Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL444
2006-02-01 12:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

ARIANA UNSCHEDULED FLIGHT DIVERSIONS ON JANUARY

Tags:  EAIR ECON AF 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000444 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA/FO, SA/A, EB/OTP, EB/CBA
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, AMEND
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A
TREASURY FOR PARAMESWARAN
COMMERCE FOR AADLER
TRANSPORTATION FOR DMODESITT
FAA FOR JHANCOCK AND TMARZIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016
TAGS: EAIR ECON AF
SUBJECT: ARIANA UNSCHEDULED FLIGHT DIVERSIONS ON JANUARY
23, 2006


Classified by Economic Officer Michael Kidwell. Reasons 1.4
(b,d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000444

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA/FO, SA/A, EB/OTP, EB/CBA
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, AMEND
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A
TREASURY FOR PARAMESWARAN
COMMERCE FOR AADLER
TRANSPORTATION FOR DMODESITT
FAA FOR JHANCOCK AND TMARZIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016
TAGS: EAIR ECON AF
SUBJECT: ARIANA UNSCHEDULED FLIGHT DIVERSIONS ON JANUARY
23, 2006


Classified by Economic Officer Michael Kidwell. Reasons 1.4
(b,d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) On January 23, 2006, Minister of Transport Qasimi
requested expedited landing clearance at Kandahar Airfield
for two flights from Ariana Afghan Airlines, the state-owned
carrier. While the Minister gave no details to justify the
request, Post learned from Ariana that passengers (pilgrims
returning from the Hajj in Saudi Arabia) on one or both of
the flights had threatened the crew if the planes did not
proceed directly to Kandahar Airfield (operated by Combined
Forces Air Component Command (CFACC)) instead of to Kabul.
Ariana eventually rerouted the flights to Kandahar and Post
obtained landing clearance for the aircraft. Post does not
believe there were terrorist motives to the attack, but
rather that an unruly group of Afghan pilgrims, fed up with
Ariana service, was desperate to get home as soon as
possible. Still, the Minister's unwillingness to disclose
the details of the incident (both to the Embassy and the
Afghan Presidency) raises serious concerns about the
transparency and safety of aviation operations in
Afghanistan. Post recommends that the USG keep this incident
in mind when considering Afghan requests for Ariana service
into the US (operated by wet-lease via a European stopover).
End summary.


2. (C) Minister of Transport Enayatullah Qasimi contacted
Embassy FAA officer just before 17:00 on January 23 to
request landing clearance in Kandahar for Ariana aircraft
carrying pilgrims returning from Saudi Arabia after the Hajj.
(Note: Due to ongoing runway refurbishment at Kandahar, the
airport is currently only open from sunrise to 12:00 noon
each day. Clearance for returning Hajj flights has been
granted at different times provided that the Ministry of
Transport requests such clearance 24 hours in advance.) The
Minister declined to provide a justification for the
expedited clearance. Consequently, Embassy FAA officer
contacted Ariana Airlines directly to find out the details

about the aircraft and why they needed expedited clearance
for Kandahar. Lufthansa Consultant and acting CEO of Ariana
Hanns Marienfeld informed him that pilgrims on two Ariana
A300 aircraft had "threatened to kill the crew" if they were
not taken directly to Kandahar. (Note: Given that Hajj
pilgrims on board Ariana flights have previously killed two
ministers, such threats must be viewed as credible. While
Ariana could not specify whether the threat was directed at
the flight crew or cabin crew, it is likely that it was aimed
at the cabin crew as the pilot was in constant contact with
Ariana and appeared relatively calm. End note.) It was
unclear initially where the two planes were and for most of
the evening January 23, Post understood that the planes were
on the ground at Ras Al Khaima airstrip in the United Arab
Emirates. On January 24, Post learned that one aircraft had
indeed been in Ras Al Khaima (UAE),but that the other had
been in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.


