HELMAND GOVERNOR ON TRIBAL WARFARE, SECURITY, NEED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003935

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, S/CT, SCA/A, S/CRS
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
STATE PASS USAID FOR AID/ANE AND AID/CDHA/DG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2015
TAGS: PGOV MARR PINR PTER AF
SUBJECT: HELMAND GOVERNOR ON TRIBAL WARFARE, SECURITY, NEED
FOR ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE

REF: KABUL 3843

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS 1.6 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: Helmand Governor Daud asked the Ambassador on
August 23 for support for efforts to carve out the space the
governor said he needs to build "loyal" local governance in
the province. The Governor acknowledged poppy cultivation
and Taliban activities are critical threats to his efforts,
but he focused on the competition between tribes --
particularly in the north of the province -- as the
underlying problem. The tribal competition provides a
fertile ground for poppy cultivation and Taliban activity,
which overwhelm the local population's ability to control
their daily lives. The Governor accepts that he must work
within the parameters defined by the tradition of tribal
authority, but he is convinced he can build legitimate, loyal
governance -- if the central government and IC provide
adequate support. The Governor said the ANA and ANP can be
loyal (as long they are receiving regular salaries) and
effective (but only in the context of security provided by
international forces). He asked for the Ambassador's help in
encouraging the British to undertake more military operations
in Taliban-controlled areas and to match the former U.S. PRT
Commander's record in supporting projects which demonstrate
there are benefits to being loyal to the government. He
would welcome increased support for projects (including
road-building) which provide employment, but asked that the
security budgets connected to those project be integrated
into a province-wide approach. End Summary.

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Tribal Elements Key to the Security Problem
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2. (C) Helmand Governor Engineer Daud requested a meeting
with the Ambassador on August 23 to appeal for support for
his efforts to carve out the secure space and resources he
needs to pursue efforts to build local governance "loyal" to
the central government. Daud noted that President Karzai had
introduced him at the Conference of Governors the previous
day (Reftel) as "my governor in a very troubled situation."
The Governor described security in the south of the province
-- south from Gereshk -- as relatively good, and then turned
to the situation in the north, where he sees the lack of
security crippling his efforts to convince the population
there is an alternative to submission to tribal warfare. In
the areas near Musa Qala and Kajaki, there is simply no
security outside the towns themselves, a situation which has
crippled both economic and social life. Daud said that, at
this point, there is a constant threat that local police will
become part of the tribal conflict. The ANA would remain
loyal, but they are entirely inadequate to the challenge.


3. (C) Daud said the key to improving the security
situation was controlling ongoing tribal warfare. Tribal
dynamics are part of every process in the province, but in
recent months have overwhelmed everything else. The key,
from Daud's view, and his most immediate concern, is former
governor Sher Mohammed (Alikozai tribe; based in Musa Qala).
President Karzai removed Sher Mohammed from Helmand and
brought him to Kabul to join the Meshrano Jirga, but the
former governor is determined to avoid ceding control of the
province to other tribal competitors. Sher Mohammed
maintains his influence through his brother, Amir Mohammed
(whom Daud is seeking to remove as Deputy Governor, and
through his local militia) whose loyalty to the government
Daud believes he could assure if he could provide them with
steady, secure salaries. While Daud noted the Taliban have
influence in all tribes in the province as well as elements
directly controlled from Pakistan, he highlighted their
ability to seize on Sher Mohammed's departure to increase

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support for and influence on those tribal elements --
particularly the Barakzai -- that seek to fill the space left
by Sher Mohammed's departure.

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Time for Communities, not Individuals to Govern
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4. (C) Daud told the Ambassador that President Karzai had
convened a private meeting of the tribal leaders to appeal
for their cooperation. Daud had not been included in the
meeting but was especially pleased to report that President
Karzai had made it clear he would not be sending Sher
Mohammed back to the province. According to Daud, "the
message got to Helmand in ten minutes," and helped reinforce
the idea that "this is the time to give communities, not
individuals, a chance to govern."


5. (C) Daud reported that the previous week he had called
together community representatives affected by the warfare to
impress on them his determination to allow them to reclaim
their lives. When they reported they feared Sher Mohammed,
the Governor had responded that if they organized themselves,
the government, the police, and assistance would follow.
Daud had told them if they wanted Sher Mohammed back, he
would accept that, but if they organized themselves to work
together, it would become difficult for the Taliban, Sher
Mohammed, or any other force to dictate to them. Daud asked
the representatives to choose 30 representatives -- drawn
from the North and the South -- for a Shura to work with him
to come up with a plan reflecting their wishes for the future
of the province.

