PRT/MEHTARLAM - THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 004326

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT,
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2016
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT/MEHTARLAM - THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE AND
PROVINCIAL INSECURITY IN LAGHMAN

REF: KABUL 4232

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Richard Norland for reasons 1.4 b
, d.


1. (SBU) Summary: The Afghan National Police (ANP) is
the predominant Afghan government institution
responsible for the security of Laghman province.
Its recent performance has engendered mistrust by
the local population and is in many cases directly
responsible for the deterioration in security
particularly observable in the districts of Dowlat
Shah and Alishang. This has allowed Taliban
officials to operate with relative impunity while
they attempt to destabilize the current district and
provincial governments. End summary.


2. (SBU) The current ability and operational state
of the ANP as a source of concern was discussed at
recent PRT related conferences at Coalition Force,s
Regional Command (RC) East, ISAF,s RC West and
NATO,s Kabul Headquarters. Mission, personnel and
logistics are all problematic. Reports from all over
the country describe an inadequately trained and
resourced institution still largely influenced by
corruption instead of professionalism. Laghman,s
experience is exacerbated by the fact that, unlike
some provinces, it lacks other security forces which
could supplement its ability to defend the
government, enforce the law and improve the security
posture of the province.

Mission Versus Reality
--------------


3. (C) Laghman,s Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF) are composed of the National Directorate of
Security (NDS) and the ANP. It lacks Border Police,
Highway Police and a full time ANA encampment (the
ANA is currently limited to a company sized unit
collocated with the PRT for training by ETT,s). The
ANP suffers from the public perception that it is
responsible not only for protecting them from
criminal activities but also from insurgents. The
ANP, lacking sufficient manpower, firepower,
training, equipment, will and leadership, is simply
incapable of acting as a viable entity to prevent a
counter-insurgency. In at least two districts
(Dowlat Shah and Alishang) they have reached mutual
non-aggression pacts with local Anti-Government
Elements (AGE.) AGE,s can and do walk armed through
the bazaar in Qalai Najil, Dowlat Shah district.
Indeed they recently replaced an Afghan flag there
with a Taliban flag despite the presence of police.
This aptly demonstrated the weakness of the
government to district inhabitants and was a prelude
to a Taliban "takeover" of the area. Approximately
120 ANA and PRT personnel responded to the reported
presence of Taliban. The ANP was not in evidence.
Although the Taliban were unable to control the town
during the daylight hours, they took up a position
on the high ground overlooking the village. When at
the end of five days the GoA/CF personnel departed
the area, the Taliban had not moved from their
positions.

Personnel
--------------

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4. (U) The typical ANP policeman is poorly trained,
clothed, equipped, paid and motivated. They are all
supposedly graduates of the Regional Training
Centers (RTC),but give no evidence of the
professional behavior expected of trained
individuals. The ANP who have accompanied PRT
missions routinely wander about looking to acquire
items the PRT has planned to hand out to local
individuals. Those that do pay attention to security
tend to hit or threaten individuals who crowd PRT
personnel. While villagers seem to take this
behavior in stride, the PRT has been obliged to
limit ANP assistance in order to minimize the effect
this has on people,s perceptions of the PRT mission.
In one case, while the PRT was conducting a shura
for which it had provided food, the ANP deserted
their posts to take places at tables in order to
eat, obliging invited guests to stand and forego the
meal. This is indicative of a lack of leadership,
even though there is a disproportionate ratio of
officers (one for each 1.78 policemen) in the
department. Even when mentors are in place at the
PRT, there are insufficient resources to let them
get to the required locations to evaluate, monitor
and mentor police personnel. The public relations
value of the ANP as a government institution is
distinctly negative.

Lack of Equipment
--------------


5. (U) The ANP lacks a sufficient amount of
everything. There is an insufficient supply of AK-
47,s for each policeman to have his own. Most of
these are Czech made, which are said to jam after
one or two shots. They have not been trained to
clean their weapons, and there are in any case no
cleaning kits. Smith and Wesson 9mm pistols have
recently been issued, but the recipients have not
been trained in their use, despite reports to the
contrary. In one case, a proud policeman was seen
with a holstered pistol that still had an orange
safety plug for shipping still in the breach, and
was surprised to hear that the weapon wouldn,t fire
with it in place. Until last month, provincial
policemen typically had between one and three
magazines containing 20-30 rounds each. They were
understandably reluctant to engage with such limited
ammunition. Though additional ammunition has been
shipped, it is uncertain whether it has been
distributed to the field. Heavy weapons are asked
for at every meeting. The police find it difficult
to defend their positions, even when this does not
require going outside of their compounds, since
their adversaries have rockets, RPG,s, and both
heavy and light machine guns. As mentioned above,
there is no backup for an attack without using the
ANA trainees and turning the PRT into a kinetic
force.


