PAG REPORT SEPT 14: SECURITY SITUATION STRETCHED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 004161

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: PAG REPORT SEPT 14: SECURITY SITUATION STRETCHED

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) An Afghan National Directorate for Security (NDS)
briefing to the September 14 Policy Action Group (PAG)
continues to paint a stretched security situation in the four
southern provinces of Helmand, Farah, Zabul, and Uruzgan.
Military gains are being put into jeopardy due to lack of
police and auxiliary police to reinforce security in the
districts once the military pulls out. PAG members
reinforced the need to speed up ongoing efforts to turn the
tide, including moving faster on reconstruction teams and
Afghan Development Zones (ADZ),as well as recruiting more
auxilliary police beginning with a pilot project in Zabul.
ISAF is planning a major media blitz on Saturday (September
16) on the success in Kandahar, stressing the Taliban's
overwhelming defeat as well as development and reconstruction
efforts that are underway. END SUMMARY

--------------
Stretched Security Situation
--------------


2. (C) The September 14 Policy Action Group (PAG) meeting,
chaired by National Security Advisor Dr. Zalmai Rassoul,
focused on the continued stretched security situation in the
south, particularly in Helmand, Farah, Zabul, and Uruzgan
provinces. National Directorate for Security (NDS) Chief,
Amrullah Saleh, delivered to the PAG a detailed description
of the security situation in the four provinces, which
generated lively discussion over how best to respond.


3. (C) In Helmand, Saleh described several pockets of Taliban
fighters which continue to put pressure on various districts.
His sources detected over 200 Taliban gathered south of the
road to Kandahar. In the Kajaki area, there were over 300
Taliban under various commanders. Other districts had
similar numbers. Saleh said that the Taliban had been able
to raise over USD 150,000 within the province. Other sources
of funding, supplies and logistics were coming from Pakistan.
He said that individual Taliban groups of 30 members were
paid about 500,000 rupees (USD 10,000) every two months. He
described Operation Medusa as effective in disrupting the
Taliban's command structure and scattering the Taliban from
key districts into villages, but urged the PAG to do more to
hold these areas so that the Taliban did not regroup, which
is what has been happening. Saleh said that in some
districts, such as Panjwai District in Kandahar, there were
only 16 police. He was skeptical that, unless more police or
auxiliaries were deployed to secure districts, Operation
Medusa would be able to sustain its military gains.


4. (C) ISAF/NATO Lt. General Richards agreed that the Taliban
command structure had been fractured, especially at the
mid-levels. He said that we should not be deterred by
Taliban regrouping as long as we kept up the pressure. He
would instruct the Canadians not to depart from districts
taken until the police could reinforce security.


5. (C) In Farah, Saleh described the poor peformance of the
civilian and ANA management of the province, which has
encouraged the Taliban to return. In particular, Bakwa had
seen the return of several "mullahs" (it was a common Taliban
tactic, he said, to label commanders "mullahs" whether they
had any religious training or not). Other districts had seen
similar returns, such as in Balabulak. The mullahs command
individual groups of about 20-30 Taliban, most of which had

KABUL 00004161 002 OF 003


moved out of the district center to Farah-ro, near Pakistan,
but are easily able to enter the provincial center on foot.
If the Taliban take the provincial center, it will be a huge
symbolic blow, Saleh argued.


6. (C) Saleh noted that there was conflicting information
coming out of Uruzgan. His deputy of operations did not
believe the Taliban were using the province as a base for
attacks, but rather as a safe haven for medical treatment and
rest. Another view was that the government had done an
effective job, which had resulted in a stalemate as well as
recovering certain areas due to Operation Mountain Thrust.
The overall view is that Operation Mountain Thrust has
contributed significantly to security in the province.
Still, the province is home to around 66 Taliban groups,
centered around three major Taliban leaders. Saleh was
hearing reports that the Governor was not receiving
sufficient funding from Kabul for changes he is trying to
make in the provincial government, e.g., there were still no
department heads in key posts. Saleh again lamented what he
saw as a "typical problem" -- we clear out the Taliban, but
if we can't intervene quickly with management and leadership
changes, we risk losing the province.


