AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH KANDAHAR GOVERNOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005215

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH KANDAHAR GOVERNOR

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C/NF) During an October 22 meeting in Kandahar,
Ambassador Neumann and Governor Khalid discussed the Afghan
National Auxiliary Police Program (ANAP) and agreed that
recruits for the ANAP needed to come from all regions of the
province and not be based on one tribe or individual if we
are to avoid turning ANAP forces into individual militias.
The Ambassador suggested, and the Governor agreed, to work
with Canadian or U.S. forces if necessary to get out to the
elders to explain the ANAP program to tribal leaders
throughout the province and seek their assistance in
recruiting members for the program. The Ambassador and
Governor shared concerns about the recent 14-point agreement
in Musa Qala, Helmand Province, where Governor Daud struck a
deal with local tribal elders that involves the withdrawl of
British troops from hotly contested positions. Governor
Khalid believes that the area will become a "paradise" for
the Taliban and drug lords. One way to test the agreement
will be to send in ANP forces from outside the area. END
SUMMARY

Auxiliary Police
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2. (C/NF) During an October 22 visit to Kandahar, Ambassador
Neuman briefed Kandahar Governor Assadullah Khalid on the
latest developments on the Afghan National Auxiliary Police
(ANAP) program. He said the U.S. was currently paying for
ANAP with help promised (but not yet received) from the
Germans, the UK, Canada, and the Dutch. He explained that
because Congress mandated where the money was to be used,
funding for the ANAP program must be structured through the
Ministry of Interior. He stressed the necessity for the ANAP
to come from different tribes and regions for the program to
work. He also emphasized the importance of drawing ANAP unit
personnel from all of a province's tribes and clans; a
non-representative force could provoke locals' hostility and
degenerate into an oppressive tribal militia. Several
provincial governors had requested village and district-level
police and have been told the same thing -- that they must
come from all parts of the province. A major challenge is
that we must go "fast and wide", the Ambassador said. All
major tribes needed to be involved, with no one left out.
The program had to be based locally but answerable to the
GOA. Otherwise, the ANAP program will fail and we will not
be building the future of Afghanistan but establishing
militias. The Ambassador asked for the Governor's help in
bringing in effective and loyal auxiliary police.


3. (C/NF) Governor Khalid agreed, saying that this was an
extremely important issue for him. He prefaced his comments
by saying that the training at the Regional Training Center
of the first group of ANAP recruits was too tough, especially
during Ramazan. He suggested that calisthentics was not a
good use of time during a short training program. He then
promised to speak "honestly and openly" on the issue and
asked that his comments not be shared with President Karzai.
The Governor said he felt more responsible than anyone else
on the ANAP issue, commenting that it was his idea
originally. He believed that the ANAP program was necessary
for Afghanistan and Kandahar, but cautioned that if it was
not done properly, ANAP could be more dangerous than the
Taliban. If ANAP is based on tribes or centered on an
individual, the country will just end up with militias, not a

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national police. Basing ANAP in an area from just one tribe
would mean that the police would just follow one tribal
leader, not the government. The Governor then asked, "so
where do we bring them from"? He explained that he would
start talking to tribal leaders to explain the ANAP program
and its security benefits. He would ask them to send their
best people to join the ANAP. The Ambassador suggested and
the Governor agreed to work with Canadian or U.S. forces as
needed to reach out to elders to explain the program and seek
their help in recruiting. The Governor shared his ideas for
the total number of ANAP needed for various districts,
including a reserve unit that could be mobilized around the
province and neighboring provinces. These ideas have been
passed to CSTC-A.


4. (C/NF) The Governor then addressed concerns he believed
were held by some in CSTC-A that he was trying to build
militias in Kandahar. The Governor shared that he told them
that he is not from Kandahar, so he has no militias and asked
"why do I need a militia"? He noted an example in his
defense of what transpired when he fired the Police Chief in
Zharay District. The local leader took his entire 40-man
unit with him when he left. Similarly, on whether the
Governor was overly influenced by Ahmad Wali Karzai (AWK),
the Head of the Provincial Council in Kandahar and brother of
President Karzai, he said that "he hears things on the
streets" and knows that many people assume he is dependent
upon AWK. The Governor noted that people often petition AWK
for help on issues. The Governor is mindful that President
Karzai is just a phone call away for AWK. The Governor
stressed that he sometimes takes advice from AWK but "from
others too". The Governor said that President Karzai was a
"good guy, respected" and the only one in Afghanistan who
could do the job. Answering a question about his relations
with Deputy Minister of Interior Hadi Khalid, the Governor
responded that he did not know him well but would answer the
question honestly. The Governor said he thought that both
Khalid and Minister of the Interior Zarar Ahmad Muqbil were
"too weak". He reserved special scorn for the Minister,
however, and said he was "not a good guy." However, he found
the Deputy Minister to be "a guy who wants to do a good job".
The problem was that "he had no base and maybe no support
from Karzai".


5. (C/NF) The Ambassador responded that we could move beyond
these concerns by working with the elders and helping to
build a strong ANAP in Kandahar. Those efforts would show
people that the Governor was not interested in building his
own militia. The Ambassador suggested that the PRT work with
the elders and tribal leaders. If we continue to work
together to build a strong ANAP, this would also build a base
for strengthening the ANP. The first place to look for new
ANP should be the ANAP, which is a temporary force, the
Ambassador explained. (Note: The Ministry of Interior is
deploying a team led by a senior officer to each province in
which ANAP will be recruited. The purposed of this team is
to engage the provincial and district elders and leadership
to explain the ANAP concept and urge these leaders to send
the "best sons of Afghanistan" to join the ANAP".)

"Truce" With Taliban in Musa Qala Region of Helmand
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6. (C/NF) Governor Khalid raised his concerns about the
recent 14-point agreement in Musa Qala where Governor Daud
struck a deal with local tribal elders that involves the
withdrawal of British troops from hotly contested positions
in Helmand province. The Governor was afraid that such a
deal might be replicated in Kandahar. He complained that

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ISAF is over-correcting a previous fault and is now placing
too much attention on tribal relations. He predicted that
Musa Qala would become a "paradise" for the Taliban and drug
lords. The Ambassador said that we shared the same concerns.
He suggested that one way to test the agreement would be to
send in police from outside Musa Qala to patrol the area.
That would tell us who was in authority. If the Taliban
don't let the police in, then we'll know there is no
agreement. The Governor responded that "we have already
given the area back".


7. (C/NF) Ambassador Neuman stressed that until we've tested
the agreement, there should be no other agreements like it.
He said that he was nervous about the deal, especially since
the area was near the Kajiki dam project which could not be
completed with such an untested agreement as the sole basis
for security. Foreigners will be working there for one year
and we could not afford to have them be hostage to the
Taliban keeping its word. He explained that the dam will be
the most important project in the South, providing
electricity to Kandahar and Lashka Gah and generating all
kinds of economic activity. Moreover, the labor force would
be coming from within the province, but if workers are unable
transit the area, this would create big problems. (See also
septel on the Musa Qala agreement).


8. (C/NF) Comment: Governor Khalid appears to be aware of
the factors that negatively affect his reputation in the
international community. He took particular pains to
distance himself from Ahmad Wali Karzai. He also emphasized
that his efforts in the security field were intended to
achieve results but not to build his own militia. He agreed
with all of the Ambassador's points on the ANAP program,
softly backing away from his earlier viewpoint that his
office should control salaries of the ANAP. Governor Khalid
appears to be very concerned about his relationship with the
Canadians and wants to maintain an open channel with the
United States. End Comment.


NEUMANN