Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL5399
2006-11-07 14:38:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRT LASHKAR GAH - NORTH QUIET AFTER ISAF

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2238
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #5399/01 3111438
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071438Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3983
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0212
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3214
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 005399 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMIT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: PRT LASHKAR GAH - NORTH QUIET AFTER ISAF
WITHDRAWAL

REF: A. KABUL 4369

B. KABUL 5204

C. KABUL 5194

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 005399

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMIT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: PRT LASHKAR GAH - NORTH QUIET AFTER ISAF
WITHDRAWAL

REF: A. KABUL 4369

B. KABUL 5204

C. KABUL 5194

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The situation in Musa Qala district in
the north of Helmand Province, the site of serious clashes
between ISAF and Taliban forces, remains relatively stable
following ISAF,s recent withdrawal from the district center
(DC). The withdrawal followed an arrangement between the
local shura (council of tribal elders) and Governor Daud,
which requires the shura to maintain security in the DC. The
shura appears to be keeping up its end, and remains in
contact with the Governor. Per reftel B, this arrangement
could be: (a) the first step towards a more durable security
environment and the gradual introduction of governmental
authority in the district; (b) a mere lull before resumption
of hostilities; or (c) a cover for creating control by the
Taliban or local elements not under GOA control. With a
local population possibly uncertain about whom to credit for
the ongoing quiet, it is important that the government act to
support local security efforts and development in the
district. The Governor is coordinating with the central
government on a list of reconstruction and development
projects for the district. Tribal leaders from other
districts have taken note of the Musa Qala arrangement, and
there is a risk that proposals for similar arrangements might
arise in the coming weeks, before the Musa Qala arrangement
has been tested. However, for now, President Karzai has told
Governor Daud, "No more deals". Recent intel indicators
point to the strong possibility that the Taliban have
reestablished significant presence in Musa Qala. Paragraph
15 contains a summary of the Musa Qala agreement's points.

END SUMMARY.

Volatile district quiet after ISAF withdrawal
--------------


2. (C/NF) The situation in Musa Qala, a district in the
north of Helmand Province and the site of serious clashes
between ISAF and Taliban forces over the last few months,
remains relatively stable following ISAF,s withdrawal from
the district center (DC) on October 16. While fighting has
continued in neighboring districts, the Musa Qala DC has been
quiet since Governor Daud, the local shura (council of tribal
elders),and the Task Force Helmand Commander reached an
understanding in early September, and at the Governor,s
request ISAF stated it would only fire if fired upon (REF A).
At that time the Musa Qala shura provided assurances that it
could maintain security within the DC. (NOTE: Over the last
several weeks fighting across the North generally has abated,
though it has actually intensified in Nahri Sarraj, a
northern/central district, southeast of Musa Qala and
bordering both Lashkar Gah district and Kandahar Province.
It is unclear, however, if the overall decrease in violence
is due to the agreement, to Ramadan and Eid, or to the onset
of the poppy planting season. Immediately after the MQ
agreement, there were signs of a spike in attacks at Kajaki
and Naw Zad. END NOTE.)


3. (C/NF) Anecdotal evidence provides both encouraging and
worrying signs: on one hand, the bazaar in the Musa Qala
district center is open and many people have returned, while
on the other, women are not permitted in the bazaar and now
must wear burkas, and girls can no longer attend school.
Whether those alleged restrictions fall within cultural norms
for Musa Qala, whether they are in response to some form of
pressure, or whether residents are "hedging their bets" by
adopting practices to keep certain elements at bay, is
unknown.


KABUL 00005399 002 OF 005


Shura holding up its end of arrangement
--------------


4. (C/NF) Following ISAF,s withdrawal, there are
indications that the local shura is adhering to its side of
the bargain, i.e., it is enforcing security through a "tribal
security force" and preventing other parties from
establishing a dominating presence in the district, though
this remains to be tested by the eventual interjection of
Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) from outside the
district (Ref B). Also, the shura continues to engage the
Governor, e.g., on government support for reconstruction
projects. (NOTE: during negotiations some weeks ago, the
local leaders made clear to Governor Daud that they would
only accept Afghans to work on reconstruction. END NOTE.)
The Governor told PRT representatives that he feels the shura
consists of genuine representatives of the local tribe.