7. (C) Saleh then briefed on the Taliban's overall
communications structure. He said that at the strategic
level, a unified command structure existed, but not at the
tactical level. The Taliban leadership had an overall view
of what to do and where to attack, but on the ground, they
faced tactical problems. Strategic planning was being
carried out in Pakistan, where they saw the entire picture.
Attacks in one region are often used to relieve pressure in
another. Saleh sees this as a new strategy compared to six
months ago, a "new situation". This generated a lively
discussion of how to respond, e.g., was there a non-military
response, since there were only three Taliban commanders in
the province? The Deputy Minister for the Interior argued
that this was not a conventional war, that the Taliban were
brutal people, and that the war could only be won if we had
real support from the local people for the ANA and the
police. He said that police assigned from outside the region
would always lack strong ties to the community and that what
was needed were auxiliary and community police from the area.
He argued that 20 well-trained police from the area were
worth more than 200 ANA police since they knew the community,
the roads, and who the enemy was.


8. (C) The Deputy Minister of Interior reported on his
two-week visit to Zabul. The Deputy Minister came away with
conflicting stories -- that the "Taliban were at the gates"
or "all is calm". There were reports of 1,500 Taliban
fighters in the province, six times more than the strength of
the ANA. Many districts had only one police chief who
policed his district with his extended family. Most
residents were afraid of the government and saw a poor
administration which lacked attention to their daily lives.
The Taliban had control in some areas and was now fighting to
get control of the highway where it has been stopping trucks
from Kandahar. Some Taliban fighters were being specifically
trained to block traffic, while others were learning other
tactics, such as IED placement or kidnapping. Most of the
1,500 Taliban were receiving pay from sources in Pakistan.
(Comment: Given the mixed picture we are getting in Zabul, we
are intensifying our efforts to develop a reliable,
first-hand impression of the situation there. End Comment)

-------------- --------------
Response: Reconstruction, ADZ and More Auxiliaries
-------------- --------------


KABUL 00004161 003 OF 003



9. (C) PAG members reinforced the need to speed up ongoing
efforts to turn the tide, including moving faster on
reconstruction teams, moving forward more quickly on Afghan
Development Zones (ADZ),including getting more input from
provincial governors, and recruiting more auxiliary police
along the lines of the Zabul model being developed on a pilot
basis starting September 16. On the auxiliary police, NSA
Rassoul argued for the need to separate out the audit from
recruitment, "due to the urgency of the situation". He said
MOI's March timeline for auxiliary police was not practical
as the ANA was stretched and ISAF could not be stuck in the
districts indefinitely. He agreed that we needed to move
faster on the ADZs.


10. (C) Defense Minister Wardak similarly argued against
waiting for the audits and called for recruitment and
training to start right away. Just shift money from one side
to the other as we need police in place, he said. He
disagreed that it was better to have police from the local
areas since they had too many local ties. CSTC-A Major
General Durbin responded that it took one week for
recruitment and two weeks for training, including vetting.
Auxiliary police were under the same criteria as the regular
police. He said that you cannot just take 300 militants and
put them into the auxiliary police without training. It was
important to proceed in a formal sequential manner, including
vetting.


11. (C) Lt. General Richards stressed that we were on the
right track. The ADZs would help with security and Major
General Durbin's police work would reinforce military gains.
What we must not do is go chasing the Taliban around. "Let
them dance to our tune". If a district falls, we will take
it back in our own time, like we have been doing, he said.
Auxiliary police will be key to all of this. A major
development and reconstruction effort is being put on the
back of the military operation in Kandahar.


12. (C) Lt. General Richards informed the PAG that a major
media blitz would be launched on Saturday (September 16) on
the success in Kandahar. The message would be that we
delivered a large military defeat to the Taliban and that a
major reconstruction effort was now underway. The Taliban
had lost huge numbers and realize now that they cannot defeat
ISAF.


13. (C) Comment: This session of the PAG brought home the
growing severity of the security challenge in the South, as
the Taliban display strategic acuity in trying to lessen ISAF
pressure on them in Kandahar and Helmand by stirring up
trouble in neighboring Farah. ISAF hopes not to be
distracted, but much will hinge on the ability of auxiliary
police forces to be raised and deployed quickly.


NEUMANN