucher said the basic message should be that the
government was not conceding land or authority, but extending
government authority to the area. Karzai added that it would

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be important to clarify there not been a deal made with the
Taliban.

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Stepping Up U.S. Assistance
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11. (C) Boucher briefed Karzai on ongoing efforts in
Washington to obtain greater assistance for Afghanistan. He
said that since the trilateral White House dinner in
September, Washington had begun looking at Afghanistan
assistance more strategically. The U.S. wanted to develop
greater capacity to link military action to
development/reconstruction and governance. If this could be
done in a coordinated fashion, we could bring about greater
success in Afghanistan, he explained. The U.S. saw enough
spots where this could be done more generally across the
board. Washington would be taking a look at numbers and
projects and consulting on the latter with the Afghan
government. Rather than an incremental shift, the U.S. plans
to blanket certain areas, but would be rely on Karzai's
leadership to extend good governance so that the Afghan
people could benefit directly. Much of the effort would go
into roads and electricity.


12. (C) Boucher said he was delivering the same message to
the Europeans whom we were hoping would do more, particularly
in the new EU Seven-Year budget, which is expected to have
Euro 200 million for Afghanistan. The U.S. was also talking
to Khazakstan and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, the
U.S. would be looking for a strong recommitment from NATO at
the Riga Summit. The U.S. was also working closely with the
Germans, who will be taking over both the G-8 and EU
presidencies, to make Afghanistan a centerpiece in both these
fora.

Counter-Narcotics
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13. (S) Boucher said that we needed to step up alternative
livelihood programs, eradication, and prosecutions. He noted
that the issue of ground spraying had been discussed between
Karzai and National Security Advisor Hadley (REF D). Karzai
said that ground spraying would be tested in Helmand, as well
as in Musa Qala. He said the situation was "troublesome" and
stressed that "security must come first". Karzai expected
more people from the area to join the Taliban in the
short-term. Karzai wanted to test if Musa Qala would
continue to be an area for poppy production and questioned if
the Musa Qala was not motivated by a desire for a ceasefire
to faciliate poppy cultivation this season.


14. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher cleared this cable.

NEUMANN