OUR TAKE ON AFGHANISTAN OBJECTIVES AT THE RIGA

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 005414

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB,
S/CT, EUR/RPM,INL/FO
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMETT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
USNATO FOR AMBASSADOR NULAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PREL EAID AF
SUBJECT: OUR TAKE ON AFGHANISTAN OBJECTIVES AT THE RIGA
SUMMIT

REF: A. USNATO 628

B. USNATO 634

C. USNATO 576

D. KABUL 5205

E. KABUL 5204

F. KABUL 5025

G. KABUL 5023

H. KABUL 5012

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann; reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The upcoming NATO Summit in Riga offers a
prime opportunity to advance our agenda in Afghanistan with
our NATO Allies. We believe it essential to continue to
project a steady, measured message on the need to eliminate
caveats some nations have imposed on the deployment of their
troops. Further, the failure of nations to fulfill the
Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) continues to
constrain COMISAF's options and raises the overall risk level
for the nations engaged most directly in the fighting in the
South. The NAC's September 27 decision to help equip the ANA
was a major step forward. he proper integration of security
and reconstruction efforts will determine whether ISAF is
able to consolidate the gains of its recent and future
operations. The NAC's October 27 approval of NATO's role as
Secretariat for the Tripartite Commission (ISAF/Afghan

SIPDIS
military/Pakistan military) is a major step forward in
engagement with Pakistan. NATO nations with influence in
Islamabad must continue working to convince Pakistan to take
action against Pakistan-based Taliban command and control
nodes and sanctuary. End Summary.

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Keeping Up the Pressure on Caveats
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2. (C) Though we are mindful of the potential for the caveat
issue to exacerbate tensions between the Allies fighting in
the South, and those who have affixed themselves to tasks in
the North, West, and/or Kabul, our talks with COMISAF
convince us it is essential to continue to project a steady,
measured message on the need to eliminate caveats some
nations have imposed on the deployment of their troops. More
than fulfilling the remaining CJSOR requirements -- important
as that is -- eliminating the caveats a number of major
Allies have imposed on their troops would provide COMISAF
significant additional operational flexibility for responding
to unexpected challenges, and for meeting more routine
demands. Just one small example: COMISAF recently noted to
local NATO Ambassadors that a number of nations with troops
in Kabul have caveats that restrict the utility of those
troops in patrolling areas near the capital from which rocket
attacks have been launched. This, COMISAF emphasized,
actually puts those troops stationed in Kabul at greater
risk, in addition to undermining ISAF's ability to support
the security of the GOA leadership.


3. (C) More broadly, COMISAF has reiterated here what SACEUR
has told the NAC in Brussels: caveats on ISAF troops continue
to channel ISAF operations toward the "economy of force" end
of the spectrum. Over the medium to long-term, this likely
will suffice to keep the Taliban from re-taking control of
the country, provided NATO publics sustain their support for
the mission in the face of the continued losses we should
expect from the Taliban's continued use and refinement of
asymmetric warfare techniques. However, such an approach
appears inadequate to empower the GOA to project good
governance and economic development into the rural areas most
at risk, particularly in the South. This, after all, will be
the key to our success in Afghanistan. And the north still
could cause trouble that would pit the elements with the
strongest caveats against the troublemakers.

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Fulfilling the CJSOR
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4. (C) Though the conclusion of Operation Medusa in September

marked an overall decrease in ISAF's operational tempo, the
failure of nations to fulfill the Combined Joint Statement of
Requirements (CJSOR) continues to constrain COMISAF's options
and raises the overall risk level for the nations engaged
most directly in the fighting in the South. Poland's plans
to send additional troops in February are certainly welcome,
but as discussed in mil-mil channels, their impact as a
potential reserve force will be limited unless other nations
provide the requisite rotary and fixed-wing assets to ensure
their mobility. Another as yet only partially fulfilled
requirement is for NATO Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams
(OMLTs),which, like their U.S. Embedded Trainer Teams (ETT)
counterparts, are geared to professionalize the Afghan
National Army (ANA) and to ensure that their host ANA units
are able to participate effectively in combined operations
with ISAF. While realizing many nations are feeling
stretched by other commitments, we believe it important to
maintain a steady chorus on the importance of NATO nations
meeting this military need that NATO nations themselves have
mutually identified.

