PRT KHOST: NEW ABP COMMANDER OPTIMISTIC DESPITE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005435

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR HARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMET
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: PRT KHOST: NEW ABP COMMANDER OPTIMISTIC DESPITE
DECIMATED/DEMORALIZED FORCE

REF: KABUL 3822

Classified By: Political Counselor Sara Rosenberry for reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D).


1. (C) Summary: Despite inheriting a demoralized force on the
heels of a 200- to 250-man walkout (a fifth of the force),
incoming acting Afghan Border Police (ABP) Commander Kasim
Khil is optimistic he can bring back and improve troop
strength and effectiveness. In what appears to be a model
approach, in his first week, Khil visited checkpoints and
ensured they were manned (using locals),met with local
elders, and identified and advanced solutions to security and
morale concerns. Although Khil said it is still unclear who
the permanent ABP Commander will be, he speculated it will
not/not be the old commander or deputy commander, whose
acrimonious relationship was a factor in the ABP walkout.
End Summary.

New Commander Surprisingly Optimistic
--------------


2. (C) Kasim Khil does not act like a commander that is
trying to lure back a fifth of his workforce. Khost,s new
acting Afghan Border Police (ABP) Chief was affable,
light-hearted, and optimistic when PolOff met him November 4.
The 50-year-old Khil brings 27 years of border policing
experience with him. During the early 80s, he was chief of
Khost,s border police. Since then he has served previous
incarnations of the ABP in a variety of border provinces.
His previous job was head of the ABP's Quick Reaction Force
(QRF) in Kabul.


3. (C) Khil arrived in Khost October 23 to take over a
decimated and dispirited ABP force. About 250 of the
1,300-man force abandoned their posts the last two weeks of
October prior to the Islamic holiday of EID. When Khil
arrived at Khost ABP Headquarters, about 20 officers were on
hand and he had to personally conduct night patrol his first
night in town. Khil said about 169 of those troops have
returned following the end of the holiday. Khil was
optimistic the force could be reconstituted in the coming
weeks, particularly following recent authorization from Kabul
he claimed will increase the force to 1,600 and rumors it
will increase again to 2,000 in the near future.

ABP Family Feud and Leadership Issues
--------------


4. (C) According to Khil, DynCorp police mentors, and
Governor Arsala Jamal, lack of effective leadership and the
highly tense standoff between former ABP Commander General
Muhammad Khalil Amin Zada and former ABP Deputy Commander
Colonel Almar Gul Mangal was a factor in the walkout (ref).
Following his bleak assessment of ABP needs and manpower,
Governor Arsala Jamal complained that the old leadership
ignored ABP problems and just &told me things were great.8


5. (C) Khalil had complained bitterly to the PRT that Gul was
undermining his authority and trying to have Khalil killed
for meddling in his smuggling operations. After Gul was
summoned to Kabul for an investigation in early October, he
encouraged his ABP supporters and fellow Mangal tribesmen to
abandon their posts to show ABP leadership his strength. Gul
initiated similar muscle flexing in July in an attempt to
make Khalil look inept. ABP and DynCorp officials estimate
the &Mangal mafia8 element of Khost,s ABP force to be
about 25 percent. Khil said despite Gul,s best efforts, he
will not be coming back to Khost and will, at a minimum, get
reassigned because he &has problems with Americans.8 He
added that loyalty to Gul was only a contributing factor in
the walkout for some of the troops and will be a nonfactor in
whether troops return since the Khalil versus Gul dynamic no

KABUL 00005435 002 OF 003


longer exists.


6. (C) According to DynCorp mentors, Khalil was increasingly
negatively perceived by the rank and file as a commander who
spends too much time in Kabul. Instead of rallying his
troops following an October 15 attack on BCP 7 that resulted
in four ABP deaths, General Khalil immediately left for
Kabul. Khil said Khalil told him he is in Kabul for health
problems, but suggested Khalil is more depressed and afraid
of Gul than physically ill after visiting him. Khil said
there was about a 40 percent chance Khalil will return to
Khost if Gul is transferred or fired. Khil said he was the
top contender for the permanent job now, but that the
situation was far from settled.

