Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL3943
2006-09-04 10:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRT KHOST:KUCHI AGREEMENT STOPS VIOLENCE, BUT

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PREF AF 
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RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 1621
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003943 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PREF AF
SUBJECT: PRT KHOST:KUCHI AGREEMENT STOPS VIOLENCE, BUT
SIDESTEPS CORE SETTLEMENT ISSUE

REF: KABUL 3220

Classified By: Political Counselor Sara Rosenberry for reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003943

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PREF AF
SUBJECT: PRT KHOST:KUCHI AGREEMENT STOPS VIOLENCE, BUT
SIDESTEPS CORE SETTLEMENT ISSUE

REF: KABUL 3220

Classified By: Political Counselor Sara Rosenberry for reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D).


1. (C) Summary. Provincial leaders are pleased with a July
31 agreement ending a violent land dispute between the Kuchi
and Baker Khel tribes in Khost's Bak District. Although they
have reason to celebrate the cooperation among traditional,
provincial, and GOA leaders to broker the agreement, it is an
&agreement8 the Kuchis felt bullied into signing by &every
tribe in the province8 under the threat of jailing its
leaders. There has been no violence since the agreement was
signed. However, the potential for conflict remains; most of
the Kuchis have not moved despite the August 14 deadline,
claiming alternate locations are already full. Most
provincial officials, with the notable exception of incoming
Governor Arsala Jamal, continue to assert Kuchis are nomads
and have no legitimate claim to permanent settlement.
Officials seem largely content to ignore the Kuchi settlement
issue pending development of a national strategy by the
federal Kuchi Commission. End Summary.

Kuchi-Baker Khel Agreement Returns From Kabul
--------------


2. (U) The Federal Kuchi Commission endorsed and distributed
official copies in mid-August of the July 31 agreement
settling a Bak District land dispute between the Kuchi and
Baker Khel tribes. The agreement stipulates the Kuchis will
leave the disputed Gurgari area for seasonal camps in Scharai
and Zaramela (article 2). The Bak Kuchis (Ashgar Khel
subtribe of the Naizai Kuchis) are allowed to stay in the
alternative locations for six months a year (article 3) in
accordance with their &nomadic way of life8 (article 1).
The agreement was read to affected parties at a 300-person
gathering in Khost City July 31, signed, and sent to Kabul.


3. (U) Governor Arsala Jamal explained to PRTOff August 13

the Kuchi Commission's delay was due to contentious
provisions of the agreement, such as the site location of a
new graveyard, as the agreement bans the Kuchis from burying
their dead at the cemetery in the disputed area. The Baker
Khel tribe is afraid the Kuchis will use the cemetery to
argue their right to the surrounding land, a tactic
historically used by tribes to assert ownership. Fighting
over the cemetery turned violent in April, resulting in four
deaths (there were also three Kuchi and as many as 15 Baker
Khel deaths in July). The final agreement side-steps the
issue by granting the agreement's provincial oversight
committee authority to find a new cemetery location for the
Kuchis (article 6). Although Kuchis have grazed the area for
generations, they started establishing a permanent settlement
last summer and burying their dead there in early 2006.

Lasting or Stop-Gap Solution?
--------------


4. (C) Jamal asserted the July 31 Agreement would be a
permanent solution for the Bak Kuchis in all respects except
determining compensation for loss of life and property during
the fighting. Compensation would be determined after one
year (article 9). He added, however, that a permanent,
national solution needs to be developed by the Kuchi
Commission to deal with settlement of the traditionally
nomadic Kuchis. Provincial officials commonly use
development of a federal solution to justify provincial
inaction regarding Kuchi settlement, fearing the tiny
province will otherwise absorb a disproportionate number of

KABUL 00003943 002 OF 004


the settling nomads. Jamal said neither side of the
Kuchi/Baker Khel conflict was pleased with the outcome, proof
that it was a true compromise.


5. (C) Outgoing Bak District Commissioner Rahim Jan, in
contrast, said the Baker Khel were pleased because they
&have gotten everything they wanted.8 He added the Kuchis
were &obliged to accept the agreement8 with the entire
province united against them. GOA and Kuchi leaders verified
there has been no post-agreement violence as of August 24.
Newly reinstalled District Commissioner Hussin Jan Sherzai
told PRTOff August 24 this was due to the heavy 50,000
Afghani collateral in cash or property (guns, vehicles, etc.)
at risk from both sides should they instigate violence.
(Note: Confusion reigns: Article 8 original version
stipulates 2 million Afghanis or about $40,000 from both
sides; the official version states 10 million Afghani, or
about $200,000 each. End Note.) Sherzai contended the Baker
Khel wanted the Kuchis out of Bak District entirely and the
Kuchis should be happy they are allowed to stay six months in
the old locations. He added the Kuchis &will have to be
happy8 with the agreement and &very happy8 Baker Khel
tribesmen routinely come to the District Center to show their
gratitude.