5. (C/NF) (NOTE: UK officials have stressed that this is an
"Afghan process," one result of the Governor's outreach to
tribal leaders across Helmand over a period of months. They
assert that this particular arrangement was reached between
the shura and the Governor, with the Governor engaging ISAF
regarding an agreement to withhold fire and eventually
withdraw from the DC. Other credible sources indicate that
the UK acted unilaterally and was part and parcel of this
agreement. From the Governor's perspective, it is an
opportunity to help extend the reach of the government -- by
recognizing traditional authority, he obtains recognition of
the government's authority. Per reftel B, whether this
arrangement indeed will extend the reach of the GOA remains
to be tested, and the sooner the better. END NOTE.)

Governor Focused on Development
--------------


6. (SBU) According to UK PRT officials, the provincial and
central governments have set responding to Musa Qala's
reconstruction and development needs as their priority. The
Governor has provided the Policy Action Group with
reconstruction priorities for the district, which include
construction of mosques, schools and a road, and
reconstruction of damaged shops and houses. Governor Daud
has sent a survey team to the district. While the PRT has
responded with some assistance, e.g., with USD 10,000 to
equip the district center, and DFID will look into how their
long-term development plan (HARD-P) can support Musa Qala
reconstruction, PRT officials deem it appropriate that Daud
is looking primarily to the central government for
reconstruction support.

Who gains from the lull in hostilities?
--------------


7. (SBU) It is difficult to gauge the perception among
Helmand residents of the arrangement that secured a period of
relative calm in Musa Qala, i.e., as to whether locals view
this as a victory for the government or the Taliban. Few if
any details of the arrangement have been made public.
According to a media summary of Helmand compiled by an INL
sub-contractor, the arrangement has been described as an
example of Taliban weakness, as a defeat. However, one
article concerning the improved security situation in Helmand
highlighted the arrangement and quoted locals as giving
tribal leaders credit for bringing peace to the district, not
the government; one tribal leader even thanked the Taliban.


8. (C/NF) One beneficiary of this arrangement is ISAF, which
has now freed troops that had been fixed for months in an
isolated "platoon house" in the district center. As UK
officials have stressed, particularly in the press, it was
the Governor who asked that ISAF troops be placed in district

KABUL 00005399 003 OF 005


centers; this arrangement then reflects a response to the
Governor's subsequent request that, following his engagement
of the local shura, circumstances favor unfixing.


9. (C/NF) An indirect beneficiary is Pakistan, who holds up
the MQ agreement as a validation of its North Waziristan
Agency agreement. That the two agreements are in fact very
different may only be admitted by Pakistan if the MQ
arrangement falls apart and no longer proves to be a positive
corollary.

What is Ahead for Musa Qala?
--------------


10. (C/NF) Whether this arrangement results in a measure of
stability leading to development and the gradual
(re)introduction of governmental authority, whether it
collapses, or whether it results in creating an enemy
sanctuary, lawlessness and a return of hostilities, depends
on the shura and its ability to maintain security in
cooperation with the ANAP officers who should arrive in the
district center in mid-November. The shura also must
continue to constructively engage the Governor, and thereby
recognize his authority. The Governor has already produced
much, in ISAF,s assurances and withdrawal, but he will also
seek to commence reconstruction projects. Also outstanding
is the potential for military activity outside the District
Center but still in Musa Qala, a possible gray area that
could create difficulties for the Governor. Nevertheless,
close monitoring of the situation in Musa Qala is needed to
alert ISAF to potential blowback on President Karzai's
government if the agreement were to crumble.

Can This be Replicated Elsewhere in Helmand?
--------------


11. (C/NF) Neither ISAF nor the Governor views the Musa Qala
arrangement as a template that can or should be mechanically
applied in other districts. COMISAF underlines that the
value of the arrangement is not yet known and must first be
tested. Daud continues to reach out to tribal leaders across
the province, leaders who have taken note of the calm in Musa
Qala. According to PRT officials, the Governor has found
that the prospect of development has spurred the interest of
local shuras, at least as much as (and in some cases more
than) the prospect of a measure of security. Daud has
engaged local leaders in the northern districts of Sangin,
Baghran an Naw Zad, and the southern district of Garmser.
PRT officials say that leaders in those districts are
engaging Daud with greater urgency, while leaders in other
districts are also saying they want an arrangement like the
one in Musa Qala.


