Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL4005
2006-09-06 12:54:00
SECRET
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

KARZAI COMMENTS ON COUNTER NARCOTICS POLICY

Tags:  SNAR AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2368
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #4005 2491254
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 061254Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2315
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T KABUL 004005 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016
TAGS: SNAR AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI COMMENTS ON COUNTER NARCOTICS POLICY

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.

S E C R E T KABUL 004005

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016
TAGS: SNAR AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI COMMENTS ON COUNTER NARCOTICS POLICY

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.


1. (S) Ambassador Neumann met with President Karzai and
discussed the Afghanistan counter-narcotics strategy.
Karzai is vehemently against aerial spraying saying that we
would eliminate poppy for one year at the price of turning
Afghanis permanently against GOA and putting large numbers
into the hands of the Taliban. He thinks eradication in
Helmand will be next to impossible this year; the government
must first establish authority and security conditions have
moved this a long way backwards from last year. Comment: By
contrast, the Governor or Helmand believes substantial
eradication could be done (septel to follow). We will be
working on Karzai. End Comment.


2. (S) Karzai thinks boosting economic assistance should
focus heavily on the non- or low- producing provinces. He
believes giving economic assistance only to the poppy
producing provinces will further alienate other parts of
Afghanistan and cause new instability. Karzai was slightly
receptive to the idea of enhanced eradication in provinces
other than Helmand but came back also to the need for
building up government authority. Badakhashan, for example,
he characterized as a province dominated by war lords and
poverty in which the writ of the GOA scarcely runs.
Eradication there would destabilize things but not help until
the GOA is able to expand its overall authority. Comment: He
is right about the lack of GOA presence. There are no
regular ANP or ANA there as the Badakhashan governor has
frequently complained, most recently to the Ambassador two
weeks ago. The ANP there are in fact all under control of
various commanders, most the appointees of Rabbani. The
force generation needs in the south and east preclude any
immediate assignment of out-of-province security forces. End
comment.


3. (S) Karzai said the problem is not the pillars of the
counter narcotics strategy but that the State does not yet
exist to implement them in most parts of the country. Karzai
nevertheless accepted that eradication must go forward where
it is possible. He noted also that the UK has raised with
him in a general way the idea of an amnesty to get large
traffickers out of the drug business and invest their ill
gotten gains in productive investments in their localities.
He was uncertain about his reaction to the idea. The
Ambassador stressed that any proposal had to be looked at
very closely to avoid the possibility that people could use
the amnesty to protect themselves while staying in the drug
business. The Ambassador noted the bad experience we had had
with a similar concept in Colombia. Karzai said the bottom
line was whether such a proposal could help reduce fighting
and undermine the Taliban; if so it would have merit.
Throughout the discussion he was more focused on the
implications of the growing insurgency and weakness of the
GOA than on counter narcotics policy per say.

NEUMANN