Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL5277
2006-10-30 14:50:00
SECRET
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR NSA HADLEY VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF ECON IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4220
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #5277/01 3031450
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301450Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3826
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0195
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3183
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3317
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 6631
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 1971
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 005277 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC PASS TO NSA HADLEY AND AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR FATA
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF ECON IR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NSA HADLEY VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 005277

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC PASS TO NSA HADLEY AND AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR FATA
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF ECON IR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NSA HADLEY VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) Your November 1-3 visit to Afghanistan will be
greeted by a President and Afghan government with security
and reconstruction very much on their minds. The country is
facing some of its most serious challenges since the fall of
the Taliban. Since his return from Washington, President
Karzai appears more self-confident, but not necessarily
politically stronger. He appears impatient, and at times
frustrated, at the slow pace at which the country is
addressing its multitude of problems. He will be looking for
your support and encouragement, but assurances must be
balanced by a clear message -- from a partner and friend --
that he needs to do more himself. Karzai needs to know that
while we are committed to a partnership to improve security
and fight terrorism, at the same time, we are relying on his
leadership to take bold action on good governance and
corruption, make the hard decisions on poppy eradication, and
be more visible publicly in his efforts to improve the lives
of all Afghans. END SUMMARY

Dinner with President Karzai
--------------


2. (S) Your dinner with President Karzai will be an
opportunity to assure him of our commitment to the
U.S.-Afghan partnership. The jirgas will be front and center
in Karzai's mind. He feels strongly that the cross-border
jirgas can use the civil (read tribal) mechanism to bring
peace to the border area. There is a strong, underlying
suspicion about whether Pakistan will follow through. Karzai
wants to hear that the U.S. will help facilitate appropriate

and rapid attendance. He is convinced the North Waziristan
agreement is not working; intel supports this. Karzai will
want to know what we plan to do about it.


3. (S) The dinner would also be a good chance to convey the
following messages:

-- The U.S. and ISAF are committed to securing the gains in
the South. Getting the auxiliary police program up and
running will be key here. The GOA needs to be seen out front
in consolidating gains through active reconstruction and
development. (He'll tell us donors need to work faster.)

-- Karzai must show greater leadership in fighting
corruption, which is poisoning efforts to build a capable and
credible governance system. This is the most important issue
for building confidence in the government. Karzai should be
urged to support his Attorney General to imprison and remove
ineffective and corrupt provincial and district officials.

-- Praise Karzai for steps taken to appoint a new Chief
Justice and Supreme Court, and for selecting and an Attorney
General committed to attacking corruption.

-- Police reform is prerequisite to pursuading Afghans to
look towards the central government as the sole provider of
security and guarantor of justice. Kabul Police Chief,
General Guzar, no longer enjoys the trust of the citizens of
Kabul. He's been identified for dismissal by the probation
board and must go.

-- Auxiliary police units need to be representative of the
districts to which they are assigned and not be
tribally-based. Otherwise, they risk provoking local

KABUL 00005277 002 OF 005


hostility and degeneration into tribal militias. If units
are simply referred up from militias, they may not be loyal
to the central government.

-- The government must do more to demonstrate it is prepared
to address the poppy and narcotics problem. Push the ground
based spraying idea you raised in Washington. He needs to
convince the Afghan public (and the British) to allow us to
move forward.

-- Karzai should reach out more to the public in all
provinces. He should encourage his Ministers to do the same.
(Comment: Moving key Ministers to take responsibility for CN
efforts in different provinces was a good initiative. End
Comment.) The government needs to show its presence and
extend its reach throughout the country, particularly in
demonstrating its efforts and success on redevelopment and
police recruitment.

Meeting with NSA Rassoul
--------------


4. (S) NSA Rassoul would benefit from hearing directly from
you U.S. concerns about corruption, the lack of good
governance, and need for a strong more visible leadership.
One issue to impress upon Rassoul is that the GOA has made a
commitment to resolve the detainee legal framework issue.
The U.S. expects that commitment to be met in a thorough and
timely manner. President Karzai has suggested using existing
Afghan law to deal with detainees, rather than the proposed
presidential decree that had been developed in close
collaboration with Afghan officials. It is not yet clear
that existing law will be adequate. Resolving this question
will require leadership, above all from the Palace, to guide
an interagency review to determine whether existing Afghan
law can adequately address our mutual needs in this area.
The key message to Rassoul should be:

-- We appreciate the GOA's commitment to resolve the detainee
legal framework issue and expect it to be met in a thorough
and timely manner. The USG has made substantial material and
political investments in the return of Afghan detainees to
Afghan custody.

