SRSG KOENIGS' BRIEFING ON PROPOSAL FOR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 004009

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SCA/PAB, S/CT
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNAF NATO PK AF
SUBJECT: SRSG KOENIGS' BRIEFING ON PROPOSAL FOR
AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN POLITICAL DIALOGUE


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for Reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (S) In an August 27 briefing for resident embassy/mission
representatives, SRSG Koenigs reported on his recent visit to
Islamabad and sought support for his proposal for an
organized political dialogue (as complement to the tripartite
process and involving the UN, the NATO political
representatives, and EU as well as the Governments of
Pakistan and Afghanistan). Koenigs said he had discussed his
proposal with Pakistani ForMin Kasuri, Interior Minister
Sherpao, and Deputy ISI MG Mustapha in Islamabad and also
discussed it with Afghan ForMin Spanta and NSA Rassoul. The
SRSG credited his Pakistani interlocutors willingness to
consider the idea of a political dialogue to recent events
which have forced Pakistan to acknowledge the cross-border
elements of the Afghan insurgency and to growing
international pressure. The GOP has become more willing to
say it must do more despite a lack of resources, and may be
willing to consider a structure political dialogue as a way
forward. Koenigs reported Afghan ForMin Spanta as being much
more wary. This likely reflects concern over the political
risks to President Karzai. Comment: Neither Koenigs nor any
of the assembled mission representatives seemed aware of the
recent ongoing quiet dialogues taking place between GOA NSA
Rassoul and his GOP counterpart or incipient conversations
which are beginning to take place between Afghan and
Pakistani parliamentarian. End Comment. Koenigs reported
"interest within the Security Council" for a briefing by
ISAF, adding he supported the idea. End Summary

-------------- --------------
Pakistan Officials Don't Say No to Political Dialogue
-------------- --------------


2. (C) On August 27, SRSG Tom Koenigs (joined by his Deputy
Chris Alexander) briefed representatives of resident missions
on his recent trip to Islamabad where he said he had outlined
"a concrete proposal" for a regular political dialogue
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as a complement to the
military-to-military consultations that take place within the
Tripartite Commission process. He said he had in mind
high-level talks every two to three months, involving the two
governments as well as the UN, NATO political representatives
(FYI: NATO senior civilian representative Everts attended
this meeting),and the EU.


3. (C) Koenigs reported that he had in his most recent
visit to Islamabad -- his third in as many months --
presented his idea to Deputy ISI MG Mustapha, MOI Sherpao,
and ForMin Kasuri. Each had shown interest in the idea and
agreed there is room for a richer political discussion. The
SRSG highlighted growing and increasingly unified
international pressure (citing Australia and Canada's recent
efforts) as helping convince the GOP it needs to do more,
despite limited leverage to affect events.


4. (C) Koenigs lauded what he described as a shift from
Islamabad's "hands off approach" toward the Taliban to a more
interventionist, law-enforcement approach. He added that
what recent efforts have uncovered has made it impossible to
sustain the "fiction" that the situation in Waziristan was
manageable or to deny that the Taliban and al Qaeda cycle
through Pakistan to Afghanistan. He reported that MOI
Sherpao had said he had been "surprised when 'peace' in
Pakistan had led to an increase in attacks in Afghanistan."
In Koenigs discussion of his visit, he noted that it had been
much more difficult to get into a discussion with Kasuri of
the main issues without a lengthy and polite preamble
avoiding any direct criticism of Pakistan,and that Kasuri was
"totally" preoccupied by concern over public perceptions of
Pakistan. Sherpao, on the other hand was much more down to
earth.

