Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL4045
2006-09-10 03:41:00
SECRET
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

NAC VISIT TO KANDAHAR PROMPTS REQUEST FOR MORE

Tags:  MARR NATO PGOV PREL PTER AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6015
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #4045/01 2530341
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 100341Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2350
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 004045 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2021
TAGS: MARR NATO PGOV PREL PTER AF
SUBJECT: NAC VISIT TO KANDAHAR PROMPTS REQUEST FOR MORE
FORCES FROM ISAF


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann. Reasons 1.4(b/d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 004045

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2021
TAGS: MARR NATO PGOV PREL PTER AF
SUBJECT: NAC VISIT TO KANDAHAR PROMPTS REQUEST FOR MORE
FORCES FROM ISAF


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann. Reasons 1.4(b/d).


1. (C) Over the course of two days, the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) visited Kandahar Air Field (KAF),home of NATO
Regional Command South (RC-South),to review PRT activities
in southern Afghanistan and receive a briefing on Operation
MEDUSA. On September 5, Kandahar PRT Commander LtCol Simon
Hetherington (CAN) briefed several Permreps (those with
national troops in the south) on the structure and tasks of
the Kandahar PRT. Hetherington stressed the PRT's commitment
to fostering development, despite a precarious security
environment, but cautioned Permreps that "putting an Afghan
face" on development (i.e., working closely with Afghan
officials to make sure they were in the lead) meant
"accepting an Afghan pace" (i.e., very slow) in moving
forward.


2. (S) On September 6, the full NAC (accompanied by SACEUR
and COMISAF) returned to KAF for a briefing on Operation
MEDUSA. RC-South Commander Brigadier General David Fraser
(CAN) explained that Operation MEDUSA, which began September
3, was designed to eliminate the threat posed by the Taliban
to western Kandahar and Kandahar city. The Taliban's aim, he
continued, was to isolate the city of Kandahar from the
Government of Afghanistan's (GOA) influence. BG Fraser
estimated that 500-700 Taliban were dug in about 20
kilometers west of the city. Of that number, 300 were judged
to be Taliban-for-hire. These were not Taliban hardliners, he
said, but "economic Taliban," earning more per day as a
fighter than they could from the International Community.
The 200 hardcore Taliban, Fraser judged, would defend their
positions to the death. He warned Permreps that MEDUSA would
be a tough fight in a tough place: despite the fact that
Coalition and NATO troops had killed an estimated 2500

insurgents this summer (and 200-300 killed in the last week
alone),replacement Taliban continued to stream in. (NOTE:
COMISAF, attending the rehearsal drill for Op MEDUSA at KAF
on September 1, called MEDUSA the first brigade operation in
NATO's history, and repeatedly urged RC-South to treat MEDUSA
as the operation on which the whole NATO campaign in
Afghanistan would turn. END NOTE.)

--------------
THE ENEMY HAS PICKED UP ITS GAME
--------------

3. (S) Noting recent IED attacks in the south, the Spanish
Permrep asked whether the suicide vehicle bombers were
affiliated with al Qaeda or the Taliban. Fraser explained
that IEDs were a tool used by insurgents to both to disrupt
ISAF movements (such as the suicide attack on a Kandahar PRT
convoy on August 23),and to settle old scores (such as the
August 28 attack in downtown Lashkar Gah against a former
chief of police). While it was true suicide bombers trained
in Pakistan, Fraser told Permreps it was important to tackle
the Afghan part of the problem: in order to be successful,
the bomber needed Afghan housing and equipment as he prepared
for his mission. Fraser added that he had good mil-mil
cooperation with the Pakistanis on the southern border,
including those Pakistanis working to stop the infiltration
of Taliban into refugee camps in Pakistan for recruiting
purposes.


4. (S) Responding to Canadian and Norwegian questions about
timelines for MEDUSA, Fraser predicted "several months" of
fighting that would continue "into the fall." He pointed out
that the battle had begun two months ago, before the transfer
of authority to NATO. In the meantime, the enemy had "picked
up its game" and was everywhere -- preaching a pro-Taliban
message in mosques, and sending night letters to Afghans
supporting the International Community. Although ISAF had
managed to deny freedom of movement to the Taliban inside the
city, Fraser warned Permreps that Kandahar remained the
Taliban's "center of gravity," and that the Taliban believed
the city was worth dying for.