Priority 1: Manning Checkpoints; Rallying Locals
-------------- ---


7. (C) Khil has made his first priority to show an ABP
presence in the districts and his second to address the
concerns that prompted the massive walkout. He immediately
called down about 100 of his QRF troops and Afghanistan,s
Deputy Commander of ABP from Kabul to conduct a sweeping tour
of the province,s border areas October 25 and 26. Khil said
the purpose of the 10-truck convoy was to show ABP presence
to the population to counter enemy propaganda that Afghan
forces were retreating to Khost City. The trip was also an
opportunity for his &crack troops8 from Kabul to show their
provincial colleagues how to conduct searches and patrols and
to visit the families of fallen ABP.


8. (C) During the tour Khil talked to elders throughout the
province and persuaded Kuchi tribesman to man the Babrak Tana
checkpoint in Tere Zayi (Border Check Point 7) and locals to
man the Lesur checkpoint in Gurbuz (BCP 4). The walkout hit
BCP 7 and 4 the hardest, where ABP strength plummeted from 35
to two and from 25 to 0, respectively, during EID. In the
next couple of weeks Khil hopes to return to near-normal ABP
complements at both checkpoints.

Grass Roots Offensive Targets Hearts and Minds
-------------- -


9. (C) His grass-roots strategy is to recreate the close
ABP-local cooperation that exists in Jaji Maidan District
province-wide, where he claimed locals rally to protect the
border checkpoint when attacked. He emphasized that without
the support of locals, including tribal cousins on the
Pakistani side of the border, the ABP would die &like a fish
out of water.8 As a local from Jai Maidan, Khil claimed he
is uniquely qualified to deal with locals and planned to use
tribal leaders to help bring back deserting ABP and recruit
new ABP. According to Khil, he has received about 150 calls
from tribal elders eager to work with him (our conversation
was interrupted by two such calls). He conceded cutting down
on corruption would be key to rallying public support, a
difficult task, but said leading by example would be a good
place to start ) in contrast to corrupt Deputy Col. Gul.


10. (C) Khil maintained that BCP 7 had not been attacked
since the Kuchis moved in the last week of October, tacit
proof of their connections to anti-GOA elements. The Kuchis
need special attention, according to Khil, because they have
received ¬hing8 from the GOA, making them ripe for
cooperation with ACM. He suggested building a school or a
well as a goodwill gesture for Kuchis in Tere Zayi and has
already organized volunteer ABP officers to teach.

Priority 2: Address Morale Issues
--------------


11. (C) Khil said unless the problems leading to the walkout
are addressed, &we can,t force the police to come back.8

KABUL 00005435 003 OF 003


Those problems, in order of importance, according to Khil:

--Treatment: In the last two months about 10 ABP have been
killed and 52 wounded. According to Khil there, has been no
support for the injured or families, devastating ABP morale.
Although ABP has a medical budget, ¬ one tablet8 is
accounted for as supplies disappear on the way from Kabul.
He also complained that Khost Hospital staff required payment
to wash bodies of fallen ABP.

--Security: Khil asked for resources such as barriers,
concertina wire, and lighting to improve &insecure8
checkpoint security at the November 4 Provincial Security
Meeting. He also asked for body armor and helmets, which the
maneuver commander said he was working on. Khil said 30 ABP
a month would be rotated from Khost to ABP regional command
in Gardez for training from Blackwater. He claimed similar
training improved his troops' performance in Kabul
exponentially.

--Leadership (see above)

--Pay: Governor Jamal provided a 1,000 Afghani bonus to
Afghan National Police (ANP) for the EID holiday, but nothing
for the ABP. ABP has not been paid for two months because
ABP leadership was afraid troops would leave anyway and take
their last paychecks with them. Khil sent a finance officer
from Kabul to pay soldiers at checkpoints and assure them pay
would be more consistent in the future.

--Corruption. Everything from shoes to beds to ammunition is
pilfered.


12. (C) COMMENT: Although still very early in his tenure,
Khil appears to be everything the last two commanders were
not: understanding of Khost,s tribal and Kuchi issues,
enthusiastic, ethical, hard-working, and genuinely concerned
about his troops. Starting fresh with new leadership is a
positive step. Bringing either Khalil or Gul back would
allow divisions in the ABP to fester. Embassy will make it
clear to the government that we would oppose old, failed
leaders being recycled after appeals with cash are made in
Kabul. This occurred earlier this year when Gul was able to
buy his way back into the deputy position after being fired
as the commander. Embassy and CSTC-A will continue to engage
with GOA officials to ensure the right solution. End Comment.

NEUMANN