Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL5387
2006-11-07 04:14:00
SECRET
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

NSA HADLEY HEARS PRESIDENT KARZAI'S VIEWS ON THE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER PINR AF 
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INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 4371
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RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005387 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

ISLAMABAD FOR A/S BOUCHER
DEPT FOR SCA/FO FOR GASTRIGHT
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR HADLEY, O'SULLIVAN, HARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-76 POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR AF
SUBJECT: NSA HADLEY HEARS PRESIDENT KARZAI'S VIEWS ON THE
CROSS-BORDER JIRGAS

REF: A. STATE 182909

B. KABUL 5218

C. KABUL 5002

D. KABUL 4990

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for Reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005387

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

ISLAMABAD FOR A/S BOUCHER
DEPT FOR SCA/FO FOR GASTRIGHT
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR HADLEY, O'SULLIVAN, HARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-76 POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR AF
SUBJECT: NSA HADLEY HEARS PRESIDENT KARZAI'S VIEWS ON THE
CROSS-BORDER JIRGAS

REF: A. STATE 182909

B. KABUL 5218

C. KABUL 5002

D. KABUL 4990

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for Reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) President Karzai used his November 2 dinner with NSA
Hadley to lay out his goals and plans for the cross-border
jirgas agreed to at the September 27 trilateral dinner in
Washington. Karzai confirmed that he hopes there will be two
parallel events, each addressing the security issues in the
border region. Karzai's idea is to use a combination of
tribal and state authority to confront and bring under
control those elements behind the violence. Karzai said he
has reached out to Pakistani tribal figures to explain his
vision, but that claims that he had issued invitations were
not correct. If Taliban supporters were to show up, Karzai
would welcome seeing them "crushed" in the face of the
authority of the jirgas. Karzai acknowledged there are risks
involved in his plan, and he underlined that success will
depend on both jirgas having "genuine," broad, national
participation, drawn from secular tribal leadership as well
as from federal and regional governmental structures,
religious leadership, and civic organizations. Karzai has
talked directly to Musharraf only briefly in Washington. He
believes his Pakistani counterpart will press for
participation drawn only from the immediate border region and
a less bold agenda. Karzai agreed that he probably will have
to see Musharraf personally to sell the idea of broader
participation. The Afghan president hopes for U.S. and UN
support in the planning process and representation at the
jirgas. He welcomed NSA's invitation to explain how, despite
years of disruptive war and dislocation, traditional tribal
authority holds sway in the border region -- as a complement

to democratic values. End Summary.

--------------
Karzai's Vision for the Jirgas
--------------


2. (S) During the November 2 dinner in Kabul hosted by
Afghan President Karzai for NSA Hadley, Karzai laid out his
goals, plans and actions to date relating to the cross-border
jirgas he and President Musharraf had agreed to during their
meeting with the President on September 27 in Washington.
Karzai confirmed that he wants the jirgas to focus on the
issue of security in the border region. Whether or not the
jirgas should have decision-making authority depends on how
they are organized, but it can be effective. "When a jirga
decides, the decision becomes binding. If it decides the
violence must end, even the Taliban must submit." However,
Karzai added that he would want to see how attendees are
shaping up before deciding whether the jirgas should be a
decision-making body, or merely consultative.


3. (S) Karzai reported he had written letters to more than
twenty tribal elders in the region explaining his vision for
the jirgas. Karzai mentioned Jamir Khan as one of those to
whom he had written, but said reports that he had issued an
invitation to Jamir Khan were not correct. Asked what he
would do if Jamir Khan and others with Taliban connections
were to show up at the jirga, Karzai said he would welcome
this development. "They would be crushed by the authority of
the jirga; they cannot defend what they do."

--------------
Broad, Moderate Participation will be Needed
--------------


4. (S) Pressed by NSA Hadley on how confident he was that

KABUL 00005387 002 OF 003


the agenda and outcome would conform to an agreed plan once
the jirgas got underway, Karzai said it all depended on the
participation. Both jirgas -- the one in Afghanistan and the
one in Pakistan -- must include "genuine," broad, national
participation. This means limiting participation by the
polarized groups currently in the border region -- to less
than 60 percent of those attending the Pakistani jirga,
according to Karzai. The objective is ensuring a strong,
moderate voice from representation drawn from a national pool
of secular (read moderate) tribal authorities, as well as
federal and regional officials, religous leaders, and civic
organizations. Karzai highlighted the need to have a
significant representation of women.


