Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL4251
2006-09-19 05:47:00
SECRET
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT KARZAI'S UPCOMING VISIT

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER ASEC PINS AF 
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2837
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 004251 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC PINS AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT KARZAI'S UPCOMING VISIT
TO WASHINGTON

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD E. NEUMANN FOR REASON 1.4(A) AND (D)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 004251

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC PINS AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT KARZAI'S UPCOMING VISIT
TO WASHINGTON

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD E. NEUMANN FOR REASON 1.4(A) AND (D)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) President Karzai is more self-confident than three
months ago, but not politically stronger. Karzai worries
endlessly about how firm our support is -- and how much he
must do. He will be looking for support and encouragement of
every kind during this visit, but assurances must be balanced
by a clear message -- from a partner and friend -- that he
needs to do more himself. He deserves praise for recent good
decisions on a new Supreme Court, Attorney General, and
governors. Karzai needs to leave knowing there is no
question we are committed to a long-term partnership. He is
at the lowest point of public confidence in his government.
A deteriorating security situation, coupled with rampant
corruption at all levels, has sapped confidence and feeds
public perceptions of a weak government and governance
system. Record poppy cultivation and opium production is
seen by the public as evidence that warlords, corrupt
officials, and the Taliban -- rather than an accountable,
honest government -- are in charge. For too many Afghans,
the government is simply not credible enough to justify the
life and death risks involved in committing to and defending
its programs and future. Changing these views will take
investment and time. Karzai urgently needs more support --
for enhanced security, infrastructure development, and
governance initiatives to reverse the psychology and fill the
village-level security gap. But, much as he does not like
hearing it, Karzai also needs to understand he must do more
himself on corruption, counternarcotics, and good governance.
Our tough message on the need for strong leadership will be
much effective if we do more to meet Karzai's urgent needs.


2. (S) The GOA continues, with good reason, to mistrust its

neighbors, most of all, Pakistan. Karzai recently took some
political risk to host and appear publicly with Musharraf in
Kabul. The public aspects of this meeting were carefully
choreographed by both sides to accent the positive in the
run-up to their upcoming meetings in Washington. The visit
went very well, with Musharraf acknowledging Pakistan's past
support for the Taliban, but there is deep skepticism -- on
the part of those who wish Karzai well and those who do not
-- as to whether Pakistan will actually take measures that
will improve the Afghan security situation and strengthen
Karzai's position. Musharraf's recent depiction of the
Taliban as a Pashtun insurgency deeply angered and insulted
Afghans of many groups. End Summary

--------------
Karzai's Mood and Needs
--------------


3. (S) Karzai has recovered personally from his funk of last
summer and is trying to go on the offensive on security,
corruption, narcotics and regional cooperation. Recent
public appearances such as at the recent National
Counter-narcotics shura, his meetings with the Governors at
the Governor's Conference, his public appearances with
President Musharraf in Kabul, and his September 14 trip to
Jalalabad to join Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in
opening the new 74 KM Jalalabad-Torkham road all demonstrated
some willingness to lead. He will be looking for
acknowledgement and for iron-clad assurances that we are
committed for the long-haul. Karzai will also be looking for
increased material support. Top of his list will be
additional equipment for the Afghanistan National Security
Forces.

Support for Afghan Security Forces:


4. (S) Karzai will want to see strong continued support for
the training and equipping of the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF). We have now trained about 34,000 troops in
the ANA, which has been acquitting itself increasingly well.

KABUL 00004251 002 OF 004


However, Karzai will continue to argue that it needs more
land mobility, airlift capability, and modern equipment. In
addition, training of the ANA is still well short of the
70,000 man army that Karzai wants. Meanwhile, training and
equipping of the 62,000 national police enshrined in the
Afghan Compact is still in a relatively early stage, and has
not yet resulted in an ANP with the skills necessary to take
up its national role. Moreover, the security situation on
the ground has deteriorated considerably from the time when
the ANSF numbers were agreed on in the Afghan Compact.
Rebalancing the police force to bring additional ANP into the
four southern provinces after the Mountain Thrust campaign
has been significantly delayed, in part because the Ministry
of Interior (MOI) has been unable to recruit sufficiently or
convince existing units from other provinces to move into
provinces with difficult security situations. Difficulties in
training and fielding regular ANP have resulted in Karzai
(and us) looking in desperation for stopgap solutions,
including recruitment of auxiliary police. We should signal
to Karzai that we have the will and resources to follow
through with police training, but we also need to underline
that this will require invigorated follow-through from MOI.