-------------- -

KABUL 00004009 002 OF 003


Need for Careful Preparation and Orchestration
-------------- -


5. (C) While expressing optimism that the GOP may becoming
more open to the idea of a political dialogue, Koenigs
underlined the need to lay the groundwork, including
addressing the "persistence of a distorted view in Pakistan
of the situation in Afghanistan." Alexander compared the
views from Islamabad and Kabul as analogous to looking
through opposite ends of a telescope. According to Koenigs,
Islamabad sees the situation in the southern provinces as
typical of Afghanistan as a whole, and considers the Karzai
government as a rump government, controlled by the Northern
Alliance. Alexander characterized the GOP's view as "out of
touch; out of date" including regarding the number of
coalition and ISAF troops on the ground. Koenig offered the
aside that Pakistan's Ambassador to Afghanistan, Sardar Taria
Azizuddin, has a good understanding of the situation -- but
doubted if he influenced thinking in Islamabad.


6. (C) Note: In a conversation on the margins of the most
recent military tripartite, A/PolMil Counselor asked
Afghanistan's Ambassador to Islamabad, Nanguyalai Tarzi, for
his views on the possibility of a political process. Tarzi
had expressed skepticism, saying that for there to be hope of
success, the GOA must be prepared to offer short, medium and
long-term goals to match those of Pakistan. He underlined
the importance of the vision coming from the very top on both
sides, as not even ministers would have the authority to make
the kind of decisions that would make a difference. He
doubted if Afghanistan was prepared for such an effort.
There would also be difficulties on the Pakistani side with
the idea that "confidence-building measures" are required.
Tarzi himself, given his understanding, would be willing to
argue that, on the political side, it was precisely what was
needed to address the massive distrust of Pakistan among
Afghans at all levels. Any political process would need to
begin slowly, with carefully orchestrated first steps, to
avoid deepening rather than relieving the distrust. End
Note.

-------------- --------------
Afghan ForMin and NSA Very Wary; Cite Risks to Karzai
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Koenigs reported that he had also presented his
proposal to Afghan ForMin Spanta and NSA Dr. Rassoul. While
they both said they realized something along the lines of his
proposal must be done, "they were not excited over the
specific proposal." Spanta in particular highlighted the
(domestic political) risks. The challenge would be how to
protect President Karzai from being accused of "fraternizing
with Pakistan," particularly if there were no significant
payoffs. Spanta emphasized that the effort would have to be
at the sub-ministerial level; even ministers' involvement
would be too public and thus too risky.


8. (S) EU Special Representative Ambassador Francesc
Vendrell offered that he understood Spanta's wariness and
emphasized the need to keep the entire effort under the
radar. He expressed concern that Pakistan might see the
process as deflecting responsibility for addressing the
cross-border issues. Koenigs agreed there was a risk of
"talk replacing pressure on the Taliban," but thought it
could be managed. The key would be united, coordinated, and
sustained pressure and support from the international
community. The SRSG said he planned to travel to Islamabad
within the next two weeks to brief missions there as part of
his effort to build momentum in support of the process.
Alexander expressed hope the Musharraf-Karzai meeting in
September might include discussion of the proposal and set
the platform.

--------------
SC Interest in ISAF Briefing
--------------


9. (C) Koenigs closed the meeting by reporting there is

KABUL 00004009 003 OF 003


interest within the Security Council in asking ISAF for a
briefing. According to Koenigs, this would be the first time
the Council would be requesting a briefing by a non-UN
mission, but, given ISAF's link to a SC Resolution, he
supported the request as a sign of the close cooperation
between the UN and NATO. Vendrell agreed, but said he was
sure it would have to be a joint SRSG-ISAF briefing. He also
speculated that "more than a little massaging" would likely
be required to get France and Russia on board.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (C) There are advantages and risks to having the UN
foster diplomatic efforts that do not include the U.S. to
broker greater Afghan-Pakistani cooperation against the
Taliban. The domestic risks to each party are substantial.
Skepticism in Kabul about the proposal was underlined by the
fact that, while ForMin Spanta expressed support for the
concept of political dialogue (his preference would be for
within the Tripartite Process),he did not mention Koenigs'
ideas (Septel). We believe Koenig's proposal is a long way
from being concrete, but see its value as encouraging the
parties to focus on the value of a political process. We
will want to use the upcoming meetings in Washington to
reinforce this idea. In the meantime, we continue to
highlight the value of concrete confidence-building measures
and work to ensure any proposals complement our own.
NEUMANN