PRT TARIN KOWT - GOVERNOR MONIB'S MILITIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 005421

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PGOV PREL PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT TARIN KOWT - GOVERNOR MONIB'S MILITIA

Classified By: A/DCM ASIMMONS, for Reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: Uruzgan's Governor Monib formed a
militia to make up for a severe shortage of Afghan
security forces and open challenges to his authority.
He created a militia force of approximately 1300 by
reaching out to tribal leaders, many of whom were
marginalized by his predecessor. He has sent this
force into action on a number of occasions in recent
months but it has proven to be ill-trained,
undisciplined and outgunned by the enemy. Despite
their recent failures, Afghans continue to be willing
to join forces across tribal lines to protect their
villages, and militia members constitute a large
recruiting pool for the Afghan National Auxiliary
Police (ANAP). Although the Auxiliary Police are
being quickly and simultaneously recruited, trained
and deployed in provinces in the south and east to
address the concerns of the provincial leadership as
well as the leadership in the central government, the
ANAP is not a self-sufficient force and will need
support from the better trained and more heavily
equipped Afghan National Army. End Summary.

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Problem: Where are the Afghan Security Forces?
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2. (SBU) Uruzgan Governor Abdul Hakim Monib assumed
office in March 2006. He was an outsider with no local
support base within the province and with few friends
upon whom he could depend to secure the province or
guarantee his personal security. Former Governor Jan
Mohammed Khan openly sought to undermine Monib's power
which resulted in a further destabilization of this
province. The Afghan National Police (ANP) and
Afghan Highway Police (AHP) were thinly disguised
militias with primary loyalty to their former
mujahadeen commanders. ANP Chief Rozie Khan was
relieved of his command in May, after which most of
his men left the force taking their weapons with them.
What remained were less than 90 officially trained ANP
who lacked weapons, ammunition and vehicles. Monib
could not rely on the protection of the AHP Commander
Col. Matiollah, who is an effective anti-Taliban
leader and fighter, but also has family ties to the
previous governor that cast doubt on his willingness
to provide adequate protection to Monib.


3. (C) Some temporary relief was provided by a new
provincial police commander, General Mohammed Qasim,
and the arrival of 100 Afghan Standby Police (ASP) in
June, but the ASP mission was confined to the
protection of the governor and Tarin Kowt city and
ended the first week of September. General Qasim
remains but is assessed by Dutch and police mentors as
a weak leader. Governor Monib recently told the Dutch
PRT Commander that he agrees with this assessment and
is considering replacing him. (Note: Officially,
Governor Monib does not have the authority to replace
police chiefs; that decision should be made by the
Minister of Interior. End note.)


4. (SBU) Uruzgan also lacks sufficient numbers of
ANA. There are two kandaks (battalions) assigned to
Uruzgan. Each is supposed to consist of approx. 612
people, but in practice, actual troop levels have
stood, on average, at 400-500 total. In August most
members of the kandaks began a long deserved leave,
after being deployed and engaged with the enemy for up
to 18 months. This resulted in a drop to less than
100 ANA combat troops in the entire province. These
troops' leave should end in November, but the
contracts of most of the ANA are also scheduled to
expire at the same time. This has prompted concerns
that if many do not re-enlist, ANA troop levels may
remain very low for the foreseeable future.

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A Desperate Solution: Form a Militia
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5. (SBU) Governor Monib moved to help solve this
shortage of Afghan security forces by forming a
militia. Over the summer, he asked tribal leaders -
many marginalized by the Populzai tribe provincial
leadership under Governor Jan Mohammed - to recruit
security forces for their local areas. According to
Gov. Monib, he currently is paying up to 1270 militia
members or "police" as he calls them. They are
distributed among the provincial districts as follows:

Tarin Kowt 500
Deh Rawood 220
Chora 40-150
Chenartu 100
Cahar Cineh 150
Khas Uruzgan 150


6. (SBU) The actual numbers and disposition of this
militia have yet to be confirmed as Monib and Gen.
Qasim have only shared partial information on actual
district deployments. Efforts to map the deployment
of these forces continue. So far, the Dutch were able
to confirm the presence of the 220 militiamen in Deh
Rawood.


7. (C) Governor Monib pays his militia salaries
substantially higher than those of the ANP. Funds for
the salaries come partially from the Governor's
reported $150,000 a month discretionary fund. Using
this and other available funds, the Governor pays each
militia and policeman $150 per month vice the
officially sanctioned $70 per month. His
justification is that police salaries are too low and
that he cannot recruit candidates willing to work as
police or ANAP for the official salary. (Note: Dutch
and US forces pay Afghan Security Guards $300 per
month in Uruzgan.)

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The Militia in Action: Dubious Track Record
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8. (SBU) An exact deployment date for the governor's
militia is unclear, but Dutch and US forces began
observing these forces in action mid-August.


