Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL4233
2006-09-18 11:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRT/ASADABAD - EAST AFGHAN MILITIA FORCES HERE TO

Tags:  SNAR PGOV PTER AF 
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VZCZCXRO3890
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #4233/01 2611147
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181147Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2585
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC 0133
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2827
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2972
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6297
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1646
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 004233 

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y OF PARA (2)

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2016
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT/ASADABAD - EAST AFGHAN MILITIA FORCES HERE TO
STAY?

REF: A) KABUL 1714 B) KABUL 2786 C) KABUL 2970 D)
KABUL 4001

KABUL 00004233 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Acting Pol-Mil Counselor Marie Richards, for reasons 1.4
b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 004233

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y OF PARA (2)

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2016
TAGS: SNAR PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT/ASADABAD - EAST AFGHAN MILITIA FORCES HERE TO
STAY?

REF: A) KABUL 1714 B) KABUL 2786 C) KABUL 2970 D)
KABUL 4001

KABUL 00004233 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Acting Pol-Mil Counselor Marie Richards, for reasons 1.4
b and d.


1. (C) Summary: Provincial and district officials
in the eastern Afghan border provinces of Kunar and
Nuristan see militia or auxiliary forces, in existence
since last year, as essential security elements.
Though they are untrained and unreliable, the 1000 men
in Kunar and 200 in Nuristan guard the roads, allowing
the police (at least theoretically) to chase criminals
and assist US and Afghan military forces in the fight
against the enemy. Kabul,s desire to appear sensitive
to the needs of the provinces, local politics, and a
recent tragedy all may work against any proposed "roll
back" of these units. End summary.

Security situation in eastern Afghanistan
--------------


2. (C) Though southern Afghanistan continues to grab
the headlines, the eastern border provinces of Kunar
and Nuristan, sandwiched between Badakhshan in the
north and Nangarhar (with the major city of Jalalabad)
to the south, are far from stable. Kunar and Nuristan
have long provided refuge to both homegrown insurgents
and a handful of foreign fighters. Operation Mountain
Lion (OML),conducted by Afghan National Army (ANA)
and US-led Coalition Forces (CF) during April and
early May 2006, temporarily dispersed Kunar,s Taliban
(TB) and elements of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,s branch of
Hezb-e Islami (HIG). Since then enemy forces have
been attempting to regroup. They continue to attack
CF, ANA, Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan
Border Police (ABP),with mixed results. CF elements,
as well as ANA forces, have recently pushed north from
Kunar into neighboring Nuristan, still a safehaven for
a number of groups including HIG and Lashkar-e Taiba
(LET). Long-term objectives are: rooting the enemy

out of Nuristan, blocking his infiltration routes from
Pakistan, and destroying his historical bases there as
well as in Kunar.

Shortage of Afghan police
--------------


3. (C) Like many provinces in this country, Kunar
and Nuristan lack adequate ANP forces. Kunar has only
about 40 ANP patrolmen in each of its 14 districts,
and about half that force guards the police
headquarters in each district. The remaining 20
patrolmen police the rest of the district, which can
range in size from approximately 100 sq km (Marawara)
to over 300 sq km (Manogai/Pech). Nuristan has 40 or
50 men in each of its eight districts, but Nuristan,s
districts are larger and less densely populated. The
two provinces, security problems are compounded by an
undermanned ABP and, in the case of most parts of
Nuristan, by the lack of any Afghan National Army
(ANA) presence. ANP forces are poorly paid, lack
heavy weapons to fight off the enemy, and are
chronically short on ammunition, with each man
carrying just 120 rounds for his AK-47. The police
forces in Kunar and Nuristan are overstretched.

Kunar and Nuristan Militias established in late 2005
-------------- --------------


4. (U) Last autumn, Kunar Governor Assadullah Wafa

KABUL 00004233 002.2 OF 004


received permission from the Ministry of the Interior
(MOI) in Kabul to hire one thousand "auxiliary" forces
to beef up security in his province, at least
temporarily. This now means that each district has on
average sixty tribal militia members. Their mission
in most cases is to guard road checkpoints, giving the
ANP the freedom to conduct more patrols. Six to ten
males man each post, responsible for monitoring up to
two kilometers of road in Kunar. In addition,
Governor Mohammad Tamim Nouristani got the green light
in late 2005 to hire 200 "auxiliaries" for Nuristan,
all of whom have been deployed to the two border
districts. Sixty "auxiliaries" are in Barge Matal,
the northeasternmost district, and the remaining 140
are stationed in the southeastern district of Kamdesh,
a hotbed of enemy activity.


5. (U) District governors in some places, e.g.
Sirkany and Narang (Kunar),work with tribal shuras
(councils) to choose men from different tribes and
villages to guard each checkpoint. In others, e.g.
Watapur (Kunar),district chiefs have preferred to
select "auxiliaries," frequently people related to
each other, from the village(s) nearest to the post in
question. Two tribal elders must vouch for each
candidate, who is then vetted by the district ANP
chief as well as the local branch of the National
Directorate of Security (NDS),Afghanistan,s
intelligence service. The provincial governor, as the
top MOI representative in the province, signs off and
forwards the auxiliary,s packet to the ministry for
final approval. (Note: These salary payments are
separate from those for regular ANP, and are not paid
out of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
(LOTFA). End note.)


