AFGHAN POLICE REFORM: CIVIL ORDER MAINTENANCE -

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 004232

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CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016
TAGS: MARR MASS PGOV AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN POLICE REFORM: CIVIL ORDER MAINTENANCE -
CONSTABULARY FORCE CONCEPT

REF: KABUL 4001

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann; reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C/REL CAN) Summary: Ongoing Afghan National Police (ANP)
reform efforts are focused on removing corrupt/incompetent
leadership, increasing the quality of training and equipment,
and "rebalancing"/augmenting the force in favor of provinces
with the greatest security needs. As important as these
measures remain, there are critical policing gaps in
Afghanistan that cannot be filled simply by hiring more
policemen and distributing the ANP to favor the most populous
or at risk areas. Under current plans, the ANP will remain
ill-equipped to respond to civil disorder and to provide
credible police services in high-threat rural areas. In an
effort to address these important gaps in the ANP's
capabilities, the Combined Security Transition Command -
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) recently developed a concept for an ANP
"Civil Order Maintenance/Constabulary" (COM/C) force. The
COM/C would be under the control of the MOI, and have a
target force size of 5,000 personnel deployed in four
1,200-man brigades. CSTC-A estimates that training and
equipping an ANP COM/C to perform these essential tasks would
require an initial investment of 130 million dollars and
annual sustainment costs of 5.5 million dollars. We will
pursue the concept in close coordination with the GOA,
Germany, UNAMA and other key players on police issues. End
Summary.

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AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE REFORM
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2. (C/REL CAN) Ongoing ANP reform efforts are focused on
removing corrupt/incompetent leadership, increasing the
quality of training and equipment, and
"rebalancing"/augmenting the force in favor of provinces with
the greatest security needs (specifically, Kandahar, Helmand,
Uruzgan, and Paktia). Accomplishing these tasks in the face
of the increasingly violent Taliban insurgency is becoming
more difficult and costly. In fact, the police "rebalancing"
directive issued by President Karzai in July has been
significantly delayed by recruitment and discipline problems
(i.e., AWOLs, refusal to transfer from home district or
unit). To date, approximately 700 of the target total of
2,100 additional ANP have been recruited in accordance with
the rebalancing directive, with another 300 expected to be
hired by the end of September. An additional effort to
increase the number of police in the South via the
recruitment of "auxiliary police" (reftel) is ongoing as a
pilot project in Zabul province. Even if these two programs
(auxiliaries and rebalancing) are fully implemented, those
police will be of only limited initial value as they will
have only received minimal training in order to deploy these
forces rapidly.

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CIVIL ORDER MAINTENANCE/CONSTABULARY CONCEPT
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3. (C/REL CAN) Developing a fully trained and professional
police for use in riot control and deployment to
Afghanistan's least secure districts remains critical to our
success here. As was evident during the May 29 riots, which
many here still see as a defining moment with respect to
confidence in Karzai's government, the ANP currently lacks
the capability to respond to civil disorder or emergencies.
Additionally, the ANP generally does not have the mobility
and firepower to provide effective police presence and other

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services in remote rural areas threatened by heavily armed
insurgents, narco-traffickers, or criminals. In an effort to
address these important gaps in the ANP's policing
capabilities, the CSTC-A Police Reform Director recently
developed a concept for an ANP COM/C.


4. (SBU) According to the CSTC-A concept, the COM/C would
have a dual mission of maintaining civil order in the cities
while providing an increased police presence throughout the
country. The COM/C would be under the control of the MOI,
and have a target force size of 5,000 personnel in a force
structure appropriate to the threat. The COM/C force
structure would come from the Afghan Standby Police. The new
force would be multi-ethnic, highly trained, and nationally
recruited. Three of the COM/C units would be equipped to
project a robust police presence in high threat rural areas.
They would patrol from 13 forward operating bases (FOB),
focused primarily in the South, East, Central, and West
regions. The FOBs would be manned in either 200- or 400-man
configurations. The fourth COM/C unit would be deployed in
150-man units across the eight major metropolitan areas of
Kabul, Feyzabad, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Farah, Kandahar,
Gardez, Jalalabad. These urban units would be specially
trained and equipped to respond to civil disorder (i.e.,
riots),hostage/kidnapping situations, and emergencies. The
German Police Program Office (GPPO) has initiated a project
that closely aligns with the riot control training.