9. (C) On August 18, Governor Monib directed local
police together with this militia to raid the Tarin
Kowt bazaar and seize contraband including poppy,
opium, and alcoholic beverages. The raid quickly got
out of hand and many ANP withdrew their participation.
Shop keepers were harassed, money and goods stolen and
property destroyed. Reports of the amount of opium
seized varied from a few hundred to 6000 pounds. When
the Dutch PRT police team inspected the local police
evidence locker shortly after the raid, only a small
amount of opium was in storage. When asked about the
missing contraband, Gov. Monib said he ordered it
destroyed but this claim remains unsubstantiated.


10. (C) On September 5, ANA and a US Special Forces
unit were attacked as they approached a checkpoint in
eastern Tarin Kowt district on the road to Deh Rawood.
ANA and US forces assumed it was an ambush by hostile
forces but later discovered their attackers were
"police" sent by the Governor to reinforce a newly
established checkpoint that he had heard would be
attacked by the Taliban. Fortunately, casualties were
limited to three ANA and militia wounded in action
(WIA). US forces involved in the incident, which
occurred on a bright, moonlit night, have doubts about
Monib's account that the incident was accidental.

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11. (C) On September 21, a militia convoy under the
command of Nabi Khan, a Ghilzai leader from Surkh
Morghab, came under attack in Abas Ali, south of Chora
and Kala Kala, in the Baluchi Valley. Later, militia
under the command of Chora district Police Chief and
Populzai tribal leader Farouk were also drawn into the
fight. The attack lasted several hours and ended
only with nightfall. Seven militia members were WIA
(2 later died),and several police vehicles were
heavily damaged. The next day, Gov. Monib confided
to the PRT Commander that he had sent the militia in
on the basis of a tip that there were a few Taliban in
the area. However, when his men arrived in the
village, they discovered that the village inhabitants
had left and the Taliban had staged an ambush.


12. (C) The nearby Kala Kala checkpoint came under
repeated anti-Coalition militia (ACM) attack during
recent weeks. In these attacks, the militia, armed
only with AK-47's, were seriously outgunned by ACM
using mortars, rocket-propelled-grenades and PKM
machine guns. Dutch Special Operations Forces have
provided support and called in close air support on
several occasions. Provincial Police Chief Gen.
Qasim says that ANP and militia forces are running low
on ammunition and asked Dutch and US forces to
replenish supplies.


13. (C) Most recently, on September 18, provincial NDS
Chief Adbul Rauf raided and seized weapons from
compounds controlled by the militia. Acting on
orders from the Governor, the militia surrounded
Rauf's compound, and after several hours, succeeded in
recovering the weapons. A Dutch print journalist in
Tarin Kowt at the time published a sensational account
of the standoff which portrayed the incident as a
siege ordered by Governor Monib.


14. (C) Rauf accuses Governor Monib of using this
militia to settle scores with local leaders and to
attack ISAF and Coalition forces. He notes that some
militia members are suspected ACM. These accusations
may be part of an escalating feud between Rauf and
Monib, a theory for which some corroborating
information exists. Monib counters these claims
saying that he is using the militia as a means to
effect tribal reconciliation, reaching out to leaders
of ethnic groups that had been disenfranchised and
even actively persecuted by the Populzai-dominated
former leadership of the province. According to
Monib, some of these leaders have in the past been
falsely accused of ACM affiliation by members of rival
groups. (Note: At Monib's insistence, MOI fired Rauf
in early October. End Note.)

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Transition to Auxiliary Police
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15. (SBU) The Governor's militia is ill-trained,
undisciplined, poorly equipped and not under the
command and control of Ministry of Interior
authorities. Out-gunned by the ACM, it is further
hampered by poor communications and logistical
support. In the future, their movements and use must
be coordinated with those of the ANA, ANP, and
international forces operating in the province to
avoid future friendly-fire incidents. Nonetheless,
these militia have demonstrated their willingness to
work with GoA authorities to protect their villages.
Provincial leaders and international forces therefore
view them, along with the soon-to-be disbanded AHP, as
a recruiting pool for the Afghan National Auxiliary
Police (ANAP).


16. (C) Dutch and US forces in Uruzgan have decided

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that efforts to train, equip and deploy the new ANAP
must be initiated immediately given the critical
shortage of ANA and ANP currently in the province and
the fact that the Governor's militia already exists.
In addition, they plan to call on this new force to
secure territory and man checkpoints in upcoming
operations that must take place to reduce increasing
ACM strength before winter.


17. (SBU) Therefore, the Dutch, with support from US
forces and the Ministry of Interior, initiated
ANAP training on October 28. The training will last
two weeks and consist of basic police and counter-
insurgency courses. In addition, militia deployed at
key checkpoints will receive basic training at their
current locations.

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Comment
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18. (C) Monib's militia may have occasionally
contributed to the province's security but have more
likely acted as a net detractor. Their disbandment
and reformation as trained ANAP, commanded and paid
from Kabul, should increase their effectiveness as an
anti-Taliban force. Unfortunately, as the ANAP is
still in the beginning stages of training, equipping
and deployment, it is not yet capable of independent
action and remains reliant on the ANP. In Uruzgan's
counter-insurgency environment, it will need the
support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANA
and ANP).
NEUMANN