6. (C) A lack of equipment prevents communications
at a provincial level (even cell phone service is
problematic to non-existent in most of the
districts) and between units within a given
district. Some district Chiefs of Police (CoP) have
bought walkie-talkies to facilitate communication,
but these are not secure and everyone can and does

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listen in. Remote observation posts lacking
communications equipment are unable to warn their
colleagues of suspicious activities observed.
Vehicles are also lacking. Three pickups have
recently been delivered, but this is less than one
per district in a province where unimproved roads
limit speeds to roughly 10km/hour. This limits the
ability of the police to patrol regularly, let alone
respond to reports of illegal activity. This lack of
presence leads to a lack of confidence in ability
and willingness of the police to respond to criminal
activity. Corruption at the highest levels of the
department further limits mobility by siphoning off
fuel allotments. Insufficient uniforms, footwear and
food contribute to a lack of morale, but the
greatest personnel problem is the inadequate salary.
A policeman typically earns
70 USD per month, only half of what it takes to
barely feed and clothe a family. Policemen are not
shy about admitting that corruption is the only way
that they can support their families. This is the
most commonly mentioned problem that people cite
when discussing their dislike of the ANP. A recently
instituted direct pay program has prevented 100
Afghanis (2 USD) from being siphoned off their
monthly salary.

ANP Relations with Provincial Partners


7. (U) The ANP not only lacks the trust of the populace,
it is also not trusted by the other ANSF institutions
it needs to collaborate with to enhance provincial
security. This is partly historical and
institutionalized, and partly due to a lack of trust
by the individual players. The new CoP has
instructed his subordinates not to share information
of any consequence with colleagues at the daily
Provincial Coordination meetings initiated by the
PRT that are intended to foster cooperation and a
quick response to security problems. Many cases
never get to the prosecutor,s office due to
corruption that allows arrested individuals to go
free. Many other cases which do get to the
prosecutor,s office are without sufficient or proper
evidence, so these people are released by the
prosecutor. While proper training by the
prosecutor,s office can improve the latter, the
current effect is that the department is not even
respected by the criminals.

Lack of Leadership
--------------


8. (C) Unprofessional leadership allows
dysfunctional command and control functions to
persist. The previous provincial police chief, Gul
Karim, was an illiterate, uneducated and corrupt
former mujahid who was rarely present in the
province and unconcerned with any professional
aspects of his position. The current police chief,
Haji Mohammad Leqha, is unqualified, having been
added at the last minute to the laboriously vetted
list of approved officers due to political
considerations. His current probationary status is
due to reports of human rights abuses, corruption
and kidnapping during his previous tenures as CoP in
other provinces. Unfortunately, the governor of the
province had no influence over Leqha,s appointment,

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nor over the appointment of the district police
chiefs. Mukhles, until recently the district CoP in
Dowlat Shah, also filled that position last summer.
At that time he is rumored to have been paying a
monthly 150,000 Afghani stipend to the then-
provincial CoP and charging a 15,000 Afghani
protection fee to district poppy farmers. Mukhles,s
assassinated father,s legacy has encumbered him with
personal problems that preclude his safe movement
within the district and keeps him from being
actively involved in directing police activities.
His recent reassignment as the head of security for
the central district of Mehtarlam bodes well for
Dowlat Shah but poorly for the capital. Meanwhile,
the district CoP,s in Alishang and Alingar districts
are said to currently pay a monthly 100,000 Afghani
(2000 USD) stipend to the CoP. Both of these, as
well as Makhles, are junior in rank to others within
their districts.


9. (SBU) The governor has attempted to improve the ANP
presence by preventing the ANP from serving in their
home districts, where personal loyalties and
interests trump institutional ones. A number of ANP
have used their position to settle family related
disputes. The CoP has until now declined to follow
through on this request. The governor has also
sought to change the CoP and all but one of the
district CoP,s, but to no avail. Current middle and
senior management is demoralized and more than a
dozen officers have threatened to tender their
resignations. Nepotism has caused one of the most
senior officers to be sent to Kabul by the CoP in an
attempt to replace him with an unprofessionally
trained relative described as corrupt.

Comments
--------------

10 (SBU) PRT Comment: The police are responsible for
the security of society. The difficulties with the
ANP may be endemic to all provinces, but they are
especially problematic in Laghman. Until police
reform encompassing professional qualifications and
a realistic salary structure occurs, ANP provincial
leadership will favor personal gain at the expense
of provincial security and the problem will fester.
There are a number of intelligent, hard working,
experienced, dedicated, sincere, educated,
professionally committed individuals in Laghman who
are capable of transforming the institution into one
with a positive stature, but it is essential to get
responsible leadership at the top before any
improvement can be expected which will change the
reality on the ground in this province.


11. (SBU) Embassy Comment: The situation of the ANP
in Laghman, typical of that found in many provinces,
cannot be fixed overnight. Rooting out corruption
and developing real leadership will take time and
commitment. In the meantime, this PRT report
highlights the importance of quickly moving forward
with the development of a smaller, professionally
trained and equipped force that can protect
districts like Dowlat Shah and support the shakier
rank and file ANP. The civil order maintenance/
constabulary force concept reported reftel has this
underlying purpose. However, even the COM/C will take

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some time to develop, train, and deploy. In the
meantime we will continue to work with the MoI on
removing corrupt and incompetent police officials
at the provincial and district level, move forward
with pay and rank reform, and explore innovative short
term solutions to the serious problems faced by the ANP.
NORLAND