12. (S/NF) Sangin is one example of how the Musa Qala
arrangement is not easily replicated. Governor Daud's
engagement with Sangin leaders has proven more difficult than
with Musa Qala leaders, there being less tribal homogeneity
in Sangin and doubts about some local leaders and their
goals. The Governor has said that negotiations with Sangin
leaders could take some time. COMISAF has briefed local NATO
Ambassadors that ISAF would not agree to withdraw from Sangin
district center, since it lies on the main transit route to
the Kajaki Dam, a key reconstruction effort in the South.
However, there are some indications that ISAF may have
already begun preliminary negotiations with tribal elders in
Sangin. Rumors of like agreements being considered may raise
doubts among Afghans as to ISAF's degree of commitment. Daud
has also expressed concern that the Sangin Council may
include a heavy influence from narcotics dons who simply want
to secure a lighter foreign presence/peace until they can
harvest their crop. (CFC-A Comment: CFC-A is concerned that
the attraction of the apparent quiet gained by what may very

KABUL 00005399 004 OF 005


well be a short-term accommodation will blind ISAF to the
harmful long-term effects on the counterinsurgency campaign,
which calls for continual pressure on the enemy. Recent
intel indicators point to the strong possibility that the
Taliban have reestablished significant presence in Musa Qala.
End Comment)


13. (C/NF) Despite the differences with Musa Qala, latest
indications are that the Governor seems to be making progress
in Sangin, as he says he now has a list of proposed district
officials, provided by local leaders, that he says he can
accept. Daud is looking for some concessions from the shura,
principally a guarantee of security for the road that needs
to be built from Highway 1 to Kajaki, the site of USAID's
high-priority dam/energy project (REF B). Daud believes
there is a need for a joint ISAF/Afghan National Army
operation in neighboring Nahri Sarraj district (using
existing, not additional, forces),to clear out Taliban,
after which the Sangin shura will be able to look to its own
security. (Note: The Ambassador's cautionary comments on the
Musa Qala arrangement recently were published in the local
and British press. Some British officials feel that if an
arrangement with the Sangin shura provides security for, and
helps advance, a major U.S. project like the one in Kajaki,
the U.S. may set aside possible reservations about these
types of deals -- they are wrong. End Note).


14. (C/NF) COMMENT: The arrangement in Musa Qala brings some
relief to locals weary from fighting and displacement, and
creates an opening to be exploited, by the government or by
those opposed to the government. If locals are unsure of
whom to credit for the lull in fighting, it is important that
the government not be seen to recede but to re-insert Afghan
security forces to test the arrangement and to help bring
development into a conflict-torn district. This will help
win over the local populace but also clarify the intentions
of the local shura handed an unusual opportunity to assert
its own authority. However, we continue to hold doubts about
this kind of arrangement, and it remains to be seen whether
the Musa Qala agreement will last. Karzai told NSA Hadley
that he (Karzai) had instructed Governor Daud that there
should be "no more deals". END COMMENT.


15. (SBU) Summary of points in Musa Qala Agreement:

-- "Local Administration" (LA) will work to serve the public,
under the Afghan national flag. -- Uphold the
constitution and avoid illegal activity.
-- Maintain security in district, help stabilize region.
-- Facilitate develop and rehabilitation projects.
-- Collect taxes and consult wtih provincial authorities on
spending them on welfare activities.
-- The LA will support children going to schools and keep
doors open to the public. (Note: The government would
tolerate the curriculum being limited to the Koran if that
was the Shura's choice; no explicit direction to permit
girls' attendance).
-- Facilitate government missions and NGO activities.
-- Cooperate on keeping roads open.
-- Guarantee the movement and security of international and
national security forces while relocating ; protect
government property.
-- LA committed to not supporting any insurgency in other
districts and to not letting the district to again become a
haven for terrorists.
-- LA will coooperate with Ulemas to try to bring "Islamic
unity and fraternity" to all people in the region, bring
peace and remove enmity.
-- Ban and control illegal arms.
-- Facilitate the return of IDPs.
-- Approved LA will commence activities only after Governor's
approval.

KABUL 00005399 005 OF 005


-- Adjust arrangement only in agreement with the Governor.
End Points.

NEUMANN