PAG REPORT OCT 2: MOVING ON GOVERNANCE AND AUX POLICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 004783

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2016
TAGS:
PREL, PGOV, PTER, ASEC, MARR, AF
SUBJECT: PAG REPORT OCT 2: MOVING ON GOVERNANCE AND AUX
POLICE

Classified By: CDA Richard Norland for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The October 2 Policy Action Group (PAG) meeting agreed
on an general action plan for Afghan Development Zones
(ADZs). Two GOA teams will be going to Helmand and Kandahar
provinces to assess the state of governance there, with the
aim of identifying and removing incompetent or corrupt
officials. The Ministry of Interior will be sending five
teams to assess auxiliary police needs and recruitment in
Ghazni, Uruzgan, Kandahar, Helmand, and Farah. A/DCM raised
concerns about the recent assassinations of Afghan Women's
Affairs officials and called for greater protection by the
GOA. The PAG discussed a set of recommendations for enhanced
strategic communications, including a GOA-hosted seminar for
religious leaders worldwide who would issue decrees against
suicide bombings. The PAG previewed issues for the October 4
PAG meeting with President Karzai, which will likely include
a security update, decisions on ADZs, and strategic
communications. END SUMMARY


2. (C) At the October 2 Policy Action Group (PAG) meeting,
chaired by National Security Advisor Dr. Zalmai Rassoul,
members heard briefings on the status of Afghan Development
Zones (ADZs) and updates from some of the PAG Pillar Groups
which are: (a) Security Operations; (b) Reconstruction and
Development; (c) Strategic Communications; and (d)
Intelligence Fusion.

IACT WG Visit to ADZs: Follow-up Action Plan
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3. (C) The Strategic Communications Group (SCG) briefed PAG
members on recent visits by the PAG Implementation and
Coordination Team (IACT) Working Group (WG) to several ADZ
sites, noting that the visit was planned at a critical time.
The SCG's outreach was welcomed by local districts. The SCG
explained the relationship between provincial areas and the
PAG, including the concept of ADZs. Several calls for action
came out of the visit, which will serve as an action plan:
(a) the ADZs should be the focus of rapid action by the GOA
and the IC; (b) a Joint Security Plan for ADZ provinces is
needed to determine the roles and tasks of all security
sectors; (c) support and improve governance in the ADZs,
including identifying and replacing ineffective and corrupt
officials and seconding capable officials to provinces; (d)
increase financial resources available to Governors; (e)
improve police capability in ADZs; (f) increase
reconstruction and development in ADZs; and increase
information sharing; (g) increase Ministerial-level visits to
ADZs; and (i) engage tribal shuras and religious leaders to
counter anti-government forces.


4. (C) Discussion then followed on how best to define the
boundaries of the ADZs. NSA Rassoul argued that we needed to
define ADZ boundaries, particularly since we needed the
appropriate level of forces to secure them. Others argued
that we didn't need to define the boundaries too tightly
since we would need to extend security beyond them. Defense
Minister Wardak agreed that it was not a good idea to
publicize where the boundaries were, but in order to properly
calculate the force structure, based on terrain and other
factors, boundaries would be needed. He said this was
particularly important in deciding where to place observation
posts, border posts and outer perimeters, as well as the

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necessary patrols. The Dutch representative argued against
limiting military operations to ADZs, even though that is
where the Taliban will be attacking. He said he was getting
reports that people in Uruzgan were feeling left out of the
ADZ process. NSA Rassoul reminded the PAG that this
discussion had taken place two months ago at great length.
He pointed to Pakistan and the money that was being thrown at
the Taliban and urged the PAG to start delivering emergency
services on the ground. The ADZs were just part of the
equation, he asserted.


5. (C) CFC MG Wilson said a lot of things were also happening
at the strategic level. While it was "background stuff", he
pointed to the tripartite talks, the border management
initiative, and the movement by Pakistan to deal with border
issues. Wilson said that the ADZs were just one initiative
at the tactical level.


6. (C) Responding to the SCG's points on the ANA, CSTC-A MG
Durbin (CG, CSTC-A) described the ANA as being good enough,
but not big enough, due to the manner in which it is being
built. At the current pace, it is being accelerated in the
manner in which the international community can support. MG
Durbin agreed that the auxiliary police needed to be sped up,
which will help alleviate an overstretched ANA. He noted
that some limitations existed due to the way appropriations
were made, so when and how to use funding will remain an
issue. National Directorate for Security (NDS) Chief,
Amrullah Saleh, agreed that the auxiliary police were key.
He said that the Pakistan issue will always be with us in one
form or another. The ANA should not be used to preserve
security, but for fighting and crushing the Taliban. On the
strategic questions, he shared that the NDS was in touch with
the ISI almost daily, by fax, phone and exchanges of
delegations. Pakistan's political desires will determine if
there will be cooperation or not, regardless of what
information is provided to Pakistan.


7. (C) Deputy UNSRSG Chris Alexander commended the IACT WG's
action plan, as it zeroed in what was doable. He said some
issues, such as more officials for Helmand Province, could be
addressed at the October 4 PAG meeting with President Karzai.
Funding for the police would also have to be brought to
President Karzai's attention. NSA Rassoul concluded the
discussion and the PAG agreed on the action plan.

Improving Governance in the ADZs
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8. (C) The Minister of Interior pointed to several moves that
had been made recently to improve provincial governance in
the four ADZs in Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul and Uruzgan, such
as appointing new governors or police chiefs in Helmand,
Kandahar, and Zabul. He said that the MOI was sending a team
to Kandahar to take a full assessment of the governance
situation and to look at identifying and replacing
ineffective and corrupt officials in the ADZs. Another
delegation will go to Helmand. To strengthen the regional
command center in Kandahar, MOI has already selected 25 new
officers, and an auxiliary police program in Zabul has
started on a pilot basis.


