Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL4245
2006-09-18 14:17:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

AUXILIARY POLICE ASSESSMENT TEAM BEGINS WORK

Tags:  SNAR PGOV PTER AF 
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OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #4245/01 2611417
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181417Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2610
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2831
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2976
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6301
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1650
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004245 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: AUXILIARY POLICE ASSESSMENT TEAM BEGINS WORK

REF: KABUL 4001

KABUL 00004245 001.2 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004245

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: AUXILIARY POLICE ASSESSMENT TEAM BEGINS WORK

REF: KABUL 4001

KABUL 00004245 001.2 OF 002



1. (SBU) After the recent Policy Action Group (PAG)
decision to move ahead with recruiting auxiliary
police (AXP) under MoI command and control, with
Zabol as the pilot province (reftel),MoI with CSTC-
A support immediately began to organize an
assessment team. An advance group of MoI, CSTC-A,
and U.S. Embassy experts under the leadership of an
MoI Colonel arrived in Kandahar on Sept 15 to carry
out the logistical planning needed to begin the
Zabol pilot project, moving on to Zabol the next
day. The full team, which will include additional
MoI personnel, ISAF, and UNAMA representatives,
should be complete and on the ground o/a Sept 19.


2. (SBU) The team is eager to move ahead with
recruitment and training, although details remain to
be worked out. Support from Zabol Governor Arman
will be critical - Zabol was chosen in part because
Arman is seen as supportive of central government
efforts - and it is not yet clear whether that will
be forthcoming. If recruits do sign up for the
program, the team will have to swing into full gear
quickly to set up training schedules, equipment
distribution, and deployment planning. (Note: Late
reports indicate an initial tranche of 30 recruits
has been identified to begin training soon. End
note.)


3. (SBU) Both MoI and the international community
are concerned about who will pay salaries. Central
to the plan is shifting salaries from the governor
to the MoI to ensure MoI control. So long as the
AXP are fully under the command and control of the
MoI, we have taken the position that they should be
treated like ordinary police. Under that
circumstance they would be eligible to come under
the LOTFA payment structure. There is enough money
allocated to police payments in present ASFF funding
streams to increase the U.S. LOTFA contribution
enough to cover at least some of the AXP, or else to
pay directly out of a parallel mechanism. The
Ambassador has made it clear to the IC that any
additional U.S. contribution should not be used to
pay the LOTFA shortfall, but rather would be
earmarked for AXP. He also said that the U.S.
donation would be limited for now to the recruitment
of approximately 800 AXP for Zabol province, and we
would make no further commitment until we had
assurance that the program would work and the new
auxiliary patrolmen would be completely under MoI
control. If the governors refuse to relinquish
control over their militias, U.S. funds would not
be used to defray their expenses.

Comment
--------------


4. (SBU) This is very much a work in progress. We
are receiving daily reports from the assessment team
in the field, which includes INL police experts and
an Embassy reporting officer. We will in a position
to report more fully on the substance of their
efforts in a week or two, when the results begin to
be seen. The U.S. members of the assessment team
are under instructions to keep the team in the field
until the program is implemented. Meanwhile, the
security situation in Kandahar and Ghazni after the

KABUL 00004245 002.2 OF 002


recent military activity there will compel a rapid
extension of effort to those provinces as soon as we
have confirmation that the experiment is on the
right track.
NEUMANN