-- It is unclear to us that existing law to deal with
detainees will be adequate.

-- We hope that you will provide the leadership from the
Palace to direct a rapid interagency review of this question
soon.

-- All that said, we doubt Rassoul has the will to drive the
process. You should question him closely on how he sees his
role.

Meeting with Foreign Minister Spanta
--------------


5. (S) As difficult as dealing with current Afghan-Pakistan
relations can be, FM Spanta needs to make this his major
focus over the next 6-12 months. While the GOA's relations
with international partners and other neighbors are very
important, having a good relationship with Pakistan is
paramount. FM Spanta should avoid the pitfalls of setting an
overly ambitious agenda with his Pakistani counterpart, but
should make a concerted effort to have frequent meetings and
contact. We understand the risks involved for Spanta, but
those risks pale in comparison to the mid to long-term risks
of failing to maintain the momentum of the White House
Trilateral. Points for Spanta:

KABUL 00005277 003 OF 005



-- Good Afghan-Pakistan relations are key to improving
regional and cross-border stability, as well as U.S.
security.

-- The U.S. is supportive of the cross-border jirga
initiative. Afghan-Pakistan relations would benefit from
expanded regular contacts at all levels.

-- We hope that the Foreign Ministry will focus on this as a
top priority over the next year. You need a multi-faceted
approach to the problems. There is no silver bullet.

-- Spanta is focused also on Iran. He correctly understands
that Iran can do far more to hurt us (and the Afghans) than
we can counter. Spanta will seek reassurances that we would
exclude Afghanistan from obligations to enforce sanctions
(much as we did for years with Jordan or Turkey on Iraq).

Meeting with Counter Narcotics Minister Qaderi
-------------- -


6. (S) Habibullah Qaderi has been Minister of Counter
Narcotics for some 20 months, since the Ministry was
established. The UK is charged with developing capacity and
capability for his Ministry, but the Minister relies
considerably on the U.S. for policy guidance and is very
appreciative of our efforts in supporting the 5 Pillars of
the UN implementation Plan (note: the GOA and UK have 8
Pillars, the USG 5 plus Institution Building, Regional
Cooperation, and Demand Reduction, Prevention and Treatment),
esepcially in Alternative Livelihoods. Minister Qaderi is
very versed on the CN problem and fully understands its
relationship to terrorism, security, governance, and
corruption. Key messages for Qaderi are:

-- The U.S. is making preparations for Ground Based Spray
(GBS) during the next poppy cultivation season. The
environmental impact study is almost concluded and looks
positive. The U.S. is talking with the UK about GBS and will
do the same with ISAF and the GOA prior to coming to
President Karzai for agreement. You should ask Qaderi what
is needed to get Karzai's agreement.

-- The U.S. expects the GOA, with US and UK support, to
conduct a vigorous poppy eradication campaign with heavy
emphasis in Helmand Province. The GOA's Afghan Eradication
Force (AEF) will be deployed in central Helmand near the end
of January or beginning of February 2007. It needs to be
used more this year.

-- It is important that the GOA target and arrest major drug
traffickers and ensure that they are prosecuted through the
Criminal Justice Task Force and once convicted serve their
sentences in Afghan prisons.

-- The GOA must tackle corruption, much of which is related
to drug trafficking, in the provinces and at the central
government level. The GOA, with support from the USG, should
support the anti-corruption efforts of newly appointed
Attorney General Sabit.

Meeting With Parliament
--------------


7. (S) You will be meeting with Meshrano Jirga (Upper
House/Senate) Speaker Mujadedi, Wolesi Jirga (Lower House)
President Qanooni, and members of both houses. You will see
Upper House Deputy Speaker Hamed Galani and Lower House
Deputy Speaker Fawzia Koofi whom you met when they attended

KABUL 00005277 004 OF 005


the State of the Union address in January. The establishment
of the Afghan Parliament is one of Afghanistan's great
success stories. The U.S. is committed to strengthening the
Afghan Parliament and democratic representation in
Afghanistan. Key messages to the Parliamentarians include:

-- You are doing well. Cooperation with the GOA is
important and we hope it continues.

-- Urge ratification of the UN Convention on Corruption (a
London Compact Benchmark) and the Counter-Narcotics Law.