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Facing Facts: Security is Inadequate
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6. (C) The Governor stressed that until the security
situation is brought under control, there can be little
progress on any plan. His underlined the challenge of
ensuring security in the face of the Taliban and while
"trying to get out from under the thumb of Sher Mohammad."
Efforts to identify a new District Chief and Chief of Police
for Musa Qala have been stymied by the fact that no one wants
either job, but Daud expressed hope the Shura process could
identify an "influential, tribal, loyal person" for the Chief
of Police position. (Comment: A District Police Chief should
follow from Phase III of Police Reform, which is being worked
through by MOI, CSTC-A, and the German Police Program. End
Comment) In the meantime, Daud said while he had hoped to
rotate police from Lashkar Ghar to Musa Qala to give those
units some relief -- and also provide some relief for the
units at Kajaki, he did not have the resources to follow
through. In order for the plan to have the desired effect
the Governor would need new district leaders and extra ANA
and ANP for at least two or three weeks. He was not
optimistic. (Comment: Ambassador Neumann was at Kajaki Dam
on August 28. The Tabiban exercise full control outside the
strong points that were visited, which protect the dam. The
small force located at the dam has no capacity to project
force or patrol. ISAF DCG accompanied the Ambassador, and we
believe ISAF is well aware of the problem. End Comment.)

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Looking to ISAF to do more
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7. (C) Daud reported that he is in constant contact with
ISAF, and that he has been asking the British for the past
two months for more operations in both the North and the
South. This is the only way to open the space needed to
allow him to establish governance. He is meeting with the

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local communities, but in order for his outreach to yield
results, the population needs to feel secure enough to try
something new. Daud told the Ambassador he has delivered
this message to Interior Minister Zarar, to the British
Ambassador, and to the NSC. He has also discussed it with
COMISAF. He is going to tell President Karzai. He asked for
the Ambassador's help in encouraging the British, who seem to
be "prisoners in the PRT compound" to be more forward
leaning. The Ambassador said he would raise the issue of the
situation in Helmand with the British Ambassador, but
underlined that the British were in charge. He encouraged
Daud to talk again directly to the British. (Comment: The
Ambassador has spoken with ISAF CG LTG Richards who is well
aware of the need to fill up maneuver units in Helmand, but
likewise, that he cannot surrender major district centers to
Taliban incursions. This is part of General Richards' call
for more NATO forces and his interest in generating
additional local police. End COmment)


8. (C) The Governor had praise for the former U.S. PRT
Commander, Lt. Col. David Seis, noting that when he had asked
for funds for a project in a Taliban area to demonstrate that
the government was in a position to meet the community's
needs, the money was in the account within 24 hours. It was
exactly the kind of cooperation that makes a difference, but
contrasts with the more cumbersome process now in place.

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Other Critical Assistance -- and Security Implications
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9. (C) Asked by the Ambassador about his own budget, Daud
reported that he receives a $200,000 annual operating budget
-- the same figure available to Sher Mohammed (who had
substantial parallel resources on which he could draw) when
he was Governor "when there was no fighting." The Governor
characterized the figure as totally inadequate -- especially
when his main tool for ensuring the loyalty of the police and
other public employees is the guarantee of a steady salary
and minimal resources to do their work. While the Deputy
Chief of Police had brought a vehicle with him when he
transferred from Zabul province, the governor of Zabul is
asking that it be returned. The Governor claimed each
maintenance for each of the 17 new Ranger vehicles received
by the province costs $500.


10. (C) Daud underlined that, "without significant military,
financial, development, and political support, it will be
very difficult to improve the situation in Helmand." He
agreed on the importance of the employment opportunities made
available through projects such as the Kajaki Dam and the
extension of the cobblestone road. They not only provide
income, but build support for the government. He asked that
careful consideration be given to how security is provided.
It is important, when decisions are made regarding who will
be hired to provide security at these projects to consider
the wider implications, including what tribal leader's people
are being hired. His recommendation would be that a separate
budget be set up for security and that those funds be used in
close coordination with the governor's office. "We must
always be looking at the larger security situation, as it
will determine the long-term outcomes."

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Bio Note
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11. (SBU) Governor Daud, whose systematic thinking reflects
background as an engineer and civil servant rather than a
politician, was born in Helmand. His family is not, however,
connected to one of the provincial tribes. He spent ten
years as a refugee in Pakistan, where he worked for UNHCR,

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before returning in 1995 to form an NGO involved in
reconstruction and relief activities. After the fall of the
Taliban, he came to Kabul to join the National Security
Council where he became Director of Policy and Oversight. He
was also the focal point for the PTS Program and detainee
related issues. In December 2005, President Karzai appointed
Daud Governor of Helmand to replace Sher Mohammed whose hold
on the province effectively blocked central government
influence. More than one more experienced politician claims
to have been offered the job before Daud and to have turned
it down.


12. (U) Dushanbe minimize considered.

NEUMANN