Precedent Agreement in Theory and Practice
--------------


6. (C) Kuchis are required to dismantle their homes (Article
7),but there is no time table for withdrawal or when the GOA
will demolish the structures. Although the agreement
requires both sides to relinquish high-ground fighting
positions (article 5),plans to disarm both sides of heavy
weapons have been abandoned, according to Jan. Sherzai
asserted about 45-60 families had moved, with about 300
remaining in Gurgari. (Note: These are highly politicized
estimates. Ex-Governor Pathan claimed only about 200 Kuchi
families lived in the area. Alternatively, the Kuchis claim
400 Kuchi families had moved and 1,500 remained in Gurgari.
The maneuver battalion in Khost estimates 3,000 to 4,000
total Kuchis in the area, down from 5,000 to 6,000 before
fighting broke out. End Note). Sherzai said the August 14
deadline to move had been extended due to &Kuchi excuses8
based on lack of logistical support and lack of room at the
alternative locations. He optimistically hoped the remaining
Kuchis would be moved August 26, when the 15-member
provincial agreement-oversight committee came to the area, as
they have about once or twice a week since the agreement was
signed. However, Kuchi elders told PRTOff August 24 the
alternative sites were full and they were waiting on the
commission to identify other locations. Otherwise, they
&hoped to stay here over the winter.8

Kuchis Disagree with Agreement: &We Are Not Nomads8
-------------- --------------


7. (U) Bak Kuchi Elder Nadir Khan said he and the six other
Kuchi representatives that signed the July 31 agreement were
coerced into supporting it. He added that main Bak Kuchi
leader Gulam Khan and other elders did not sign the document.
After hearing the contents of the agreement at the July 31
meeting, he claimed he rose and shouted &this is not fair.8
Then the Provincial Police Commander grabbed his arm and
told him to sign or go to jail. Khan and other Bak Kuchi
leaders said they could not resist the collective pressure
from &every tribe in the province,8 the federal Kuchi
Commission, Provincial Council, and provincial shuras. Khan
said despite promises for a future Kabul-based solution, the
Gurgari dispute would not likely be revisited. Kuchi elders

KABUL 00003943 003 OF 004


are trying a last-ditch effort to plead their case with
President Karzai, but &if he does not help, we will have to
find a place to stay. We are not nomads.8 Kuchi elders
claim 100 percent of the Gurgari-area Kuchis want to settle.

Provincial Leadership: Mission Accomplished(
--------------


8. (C) Provincial authorities characterize the agreement as
significant victory for provincial leadership in general and
the Provincial Council (PC) and Director of Tribal Affairs in
particular, who led cease-fire and agreement talks (ref).
Although they only grudgingly share credit with federal Kuchi
Commission, Bak Kuchis cite the commission's involvement as a
vital component in their decision to lay down arms. Kuchis
repeatedly told PRTOff they will only recognize national
authority, as they perceive any provincial decision as
inherently unfair. Kuchi elders add they would consider
moving to other provinces as part of a national settlement
plan.


9. (C) PC leaders disputed Kuchis were forced into the
agreement, though they conceded there was little difference
between the agreement and the controversial April conclusion
of a provincial committee. Vice-Chairman Taj Ali said
despite initial Kuchi resistance, the PC managed to convince
them to support it because it ensured nomadic rights to
grazing land, establishment of a new cemetery, protection
from Baker Khel attacks, and 30 plots in the official
returnee camp outside of Khost City. Ali later admitted the
allocation of plots was an oral promise from ex-Governor
Pathan that is not in the agreement.

New Governor May Mean New Approach
--------------


10. (C) In contrast to collective provincial leader opinion,
Gov. Jamal acknowledged trying to force Kuchis back into a
nomadic life was no solution. He said Kuchis that have lived
in Pakistani refugee camps for 25 years had lost the
livestock and skills to return to a nomadic lifestyle. Jamal
is urging expedited development of a long-term, national plan
to settle Kuchis by the Kuchi Commission and efforts to
identify and mitigate potential conflicts before fighting
breaks out. He said although some would undoubtedly be
settled in Khost, a disproportionate number of Kuchis have
flocked to the province to take advantage of rising land
values. Jamal said in other provinces Kuchis were
integrating more or less smoothly into urban centers, but
this approach would not work in Khost due to the sheer size
of Kuchi populations. He was intrigued by the suggestion of
opening up plots to resettle Kuchis in a proposed returnee
camp in Tere Zayi district ahead of a national plan, but made
no commitments.

Bak Decision as Precedent Pending National Plan
-------------- --


11. (C) Both provincial and Kuchi leaders agree the Bak
situation and resultant agreement are precedents. Bak Kuchis
told PRTOff August 24, although there are simmering arguments
in other provinces, none have escalated to the open warfare
nor required a Kuchi Commission-facilitated agreement.
Deputy Governor Ajab Khan Sangeen told PRTOff a national
solution would be slow coming and could be too late to
prevent fighting in other provinces, such as Nangahar and
Logar. In contrast, Governor Jamal said the Kuchi Commission
was working on the details of a draft national strategy,
which would be unveiled &soon.8 He said Kabul wants to

KABUL 00003943 004 OF 004


keep the draft's progress out of the headlines to reduce
volatile, perhaps violent, reactions from perceived winners
and losers ahead of its official release.


12. (C) Comment: The good news is the agreement stopped
fighting and demonstrated encouraging cooperation between
traditional tribal and GOA leadership; the bad news it is not
really an agreement, as it is clearly being imposed on the
Kuchis, and only kicks the ultimate problem of Kuchi
settlement further down the road. PC members struggled with
good reason to identify advantages in the agreement for
Kuchis. The agreement largely formalizes existing grazing
agreements and security assurances are a red herring, as
moving the Kuchis removes the primary reason for Baker Khel
attacks.


13. (C) Although there is merit to developing a national
settlement strategy for Kuchis who are ill-prepared and
uninterested in resuming a nomadic lifestyle, it is also a
convenient excuse for inaction on the provincial level.
Despite political sensitivities, we should encourage
provincial leaders to look creatively at the Kuchi issue,
particularly in the context of the larger refugee returnee
issue. Providing provincial leaders with resources to
provide incentives to settled tribes to accept a Kuchi
settlement, or, more likely, inclusion of Kuchis in
mixed-tribe returnee camps, would be necessary to reach a
long term solution.
NEUMANN