-- Will Parliament be able to enact key commercial framework
legislation vital to establishing a viable economy and
attracting domestic and foreign direct investment? This is a
key London Compact benchmark and is critical for creating
jobs and growing the economy.

-- Express U.S. support for improved Afghanistan-Pakistan
relations and explore the Parliament's view of President's
Karzai's proposal for cross-border jirgas.

Meeting with the Supreme Court
--------------


8. (S) You will be meeting with Chief Justice Azimi and
members of the Supreme Court. The new Chief Justice is much
more moderate than the last and also has vowed to reform the
court administratively. The U.S., through USAID, is working
with the Supreme Court to provide judicial and administrative
training and to support Azimi's efforts to accelerate
judicial reform. Points for Azimi include:

-- Congratulate him on the new court.

-- We are studying the reforms proposed by Chief Justice
Azimi. We will work with the international community to give
coordinated support.

-- We support Azimi's priorities to filter out unqualified
judges, fight corruption, improve IT and internet connections
at provincial courts, and improve judicial infrastructure,
including secure housing for judges.

-- Ask Azimi how he thinks the detainee impass can be
resolved. How can he use his influence?

Visit to Kandahar
--------------


9. (S) Your visit to Kandahar comes one day after the
transfer of authority (TOA) of ISAF Regional Command-South to
Dutch leadership. RC-South is currently launching
additional, limited post-Medusa operations to dislodge
Taliban elements in the Panjwayi and Zharay Districts.
Securing these with Afghan Security Forces will be critical
to consolidating the military gains achieved by Medusa.
Canadian forces want more Afghan forces but they cannot be
produced overnight. The Afghan National Auxiliary Police
(ANAP) is our best available answer; the allies could help
with funding. Canadian forces have taken multiple casualties
since the heavy Medusa fighting subsided. In response, the
security priority has shifted to the construction of a more
secure 4-km combat road (dubbed "Route Summit") running
north-south between the two district centers. We are
prepared to start the work quickly if the Germans cannot do
so (they have offered).


10. (S) Besides security, the key challenges facing Kandahar
Governor Asadullah Khalid are reconstruction and development

KABUL 00005277 005 OF 005


and the return of 15,000 internally displaced persons (IDP)
families. The provincial government remains weak. This
weakness, combined with corruption (fingers point at Karzai's
brother) and insecurity, has bled popular support for both
Governor Khalid and the Karzai Government. The World Food
Program (WFP),UNHCR, and UNICEF have been working with the
PRT and provincial government to provide emergency food and
non-food supplies for the IDPs.


11. (S) Damage levels vary across the area but those
villages where Taliban defended in force suffered severe
damage. Elders at shuras convened to encourage the return of
IDPs have made clear that returns to the districts will
remain minimal until the security situation improves. The
delay in the return of the IDPs compounds the insecurity on
the ground as it creates a vacuum in which the Taliban can
operate.


12. (S) The Policy Action Group has been focusing on Afghan
Development Zones (ADZs) to concentrate and coordinate
resources in relatively secure areas. The ADZ for Kandahar
is expected to include Kandahar city and environs as well as
Panjwayi and Zharay. The Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA) and USAID have dedicated significant resources
to the province in complementary programs. In your meetings
in Kandahar, you may wish to articulate the following points:

-- Congratulate the Dutch for taking over RC-South. Stress
our understanding that it is critical to consolidate the
initial victory with security and development; ask how
commanders evaluate the problems.

-- The continued development of the ANSF, both in terms of
capabilities and numbers, is crucial but slow. The U.S. is
committed to make this happen, in close coordination with the
GOA and international partners.

-- We are committed to reconstruction activities as fast as
security allows. We want to work with our Canadian
colleagues.

With Governor Khalid:

-- Commend the Governor's efforts to secure the province.
The U.S. supports building a strong security force in
Kandahar.

-- The U.S. is already working to build an auxiliary police
force. Ask how it can be broadly based and kept under real
MOI command and control.

-- Khalid believes the recent agreement in Musa Qala district
in Helmand is dangerous. Stress that this is a test case,
should not be duplicated until we are satisfied that the
arrangement can work, and that we agreed recently with ISAF
and President Karzai that as soon as possible police from
outside the Musa Qala area must deploy there.

-- Ask Khalid what he needs to improve his ability to deliver
services to his people.

NEUMANN