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Providing Additional Support to the ANSF
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5. (C) The NAC's September 27 decision to help equip the ANA
was a major step forward. Although a number of Allies
already have provided equipment donations to the ANA and/or
Afghan National Police (ANP),the NAC decision provided this
effort a second wind by making it a high-profile Alliance
objective. Properly equipping and training the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF: ANA and ANP) with quality
equipment is fundamentally in line with our long-term goal of
empowering the GOA to project security with reduced reliance
on the international community. We should continue to use
all opportunities to highlight the importance of following up
on this decision, so manifestly in the interest of all NATO
nations and partners. Moreover, in the immediate future, we
should look for ways to expand NATO nations' support for
equipping and training the ANP, a critical and thus far
under-developed element of Afghan national security.
Currently there is a substantial requirement for mentors
within the ANP. The orchestration of a concept silmilar to
the OMLT program should be broached with NATO - preferably
with the Germans leading the effort in brussels if they are
willing to substainitally increase their own role - to
facilitate mentoring at the regional, provincial, and
district levels. Participation in this concept should not be
limited to military police but also encompass the totality of
the civilian police expertise that is resonant within the
countries belonging to NATO. An increase in police mentors
is required to continue to build the ANP into a viable force
that is capable of enforcing the rule of law throughout the
nation.

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Bringing Pressure to Bear on Pakistan
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6. (C) It is clear that the insurgency is more and more tied
to the festering problem of Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan.
Although it is not the sole determinant of campaign success,
failure to redress the Pakistan-based Taliban threat will
lengthen the struggle and significantly increase the
expenditure of U.S., NATO, and Afghan blood and treasure on
the overall effort here. We note the NAC's October 27
approval of NATO's assumption of Tripartite Secretariat
responsibilities, which can be expected to nurture the
overall relationship and foster better unity of effort
between NATO, the Pakistani Army, and the ANA, especially
regarding activities focused on security of the border
region. However, the issue of Pakistani action on their side
of the border is larger than simple operational mil-to-mil
border arrangements, and has broader strategic implications.
We feel the Government of Pakistan has the necessary capacity
to act yet has been unwilling to make the strategic-level
decision to actively combat the Taliban and AQAM command and
control. Though NATO's ability to influence politically the

Government of Pakistan is limited, the U.S. and other NATO
Allies with influence in Islamabad should strive to reach
consensus on this issue and to pursue a coherent engagement
policy aimed at convincing Pakistan to act decisively to
eliminate the sanctuary. The nascent NATO Ambassadors'
informal group in Islamabad could provide a means of informal
coordination.

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Integrating Security and Reconstruction
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7. (C) The proper integration of security and reconstruction
efforts, and an increase in development funds, will determine
whether ISAF is able to consolidate the gains of its recent
and future operations. COMISAF and a number of Allies are
keenly aware of the ISAF deficit that still remains in this
area, and have been thinking creatively about how to fill
some of the gaps -- for example, considering the creation of
a CERP-like fund for ISAF commanders engaged in clearing and
stabilization operations. More Allied funding for
reconstruction would be very welcome, in both strategic
infrastructure and PRT-led smaller projects. COMISAF has
also relayed to us his thoughts on whether there needs to be
a more direct dedication of ISAF maneuver units to force
protection tasks associated with reconstruction and
development assistance. For the most part, PRT commanders,
particularly in the South, often are stretched too thinly to
provide adequate security for civilian counterparts
attempting to establish and monitor reconstruction projects
in rural areas. Doing this well will be important to ISAF's
long-term success, as well as to generating near-term good
news stories that will help us to keep NATO and partner
publics in the fight. Continued emphasis on contributing
nations' financial resources toward development projects is
also in order.
NEUMANN