5. (S) According to Karzai, this broad participation would
ensure the voice and authority of the jirgas would represent
those who "reject violence, want peace, would be willing to
fight against the Taliban and support civil socity." Karzai
thought the only risk to his plan for binding decisions to
deal with violence and terrorism would be the failure to have
broad moderate representation at the jirgas. If he failed to
achieve that, he would not want to modify the jirgas' terms
of reference from "decision-making" to simply "consultative."
Pressed again on his confidence that the agenda could be
controlled, Karzai said the only risk would be if the issue
of the Durrand Line were raised, but he was confident that
could be avoided by careful planning and outreach to
participants beforehand.


6. (C) NSA Hadley asked Karzai about the dynamic between
tribal traditions and state structures and authority -- as
part of the jirga process and more broadly. Karzai stressed
that, in his view, the two systems are compatible and
complementary. He observed that Afghan civil society may not
be defined as Westerners see it, but it also is based on a
strong consultative tradition. Karzai was strong in saying
that having tribal and elected elements together strengthens
rather than subverts democracy.

--------------
Afghan-Pakistani Consultations and Planning
--------------


7. (S) Karzai agreed with NSA Hadley that successful jirgas
will probably require direct discussions with Musharraf.
Karzai said he and Musharraf talk regularly and have
discussed the jirgas (if superficially) on two occasions
since the Washington meeting. He used his call to Musharraf
on Eid (October 23) to say the sooner the jirgas take place,
the better. Musharraf had not disagreed. The Pakistani
president called back a few days later, when, according to
Karzai, Musharraf reiterated his belief that Baloch tribal
leader Nawab Akbar Bugti's grandson (and reported successor)
is currently in Afghanistan and insisted that he be delivered
to the GOP. Karzai said that, to this point, Musharraf has
been vague on timing and organization of the jirgas.


8. (S) Invited by NSA Hadley to name those he would like
Musharraf to name to represent Pakistan in planning
discussions, Karzai volunteered the names of Pakistani
Minister of Interior Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao and Minister of
Culture GG Jamal. Asked about Northwest Provinces Governor
Orakzai, Karzai said that, while Orakzai would certainly be
"in Musharraf's hands," his being part of the Pakistani
planning team was "okay."


9. (S) NSA Hadley asked Karzai who would be representing
Afghanistan in planning discussions with Pakistan. Karzai
said that Farook Wardak would be responsible for heading the
planning "secretariat," but that a respected political figure
with strong tribal ties and credentials would be given the
overall lead in talks with Pakistan. Pressed to confirm that
Pir Gailani would hold that position, Karzai said only that
Gailani's name had been discussed in a meeting the previous
day, but that not everyone had the same view. The key

KABUL 00005387 003 OF 003


criteria was that there needed to be individuals involved who
have strong ties to Pakistan. He assured NSA Hadley the
Afghan committee would be named shortly, adding "we are ready
to move on this. I don't know if Pakistan is, but we are
ready."

--------------
U.S. and United Nations' Role
--------------


10. (S) At three points in the meeting Karzai mentioned that
he wanted the UN and U.S. to play a role in the jirgas. This
would be particularly important in the planning process to
ensure that moderate elements were represented in both
jirgas. Karzai also welcomed international presence at the
jirgas themselves. NSA Hadley reiterated U.S. support for
the cross-jirga concept, underlining the expectation that we
would be supporting a process that would lead to positive and
constructive cross-border dialogue.

--------------
On the Role of Tribes in Afghanistan Today
--------------


11. (C) During the informal pre-dinner meeting, NSA Hadley
invited Karzai to describe the role of tribes in contemporary
Afghanistan -- specifically whether 30 years of war and
aftermath has undermined tribal effectiveness. Karzai agreed
that years of war, leading to lost homes and community ties,
had resulted in a generation that has lost contact with
Afghan history and traditions. These are the young men
vulnerable to madrassess. But the losses are not universal;
there are many provinces where the tribal structure and
influence remains strong. Karzai cited Arghandab District in
Kandahar, right next to Panjswai where he said the Taliban
have almost free rein. When the Taliban showed up in
Arghandab, the head of that district convened a shira and
organized a resistance. According to Karzai, the district
has remained perfectly safe.


12. (C) Karzai cited tradition and political service as the
keys to tribal influence. "You can't buy it; no amount of
money or guns will earn you that influence." You earn it by
being part of the tribe and serving the community. He added
that great responsibility comes with the influence. Elders
are responsible for seeing that the traditions and values --
"the psychology of the tribe" -- are passed down.


13. (U) This cable has NSC Clearance.
NEUMANN