PRESIDENT MUSHARAF'S VISIT TO KABUL: LAYING THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004062

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A,

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PK AF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MUSHARAF'S VISIT TO KABUL: LAYING THE
GROUNDWORK FOR DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON


Classified By: DCM Richard Norland for Reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Keenly aware of domestic skepticism over Pakistan's
claims that it is committed to controlling cross-border
elements of the ongoing insurgency, President Karzai
nevertheless made the decision to host a very public visit by
President Musharaf to Kabul on September 6-7. The theme of
the visit was "Security in Afghanistan means Security for
Pakistan," and the goal was laying the groundwork for
constructive and forward-looking discussions during the
presidents' upcoming visit to Washington. Karzai and
Musharaf met privately for an hour and a half (Septel). The
local press and public focused on the presidents' joint
public appearance for Musharaf's speech at the end of the
visit. The event had been scripted to avoid questions in
order to prevent provoking Musharaf, who highlighted the need
for tough action against militants complemented by outreach
to give those tempted to join insurgencies an alternative.
The result: even skeptical Afghans found little to complain
about in Musharaf's remarks, but they joined Karzai in
underlining that they will be looking for action to match the
assurances given. End Summary.


2. (C) President Musharaf's September 6-7 visit to Kabul
produced much of what the GOA has been demanding in terms of
acknowledging the extent to which activities in Pakistan
contribute to the security problem in Afghanistan.
Presidential advisors had, prior to the visit, highlighted
the political risk to Karzai if the visit had produced less.
Kicked off by a televised arrival ceremony, the visit
included an hour and a half private meeting between the two
presidents (Septel),followed by a state dinner (which the
Iranian and Indian Ambassadors reportedly left conspicuously
early). The key-event, in terms of public opinion, was a
speech by Musharaf and reciprocal remarks by Karzai before a
group of approximately 400 parliamentarians, officials, and
opinion-makers.

--------------
Musharaf's Public Speech: Worth the Risk
--------------


3. (C) Keenly aware of the political risks involved,
President Karzai had been wary of accompanying his Pakistani
counterpart to the event where Musharaf would make public
remarks. In the end -- with quiet encouragement from the
Ambassador and the British -- he agreed to attend. The
event, attended by approximately 400 selected
parliamentarians, cabinet members, and religious leaders, was
organized to avoid questions that might "provoke" Musharaf to
make unhelpful statements beyond his prepared speech.


4. (C) In his almost 70 minutes of remarks, Musharaf worked
to draw a line between Pakistani support of the Taliban prior
to 9/11 and now, when the GOP no longer sees the Taliban as
representing Pashtuns. He acknowledged that Al Qaeda and the
Taliban are active in Pakistan ..."as they are in
Afghanistan," but also drew a distinction between militant
and non-militant Taliban. He linked the former with
terrorism which he assured the GOP would isolate and fight
with force in order: 1) to prevent the "Talibanization" of
Pakistan, 2) to avoid undermining efforts to build regional
coalitions, and 3) to escape the economic and cultural
"backwardness" the militants attempt to impose. Musharaf
defended the Waziristan Peace Accord, claiming that the
government's "bottom line" (expulsion of foreigners from the
region; no training camps; and no Taliban infiltration into
Afghanistan) had been accepted.


5. (C) Musharaf called for several initiatives to draw
moderate Taliban to the mainstream: bolstering civil society,
working through tribal chiefs (or Maliks),massive
redevelopment, and integrating into the political process
individuals "tired of fighting." He outlined several
measures to address what he described as the root causes of
terrorism: illiteracy and lack of options. The measures
would include providing moderate education, reforming the
Madrassa system, and curtailing spread of hate messages
through loudspeakers and 'night letters'.

KABUL 00004062 002 OF 002




6. (C) Musharaf closed his remarks by returning to his
opening theme: that it is time to put accusations and blame
in the past and to work for future cooperation. He
underlined the interdependence of security in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and read, in Dari, lines by an Afghan poet:
"Whenever there is trouble in Afghanistan, there is trouble
in all of Asia."

--------------
Karzai: Appreciative, but Looking for Action
--------------


7. (C) President Karzai's brief remarks in response were
addressed to Musharaf rather than the audience. He expressed
appreciation for Pakistan's hospitality during the Jihad
years and expressed Afghanistan's intention to have peaceful
relations. He underlined the GOA's determination to prevent
foreign elements using Afghan soil for anti-Pakistani
activity and called for Pakistan's help "as a brother" to
control extremist activity. He repeated the message, which
he also offered in the joint press conference following the
presidents' private meeting, that what Afghans are looking
for is action and results to match assurances.

--------------
Public/Officials' Response to the Visit
--------------


8. (C) Public response to the visit was mixed, but dominated
by a skeptical, wait and see tone. In private remarks,
Parliamentary Speaker Qanooni characterized the visit as an
opening to an expanded political dialogue, while former
Afghan President (and current parliamentarian) Rabani was not
prepared to accept Musharaf's assurances that the GOP is
fully committed to fighting the Taliban. One university
student expressed stronger skepticism, noting that Musharaf
has talked of friendship on each of his visits, but that
tensions and cross border activity continue. For most
Afghans, the test of Pakistan's assurances will be in its
actions over the coming months.


9. (C) MFA officials shared President Karzai's and the
public's 'actions speak louder than words' assessment of the
visit. MFA North American Desk Officer Mirwais Samadi told
us the government said the Ministry was pleased to hear
Musharaf's assurances but observed they came only after the
Pakistani president can no longer deny that Pakistan is the
source of equipment and training for terrorist groups
operating in Afghanistan. He said Afghanistan will support
the Waziristan Peace Accord if it helps stop cross border
activity. He reported that President Karzai had reassured
Musharaf that the GOA would not permit India to interfere in
Pakistan as Afghanistan had itself suffered from decades of
foreign interference.


10. (C) Deputy National Security Advisor Ibrahim underlined
that the GOA and Karzai personally had worked hard and taken
risks to orchestrate a positive visit. The goal of laying
the groundwork for a positive, constructive and
forward-looking talks in Washington had been achieved. The
GAO had decided not to use the visit to push ahead with the
idea of a bilateral commission out of concern that it might
experience teething problems that could complicate the
discussions in Washington. Ibrahim sought to assure us that,
when Karzai and Musharaf see President Bush, "they will be
arriving as friends."
NEUMANN