3. (C) Embassy staff liaised with appropriate CFC-A and
CJTF76 staff to obtain clearance at Kandahar and to
coordinate a response. Post was unable to obtain manifests
for the flights at the time. (Note: Post believes that
Ariana may not have even created detailed manifests for the
flights. However, Post believes it unlikely that any Amcits
were onboard. End note.) After Embassy FAA officer
clarified with Ariana that the aircraft were on the ground in
Ras Al Khaima (only partly true as it turned out),Post
informed AmEmbassy Abu Dhabi, and FAA Kabul coordinated
further actions with FAA Abu Dhabi.

4. (C) Embassy FAA officer confirmed landing clearance with
the Kandahar Airfield. When Combined Forces Air Component
Command (CFACC) staff confronted Minister Qasimi about the
unfolding events, the Minister reluctantly acknowledged that
passengers had "threatened bodily harm" if they were not
taken to Kandahar. However, according to Ariana staff in
Kabul (who were in touch with the flight crew by radio),the
passengers made death threats against the crew. Information
available at the time indicated that this was a not a planned
hijacking or terrorist action. Most of the pilgrims had been
in Saudi Arabia for almost six weeks, and many had been
delayed when transferred from Kandahar to Kabul as they
departed for Hajj in early December. Post believes that
these were tired, unruly pilgrims that wanted to get home and
had no other agenda. The Charge also informed President
Karzai's chief of staff about the incident as the Ministry of
Transport had not informed the Presidency. The chief of
staff asked for U.S. support in facilitating landings at
Kandahar. (Note: Subsequently, the President's chief of
staff confirmed that the Ministry of Transport never
responded to his request for more details on the incident.
End note.)


5. (C) Post is unable to confirm how the incident began.
Initial reports from Ariana indicated that both aircraft were
making scheduled stops in Ras Al Khaima before proceeding to
Kabul. Passengers on one aircraft then threatened the crew
and demanded to be taken to Kandahar directly. Passengers on
the second plane heard about the first incident and then made
the same threats and demands. Another, perhaps more
plausible, report suggests that the first A300 was en route
to Kabul, as the pilot had determined before take off that he
did not want to land an A300 at night in Kandahar (Note: The
airstrip is narrow and the approach is more dangerous at
night. Landing would have been safer at Kabul. End note.)
Though Post confirmed that Ariana had determined earlier that
week not to use A300s for flights into Kandahar, Ariana may
not have announced that decision to its passengers.
In-flight, when the pilot announced that the aircraft was en
route to Kabul, the passengers became unruly and threatened
the crew. The aircraft then made an unscheduled stop in Ras
Al Khaima. Based on lack of action by UAE authorities and
reports from the DATT in Abu Dhabi, it appears that Ariana
never informed the airport tower or airport authorities in
UAE about the situation. It is unclear how the second
aircraft heard of these events or if, in fact, the passengers
of the second plane (which Post now knows was in Jeddah at
the time) even made similar threats and demands.


6. (C) At approximately 19:30, Embassy FAA officer confirmed
that two Ariana-operated 727s were en route to Ras Al Khaima.
The smaller planes are easier to land in Kandahar and were
piloted by different crews. Ariana transferred all 220
passengers from the A300 in Ras Al Khaima onto the two 727s.
Both planes flew directly to Kandahar with local landing
times of approximately 02:00 and 03:00. The second A300
arrived from Jeddah into Kandahar at local time 06:00.
Ariana reported no further unrest from the passengers. At
the request of Minister Qasimi, Kandahar Airfield granted
24/7 landing rights for Hajj flights for the next few days.
This should expedite return of the Afghan pilgrims from Saudi
Arabia and reduce the likelihood of further incidents.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) This incident raises serious concerns about the
transparency of flight operations on the part of Ariana and
the Ministry of Transport. The Minister was quite willing to
request landing clearance without informing the airfield
about the unruly, threatening passengers onboard the incoming
aircraft. Further, neither Ariana nor the Ministry were
willing to provide a manifest of the flight, though both
maintained that no Amcits were onboard the flights. The
Ministry and Ariana seem to be more concerned about public
perceptions than about the safety of their passengers. Post
anticipates that, if pressed, Ariana and the Ministry may
deny that the incident took place. Post recommends that this
incident be a strong factor in considering whether or not to
support Ariana's and the Minister's request for a wet-lease
flight into the US (with a European stopover). End comment.
NORLAND