5. (SBU) CSTC-A estimates that training and equipping an ANP
COM/C to perform these essential tasks would require an
initial investment of 130 million dollars and annual
sustainment costs of 5.5 million dollars. Under this
concept, the COM/C would be outfitted with armored vehicles
(including SWAT vans),radio communications packages, medical
trucks, machine guns, non-lethal weapons, and the
infrastructure required at the 13 forward operating bases.
It is projected that the first unit of about 400-500
patrolmen would be operational within nine months, i.e. June

2007. Standing up Kabul riot police and an initial
deployment to the South would be the first priorities. The
force would continue to grow as facilities and funding
permit.

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GERMAN REACTION
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6. (C/REL CAN) DCM and Polmiloff, with CSTC-A Deputy
Commanding General BG O'Brien, met with German Police Advisor
Ambassador Frick and members of the GPPO on September 10.
Frick said he recognizes that the situation in Afghanistan
right now, especially in the South and Southeast, requires a
paramilitary-style element on a transitional basis, although
he said Germany still looks forward to a time when
Afghanistan can have a peacetime police force. While noting
that Germany would prefer that the Afghan National Army (ANA)
take on the task of securing remote districts, Frick accepted
our explanation that the ANA is overstretched and fully
committed to other duties. The ANA should not reduce its
force structure to take on what is essentially a police
responsibility. Frick said that he agrees in principle with
the COM/C plan, and that the GPPO and German Embassy will
want to remain fully involved in the planning process. BG
O'Brien noted that a working group has already been set up
for that purpose. (Note: Under the CSTC-A plan, Germany
would be invited to provide police expertise for the Civil
Order Maintenance, i.e. riot police training. End note.)
Finally, Ambassador Frick remarked that the word
"constabulary" did not seem appropriate to the task, and

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suggested new terminology, such as "intervention police." BG
O'Brien said that the Interior Ministry is working on new
terminology in Dari and we will change the name in English to
reflect its decision.


7. (C/REL CAN) In an earlier meeting with the GPPO, Mr.
Collins, Director, CSTC-A Police Reform Directorate, who
designed and drafted the COM/C plan, emphasized the critical
importance of incrementally establishing the rule-of-law
throughout Afghanistan. Insurgents and organized criminal
gangs act with impunity in Afghanistan's hard-to-reach rural
areas. PRT Commanders routinely report requests made by
local elders for police presence, support and services for
their people and villages. The elders report intimidation,
harassment, and wide scale abuse of the public by vigilantes,
thugs, gangs, and heavily armed insurgents. Mr. Collins
explained to the GPPO that Germany's plan was good, but,
unlike the COM/C plan, it did not go far enough in addressing
police service and rule-of-law issues. Afghanistan's porous
borders cannot be controlled by the ANP Border Police alone.

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COMMENT
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8. (C/REL CAN) The COM/C concept is still under development
at CSTC-A, and has not been approved by the GOA or officially
endorsed by any members of the international community. The
concept does meet a request from the Minister of the Interior
for a force of this type to address the serious requirements
the ANP face. Initial reactions from the Germans were
largely positive, and there is a strong case to be made for
such a force. We will pursue the concept in close
coordination with the GOA, Germany, UNAMA and other key
players on police issues. The GOA's ability to respond
appropriately to civil disorder in urban areas and to provide
Afghanistan's rural population with credible, fully
professional police services is essential to support our
security, rule of law, and reconstruction goals here.
NEUMANN