5. (S) We defer to the Department to develop a response to
Karzai's concerns about NATO troop levels, but wish to stress
that the USG's words must convey confidence that all military
requirments will be met before the end of ISAF IX.

Infrastructure and Development Support:


6. (S) Karzai will also want as much infrastructure and
development support as he can get, and he will want as much
of that to go directly into the GOA's hands as possible. We
have repeatedly noted that where roads end, the Taliban and
insurgency begins. The same principle applies to other
infrastructure support. Many district capitals still remain
unconnected to the national road system and without the
infrastructure needed to distance them from the tipping point
toward warlord-Taliban control.


7. (S) As the situation in the south has deteriorated this
summer, we appear on the brink of receiving an additional USD
$60 million for key road construction in the south, but
funding this year from the supplemental budget does not do
anything to fund the projects needed to fill the space opened
up by successful security operations. One of the focuses of
the newly created Policy Action Group (PAG) has been to try
to mobilize development support that can be quickly deployed
into areas following NATO/ISAF campaigns. The goal is to
give the population reasons to move back in and commit to the
government. We have requested USD 100 million to provide
robust support for the PRT program which will enable us to
support capacity-building and rural development projects that
convince populations that the government does indeed count
for something in the provinces by virtue of being able to
deliver some services.


8. (S) We should also reaffirm our commitment to doing
everything we can to complete the major infrastructure
projects for energy (the Kajaki dam/Southern Electricity
Transmission System in the Helmand Valley and the Northern
Electricity Transmission System which could bring grid
electricity to forty percent of the Afghan population versus
six percent today) and the ring road projects. Security
challenges have resulted in delay of and increased costs for
both key roads and development of the electrical grid system.

A Politically Sensitive Approach to Poppy Problem:


9. (S) Karzai understands the corrosive effect of opium
production on the people and body politic of Afghanistan, and
the nexus between narco-trafficking, corruption, and
security. He pushed local eradication, but fears the
backlash of arial spraying and focuses instead on greater
support for alternative livelihood and development assistance
programs. Confronted with the political realities in the
U.S., Karzai will do law enforcement and eradication, but

KABUL 00004251 003 OF 004


will be concerned that the pace of and fallout from these
approaches not lose the war with the Taliban.

Support for More Action from Pakistan:


10. (S) Karzai may express reservations about Pakistan's
intentions. While a well-orchestrated visit to Kabul by
President Musharraf produced generally positive public
comment, a Musharraf speech in Brussels that referred to the
domestic Afghan element of the insurgency prompted an angry
statement from the Foreign Ministry here. While Karzai wants
to get along better with his larger neighbor to the east,
bitter years of experience make Afghans cynical and create
risks for any Afghan politician who steps forward to improve
relations, as Karzai has done. Recognizing U.S. interests
are best served by a less tense relationship across the
Durand Line, we should acknowledge the risks that Karzai has
taken and applaud his leadership. We must encourage him to
continue to reach out to Musharraf; the Pakistani leader is
leaning further forward than ever before. Astute
relationship-management by Karzai could force Musharraf to
take an actual step in the right direction, e.g., by
arresting a large number of significant Taliban figures. But
keeping Karzai moving in the right direction requires
assurance of our own determination to press for more GOP
action, especially against the Taliban leadership.

--------------
In Return, What We Need from Karzai
--------------


11. (S) We have advised that it would be very helpful for
Karzai to say "thank you" to the American public for the
support given and sacrifices made so far and to explain why
it is critical that we sustain and even increase our efforts.
Key messages should be that Afghans are allies in the GWOT,
that our engagement will ward off another 9/11, that Afghans
embrace a moderate version of Islam that does not pose a
threat to the West, and that Afghanistan is prepared to step
up its effort to ensure that continued security and
reconstruction aid will succeed in securing this vision.