5. (C) The Turkish Permrep asked how the Taliban paid its

KABUL 00004045 002 OF 003


soldiers-for-hire and bought equipment. "From drugs," Fraser
responded bluntly. The Panjwayi area of western Kandahar was
a major poppy-producing district -- another reason, Fraser
said, that the Taliban would fight to the death to protect
the area.


6. (C) In response to the Latvian question of what the GOA
should be doing, Fraser stated the GOA needed to deliver
effects in the provinces. They need to get out more, he
stated, and talk to Afghans. The GOA needed to be seen to be
listening to the people of Afghanistan. In addition, the
central government in Kabul needed to push more resources
down to the provincial level -- police and army in particular
-- and loosen the purse strings. In other words, Fraser
concluded, "show the people of Afghanistan that the
Government of Afghanistan means something."

--------------
NEED MORE DEFENSE RIGHT NOW...
--------------

7. (S) Fraser thanked Permreps for the Allied forces that
were already augmenting Canadian forces in the south for
MEDUSA. RC-North had agreed to send French reinforcements
from Kabul (NOTE: subsequently refused by Paris),and two
U.S. companies were coming in from the East. Fraser appealed
to the NAC for more troops -- to win the fight, and more
resources -- to extend the GOA's reach in southern
Afghanistan. Fraser also pointed out that as the GOA
solidified and expanded its influence in the south, ISAF
would need more resources to support the government's efforts.


8. (S) The UK Permrep asked about the implications of
Operation MEDUSA for the rest of the south. Fraser
reiterated his appeal for a reserve force ("I only have one
platoon right now.") RC-South was "robbing Peter to pay
Paul" with the Portugese replacing the Romanians as the KAF
perimeter guard force, so the Romanians can reinforce Zabul
province. "If I were king for a day" Fraser added, "I'd
request several battle groups." Fraser predicted that the
Taliban would expand into Nimroz and Day Kundi (the two
provinces in RC-South without an ISAF presence) in the future.


9. (S) The U.S. Permrep asked whether development efforts
had been stymied by the battle rhythm -- "It looks like we
can't walk and chew gum" -- and whether the battle had
implications for NATO's move to Stage 4 TOA in RC-East.
Fraser claimed that the development agenda was not hostage to
the security situation, explaining that the military was
doing development "right behind the battle" (50 tractors were
being given to Panjwayi elders via CERP funds). For the long
term, he added, the PRTs would contribute to the "Three Ds"
(Defense, Development, Diplomacy). As to Stage 4, Fraser
commented that from his perspective, having participated in
both OEF and ISAF in the south, it was one thing to have the
voices of seven coalition partners with you, quite another to
have all of NATO standing beside you.


10. (S) COMISAF also thanked Allies' willingness to join the
fight for the south -- the French would be coming down from
duties in Kabul (NOTE: this did not happen),the Dutch came
"without question" and the U.S. disengaged from Operation
Enduring Freedom in the east to help. With this help,
COMISAF said, we can balance our forces. That said, COMISAF
added his own urgent plea for enablers. We can balance
forces, he said, but not forever.

-------------- --------------
...NEED MORE DEVELOPMENT/DIPLOMACY FOR THE LONG TERM
-------------- --------------

11. (S) BG Fraser emphasized to Permreps that ISAF was
fighting a counterinsurgency, which could take years to win.
The enemy, he stated, hoped NATO would grow discouraged, give
up and leave. COMISAF stressed the multidimensional nature
of the operation, and urged Permreps "to respect the fact
that success could not be achieved overnight." He also
stated that more needed to be done in the civilian fields,

KABUL 00004045 003 OF 003


and urged the Development and Diplomacy pillars "to up their
game."


12. (U) Ambassador Nuland did not have an opportunity to
clear this message.
NEUMANN