Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL4001
2006-09-06 11:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PAG APPROVES AUXILIARY POLICE

Tags:  PTER SNAR MARR PGOV AF 
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DE RUEHBUL #4001/01 2491115
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061115Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2309
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2800
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2951
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6278
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1629
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004001 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM, INL/FO
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2016
TAGS: PTER SNAR MARR PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PAG APPROVES AUXILIARY POLICE


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann, for reasons 1.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004001

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM, INL/FO
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2016
TAGS: PTER SNAR MARR PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PAG APPROVES AUXILIARY POLICE


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann, for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) The August 30 Policy Action Group (PAG),
chaired by National Security Advisor Rassoul,
approved in principle a concept for auxiliary police
proposed by the Ministry of Interior. The MoI
argued that it is essential to provide some level of
security in key provinces immediately, particularly
since the rebalancing effort has been delayed
(septel) and militia/arbakei are already operating
in many areas. The MoI plan would put the auxiliary
police under the command of ANP leadership and not
the governors (who now control the militias). The
auxiliaries could be recruited from present militia
forces, but as individuals, not groups, and they
would have to meet the same standards as ANP
patrolmen and would not be permitted to serve in any
militia concurrently. They would be registered and
receive police ID cards, and would be paid through
normal ANP channels, not by governors, operational
funds (as is now the case for militiamen). The new
auxiliaries would receive 10 days of initial
training followed by one week of training per
quarter - this would allow them to start immediately
rather than facing the usual delay of up to three
months for new ANP hires.


2. (C) MoI and CSTC-A have assessed that the
relatively short period of time required to hire and
train the auxiliary police force is appropriate based
upon the sense of urgency President Karzai,s places
on bolstering the forces in the south. Auxiliary
police would be contracted for only a one year period,
although based upon the state of the insurgency in
Afghanistan a year from now their term of service
could be extended for another year (maximum duration
of service is 2 years). After their service the
auxiliary policemen could receive additional
training and become members of the ANP. CSTC-A is

also working on a plan whereby they could be placed
in a "Police Reserve" force. Although the reserve
concept is still just a nascent proposal, the
thought is that the Police Reserve force would be
available to respond to national disasters or
mitigate future insurgencies.


3. (C) There were a number of questions from the
international community - who pays, who equips, how
many auxiliaries are really needed, what salary
level, what to do if fewer or different auxiliaries
are recruited than in the governors, militias, and
so on. The GOA is determined, however, to move
ahead with this plan, despite the lack of resolution
of these issues. For that reason, Ambassador
Neumann pressed the group to move quickly with a
pilot project in two provinces, saying that many of
the questions raised by PAG members could not be
solved in Kabul and would have to be worked out on
the ground. It was agreed to begin the experiment
in Zabol - which has a good governor (with a
militia) and a strong ANA. Second up would be
Ghazni, which will need a strong backfill of ANP in
conjunction with Operation Mountain Fury. (Note: A
pilot program in Ghazni would require a change in
the governor there, an action President Karzai has
repeatedly promised as being "imminent.")

Comment
--------------

KABUL 00004001 002 OF 002




4. (C) We and others in the international
community continue to have concerns about auxiliary
police. Afghans need national institutions (ANA,
ANP, judiciary, etc.) to build an identity as a
nation. "Auxiliary police" that respond to district
and provincial officials and who owe their
employment to those officials will not necessarily
aid in building a coherent national identity.
Moreover, local populations may confuse them with
militia, weakening public perception of central
government authority. Auxiliary police should be
seen as an interim measure, until the ANA and ANP
are sufficiently capable to take over all security
duties. It will be essential to ensure that they
are paid directly from a central authority, not
through the governor. Command and control will have
to originate in the Ministry of the Interior,
through the regional police commands. Finally,
there will need to be a plan to fold police
auxiliaries into the ANP within the next three or
four years. The MoI proposal, developed with the
assistance of CSTC-A, attempts to address many of
these concerns.


5. (C) Comment cont,d: "Auxiliaries" potentially
serve a number of purposes for different political
actors. They offer the GoA an opportunity to "do
something" immediately about the shortage of trained
ANP. They give elders a direct role in providing
security to their respective communities. To the
extent they remain under control of governors, they
are a patronage tool. Therefore, we can expect
calls for "auxiliary police" under governors,
control to continue. We have made clear that our
support for chain of command to come under the
national police as proposed in the MoI plan. Rapid
implementation of the MoI plan in one or two
provinces will soon show whether the concept is one
that could be supported on a larger scale, or
whether it is fundamentally misconceived.


6. (U) Post will email the draft Terms of Reference
for the Recruiting and Employment of the Temporary
Auxiliary Police to SCA/A and INL/FO.
NEUMANN