On Corruption:


12. (S) It will be easier for Karzai to say thank you for
support than to accept what he will see as criticism. He
nevertheless needs to hear in Washington what he is hearing
in Kabul -- as advice from a friend and partner -- that he
must do more to fight corruption and encourage good
governance. Partly in response to the weakness of his
government and as an attempt to balance out competing
political interests, Karzai has too often looked past
stronger candidates who would like to serve to appoint weak
and corrupt individuals to key positions. He needs to demand
that the new Attorney General, Counter Narcotics Court and
Supreme Court deliver high-profile prosecutions and
convictions of corrupt officials, and he must support them
when they act.


13. (S) Karzai must not only remove corrupt governors and
officials and vigorously pursue prosecutions of high-profile
narcotics trafficking and corruption cases, but he must
insist that local officials charged with corruption be held
accountable. We need Karzai to keep moving ahead on
replacing the 14 bad police chiefs identified by the
probation board. He needs to understand that, even when the
evidence might not stand up in court, the scent of corruption
among his staff, ministers, governors, and close relatives is
as corrosive to the credibility of his government and
leadership as proven crimes. One of the most symbolically
important things Karzai could do would be to persuade his
brother Ahmed Wali Karzai, widely understood to be corrupt
and a narcotics trafficker, to leave the country. Karzai
must understand that failure to move in this area undermines
his leadership at home but also invites questions from
Congress and the American People. Afghanistan should ratify
the UN Convention against corruption.

KABUL 00004251 004 OF 004



On Counternarcotics:


14. (S) Karzai has been advised that American audiences,
especially on the hill, need to hear him outline actions he
is willing to take to fight narcotics and the terrorism it
finances. He needs to avoid complaining that the West has
not provided enough alternative livelihood support, but
rather acknowledge the situation is critical and say
unequivocally that his government -- including its
centrally-appointed governors -- are prepared to go after
poppy production. Karzai should acknowledge, at least
privately, that he understands there is no realistic
alternative to ground based spraying in provinces at or near
the tipping point.

On Financing Provincial and Local Government:


15. (S) Karzai and the legislative branch need to rethink
how to fund and structure provincial and local government.
The current provincial system has an extremely limited budget
that lacks transparency and fiscal sustainability. Governors
now rely on ad hoc methods and budgets to carry out their
responsibilities -- an open invitation to corruption. The
GOA needs to raise revenue in a transparent manner, follow
through with customs reform, and begin convincing the Afghan
people that they cannot expect to receive services from a
government they are not willing to pay for. The Ministry of
Interior must follow through on rank-and-pay police reform as
its highest priority, with a goal of getting
nationally-trained police into every province at the earliest
possible date.

On Pakistan:


16. (S) The two leaders say they are committed to moving
ahead "as friends" on a process to address cross-border
issues, including the insurgency. As noted previously,
Karzai will need results to convince the Afghan public he was
not hoodwinked by Musharraf, but he also needs to instruct
his subordinates to avoid public remarks that criticize
Pakistan. We should ask him to make clear to Musharraf that
he is open to pursuing confidence-building measures, making
it easier for the top GOP leadership to deliver on its part
of the bargin.

On Leadership:


17. (S) In the end, much of what Karzai needs to do boils
down to leadership. We must encourage continued positive
momentum while impressing on Karzai the need to invest his
political capital to build his national stature, lest it
continue to ebb away. That means taking some tough decisions
and actions -- on sustaining and nurturing political
engagement with Pakistan, on fighting corruption and drug
trafficking, on standing up to his own family and clan to
demonstrate he is the President of and for all Afghans, and
on sharing responsibility with ISAF and Coalition Forces for
improving security. We, in turn, must recognize he is not
strong enough and Afghanistan not stable enough for him to do
these things without our encouragement, our occasional
pressure, and a lot of our money and force to back him up.
NEUMANN