9. (C) The Minister of Education argued for the need to have
an honest review and assessment of the situation. Part of
this process has to include coming up with a way to find good
people to replace corrupt officials, creating a national
database of solid candidates, developing a junior civilian
corps, and increasing salaries so that there are incentives

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for people to take risks. All of this is as important as
ADZs and auxiliary police, he asserted. He said all
governors in the country would support this process.

Auxiliary Police
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10. (C) The Deputy Minister of Interior briefed on his
recent visits to Zabul and Kandahar. His assessment of Zabul
was that there was great district-level support for auxiliary
police. Five hundred volunteers were now willing to join the
program. The vetting process was now finishing, with one
class in training and 180 individuals ready for new classes.
The training course involves 5 days in class and 5 days on
the range. Forty-five auxiliary police will graduate within
the week and will wear uniforms.


11. (C) In Kandahar, the Minister met with the chief of
police who is now supporting the program. Two problems in
Kandahar, however, were raised. Currently, most districts in
Kandahar have no professional chief of districts or officers.
In addition, auxiliary police need to be led by regular
police, but the scarcity of professional police in the
province creates the problem of no one there to lead the
auxiliary police. One suggestion is to send professional
police from Kabul, but this requires funding since the police
would have to be relocated along with their families.


12. (C) The Deputy Minister of Interior reported that five
teams would soon go to Ghazni, Uruzgan, Kandahar, Helmand,
and Farah, starting with Kandahar for the purpose of
recruiting. The question was then raised as to whether
members of the international community should accompany the
teams. NSA Rassoul said there would be no time. MOI said
that the main purpose of the teams was to try to identify
recruits. NDS argued that outreach should be carried out by
Afghans alone in order to demonstrate to the people that the
GOA can stand up on its own. There was a psychological
beneft to this, he said.


13. (C) General Durbin added that CSTC-A and ISAF could
support simultaneous training in up to five provinces. Two
week training programs could be carried out in all five
provinces if there were enough training teams. A 10-person
team could train 100 men. Five 10-person training teams
could train 500, all in two weeks. Currently, there is
enough equipment for 4,000 new police. MG Durbin commented
on a point made by one PAG member regarding a lack of
ammunition, by pointing out that there was not a shortage of
ammunition, only a shortage of vetted reliable leaders to
whom the ammunition could be issued and can demonstrate and
maintain appropriate property accountability. We don't want
unqualified leaders being issued ammunition, only to find it
being sold in bazaars and to the Taliban, he stated.


14. (C) The Education Minister stressed the importance of
introducing legitimacy into the process by getting the right
people and properly screening them. He stated that if police
authority -- including auxiliary police tied to the community
-- existed, the Taliban would not dare attack since it would
be an attack on the community, not the state. He said that
even the Taliban would not do this.


15. (C) The Defense Minister stressed again that auxiliary
police were key. He said we had already wasted two weeks.
The pilot program in Zabul was not sufficient, so the GOA has
decided to go ahead with the five teams to other provinces.
He asked MG Durbin to start pre-positioning equipment and

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uniforms, so that we didn't have to wait once the recruits
were inducted. This will allow us to release some ANA from
police duties, he said.

Attacks on Women's Affairs Department Officials
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16. (C) A/DCM raised U.S. concerns about recent attacks on
the Ministry of Women's Affairs officials, noted that a
number of MOWA officials had received death threats, and
suggested that the Department and its affiliated NGOs be
afforded greater protection. The NDS Chief responded that as
the general security level rises, it will cover these
concerns, making it harder for insurgents to attack such
groups. The Minister of Interior said that he had also heard
about the threat against the Khost Women's Affairs Department
head and would meet with her to address these concerns.

Strategic Communications Strategy: Recommendations
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17. (C) The Minister of Information and Communications then
briefed on recommendations for strategic communications that
would involve traditional forms, security issues, and
reconstruction and development.

a) (C) One recommendation is to host an international seminar
of Muslim religious leaders from all over the world. The
seminar would help draft decrees on such issues as suicide
attacks and polio vaccination. For example, the decree on
suicide attacks would challenge the Islamic legitimacy of
such actions. Mullahs from Egypt, Pakistan and other Muslim
countries would be invited. Since the Taliban are largely
illiterate, the seminar would produce fatwahs and decrees
that would target the Taliban. The Egyptian Embassy in Kabul
has already agreed to recruit mullahs for the seminar.

b) (C) Another proposal is to draft messages to be
disseminated by mullas for prayers and at mosques.

c) (C) The Reconstruction and Development subgroup recommends
that the Minister of Rural Reconstruction and Development
visit Panjwai and other districts to monitor needs there,
which would have a positive aspect on the districts. Media
will be invited to accompany the Minister.

d) (C) The Reconstruction and Development subgroup has asked
all Ministries how best to communicate reconstruction and
development efforts. The group will be hosting an
interagency meeting on October 5.

e) (C) The Ministry of Information and Communication will be
asked to establish a center to analyze and monitor the media
to help address the gap between the government and the
people. The Ministry believes it can help bridge this gap.
The Minister claimed to the PAG that it had received the
lowest level of assistance and aid in the national budget.

f) (C) A final recommendation was to ask Ministers to attend
or send staff to the regular strategic communications
sessions. Apparently, participation from other Ministries
has been low.

October 4 PAG Meeting with President Karzai
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18. (C) Participants agreed that various aspects of the
meeting's discussion (including ADZs and strategic

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communications) should be placed on an agenda for the next
PAG meeting which would be chaired by President Karzai on
October 4 (septel).

NORLAND