6. (C) Pay for the "auxiliaries" is 4000 afghani
($80)/month, though disbursement of these funds in
Kunar has regularly been one or two months behind
schedule. The governor of Nuristan complains that his
remote province still has received no salaries at all
for the auxiliaries since the program,s inception.
Each auxiliary, who gets no training from the ANP or
anyone else, must supply his own personal weapon,
almost invariably an AK-47 rifle. Militia forces in
Sirkany state they are responsible for providing their
own ammo, though the Watapur district governor states
he buys rounds for his auxiliaries on the local
economy, sometimes on the black market.


7. (U) The thousand-man "auxiliary" force in Kunar
and the 200 in Nuristan are not unified under the
command of a single tribe or really under any one
government official for that matter. Command and
control relationships are ambiguous. Each checkpoint
has a commander who answers to both the district
governor and police chief.

Lack of uniform and communication leads to tragedy
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Coalition Forces (CF) find it difficult to
tell the "auxiliaries" on the road from anti-coalition
militias (ACM),with tragic results on one occasion
recently. Neither the MOI nor the local government
issues the militiamen official identification cards,
but some districts have taken it upon themselves to
provide them temporary (and easily forged) documents.
The checkpoint personnel do not have uniforms, though
in some locations they try to dress in a similar
fashion. On 20 Jun 06, auxiliary and ANP forces, none

KABUL 00004233 003.2 OF 004


in uniform, were speeding in an unmarked car along the
main road in the unstable Pech River Valley to answer
a distress call from an ANP squad. CF shot at the
vehicle, believing the armed men to be enemy fighters
with hostile intent, killing one ANP soldier and two
militia members, as well as wounding a policeman and
the civilian driver. To avoid another tragedy, GOA
and CF have been consulting over ways to improve
communication and coordination with the auxiliaries.
Provincial officials are planning to supply them with
uniforms and have submitted a request, through MoI,
that CF provide basic police training to them as well.

Effectiveness of auxiliaries
--------------


9. (C) Gauging the effectiveness of these
"auxiliary" forces is tough. On the one hand, most of
these auxiliaries seem to contribute little to
increasing real security along even the small patch of
road over which they are responsible. They readily
admit that they will go out on a "roving patrol" only
when they get word that CF or ANA will be passing by.
There are citizen complaints that the "auxiliaries"
are corrupt. A number of IED incidents along the
roads of Kunar have occurred within sight of auxiliary
checkpoints, causing CF and GOA to question whether
the militias have been co-opted by the enemy.


10. (C) On the other hand, the very presence of
"auxiliaries" is an indication that the GOA is taking
the security concerns of the provincial government
seriously. District leaders in the two provinces say
they believe that the militias, intimately familiar as
they are with their areas and their inhabitants, can
make vital contributions to security. CF commanders
note that the militias working on the Pech River
Valley road turn in an average of two IEDs per week.
Nearby villagers repelled an enemy attack on a
checkpoint in southwestern Kunar, coming to the aid of
their "boys" in the auxiliaries, something they might
not have done if that position had been manned by CF
or out-of-district ANP personnel.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) PRT Comment: It will be difficult to "roll
back" the auxiliaries, at least in Kunar. District
leaders want to protect this institution for political
reasons. Funding of the auxiliaries is also an easy
way for Kabul to defend itself against charges that it
is not paying attention to the security requests of
provincial governors. Kunar has been waiting for the
go ahead from MOI to hire fifty more auxiliaries for
each of the most restive districts. In Nuristan, the
governor and Coalition Forces are hoping the MOI will
avoid this growing headache by simply converting the
200 auxiliaries in the east into regular ANP troops.
Critics of the militias can only hope that that goes
through, and that Kunar will follow suit. Either way,
militia members might not provide much in the way of
actual security protection, but they at least
symbolize a projection (however minimalist) of the
MOI,s, and thereby the GOA,s, reach into Kunar and
Nuristan. And in the mean time, to avoid a repeat of
the 20 June tragedy in Watapur, the GOA will try to
train and better equip the auxiliaries, giving them
greater legitimacy as well as making them an even more
entrenched element of security in eastern Afghanistan.


KABUL 00004233 004.2 OF 004



14. (C) Embassy Comment: As noted ref d, action is
being taken on the national level to regularize
"auxiliaries" like those in Nuristan and Kunar by
putting them under the full command and control of the
MoI, issuing them uniforms and ID cards, offering some
training, and eventually (it is hoped) folding them
into the ANP. The focus right now is on the south
rather than the northeast due to the need to direct
energies to the areas where the insurgents are most
active. Thus, it may take some time to bring the
elements described by PRT Asadabad under full MoI
control. In the meantime, the auxiliaries may at
least provide a token degree of GOA power projection,
to be followed up later with a more regular
formulation and eventually by a fully trained national
police force.
NEUMANN