PRT/KUNDUZ: BETTER THAN ITS REPUTATION

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 003934

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR AF
SUBJECT: PRT/KUNDUZ: BETTER THAN ITS REPUTATION


1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The German-led PRT in Kunduz is
one of the most maligned PRTs in Afghanistan, but
many of the old myths, especially regarding the
PRT's military effectiveness, no longer apply. The
Germans now patrol regularly throughout their area
of responsibility (Kunduz and Takhar provinces),
averaging 130 to 150 patrols per week, and routinely
overnight outside the PRT compound in order to
access the more remote districts. In the face of a
deteriorating security situation over the past few
months, the Germans have shown no sign of wavering
in their commitment to the mission. The attitude of
the PRT toward the U.S. Department of State (DOS)
representative has improved significantly since the
early days when Germany first took over the
operation in Kunduz, and there has been no
degradation in treatment even though DOS rep has not
had any QIP funds to contribute to PRT projects
since early 2006. Meanwhile, the bifurcated command
structure of the PRT, as well as the reluctance of
the German development agencies to work closely with
the military on projects, continue to hamper the
PRT's performance. Nonetheless, overall, the PRT is
much improved. END SUMMARY.

SNAPSHOT OF PRT KUNDUZ
--------------

2. (SBU) Originally, PRT Kunduz's area of
responsibility (AOR) included all four provinces of
the northeast (Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan and
Badakhshan),but since the establishment of fully
independent ISAF PRTs in Puli-Khumri (Netherlands)
and Feyzabad (Germany) in late 2004 and 2005
respectively, PRT Kunduz's AOR has encompassed just
Kunduz and Takhar provinces. The PRT is
multinational, with troop contributions from six
nations other than Germany (Switzerland, Romania,
France, Netherlands, Belgium, and Hungary),but the
total number of non-German troops constitute less
than 10 percent of the total force of 450. All the
key leadership and staff positions at the PRT are
held by Germans and the working language of the PRT
is German. (This is in contrast to the German-led
PRT in Feyzabad, which is truly a multinational
operation, with English as the working language and
the Czechs and Danes contributing almost 100 of the
330 troops and filling the deputy commander and J-3
slots, respectively.) There are nine staff in the
civilian component of PRT Kunduz: three German
diplomats (the most senior of whom is the civilian
leader),three German police officers, two officials
from the German Federal Intelligence Service, and
the U.S. DOS rep. The German civilians serve tours
of varying lengths, from two months to two years.

INTENSE SCRUTINY AS ISAF'S FIRST PRT
--------------

3. (SBU) PRT Kunduz was one of the first PRTs
established by the U.S.-led Coalition in late 2002.
When NATO took command of ISAF in August 2003 and
decided to expand beginning in the north, Kunduz
became ISAF's first PRT. This occurred in early
January 2004, at the same time that leadership of
the PRT was transferred from the U.S. to Germany.
For several months, Kunduz was the only ISAF PRT.
As a result, the German operation was under
incredible scrutiny and comparisons (almost all
unfavorable) were inevitably drawn between it and
the OEF PRTs. However, while much of the criticism
was deserved early on when the PRT was first

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established, it is probably unfair to continue to
depict the German PRT in this way.

THE TOP FIVE CRITICISMS
--------------

4. (SBU) The early criticisms focused on five areas:

-- a poor tooth-to-tail ratio at the PRT, where
there are almost three times as many support troops
as there are troops who work outside the PRT, and
too much spent on building a new PRT compound.

-- the lack of military effectiveness due to risk
averseness, including restrictions on overnight and
long-range patrolling and burdensome requirements
for force protection and medical support.

-- the lack of PRT cohesion due to the bifurcated
command structure, in which the military and
civilian components operate independently.

-- the almost complete detachment of the PRT from
the German development agencies, who live off the
PRT compound and deliberately seek to limit their
interaction with the military.

-- the reluctance of the PRT command to embrace the
U.S. reps as full-fledged members of the PRT team.

YES IT'S BIG, BUT...
--------------

5. (SBU) The German PRT is several times bigger
than the U.S. contingent it replaced and the German
tooth-to-tail ratio is not as favorable. However,
the Germans do not have an-in-country base like
Bagram at which to centralize their combat support
and combat service support assets. These assets
must be located at the PRTs themselves. Plus, there
are many facilities at PRT Kunduz -- most notably
the role 2-plus hospital with a staff of 50 -- which
serve German troops and other internationals and
Afghans throughout the region. During the first
five months of this year, the hospital treated more
than 2,200 people (both outpatients and inpatients)
and performed some 35 operations. One third of the
patients and most of the serious cases (including
those involving operations) were Afghans.


6. (SBU) It must also be conceded that the Germans
have spent a great deal on administrative costs,
especially in building a brand-new PRT camp, which
opened in May, on a plateau 15 kilometers south of
Kunduz. The 460-hectare camp (reportedly as large
as the Vatican) has cost 35 million Euros so far
(more than three times the original estimate) and is
still not finished. But this facility has been
built to German standards and the Germans plan to
turn it over to the Afghans when the ISAF mission
ends. The compound could eventually be used as a
university campus, which would make it the first
university in the northeast. The new camp has also
given a very positive signal to the Afghans about
the commitment of the international community, and
especially the Germans, to continue the ISAF mission
as long as necessary. The camp should also make it
easier for the Bundeswehr to get soldiers to
volunteer for second, third and fourth tours to
Kunduz, which will be absolutely necessary to
sustain a commitment over the long term.


KABUL 00003934 003 OF 005


BIG IMPROVEMENT ON MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
--------------

7. (SBU) When the Germans first arrived in Kunduz,
they did have very restrictive rules of engagement.
They did not do foot patrols, they did not stay
outside the PRT overnight, they avoided patrolling
during hours of darkness, they rarely ventured
beyond a 40-kilometer radius of the PRT and they
reacted to threats and attacks by retreating.
However, the Germans have learned and adapted and
become much more proactive. The 10th German
contingent, which served at Kunduz from March to
July of this year, averaged between 130 and 150
patrols a week, which included mounted patrols all
night on the major roads. CIMIC (Civil Affairs),
Psyops, and J-2 (Intelligence) teams traveled
regularly to all 24 districts in the PRT's AOR. The
Germans have long had a safe house in Taloqan, the
provincial capital of Takhar, but now they are
procuring a bigger compound to increase their
patrolling capabilities.


8. (SBU) The requirement to have a doctor and
ambulance within an hour of any deployed unit still
stands, but the PRT no longer restricts itself to
using just the six-wheel Fuchs Armored Personnel
Carrier (APC) as the ambulance, since the Fuchs
cannot be used on narrow roads or small bridges.
This means there is essentially no limit to where
the PRT can go in its AOR.


9. (SBU) In the face of a deteriorating security
situation over the past few months -- which has
included an unprecedented suicide car bomb attack
and two ambushes with rocket propelled grenade (RPG)
launchers -- the Germans have shown no sign of
wavering in their commitment to the mission. The
Germans have responded to each attack by immediately
returning to the area and engaging with local
officials and the population. In the case of the
two RPG ambushes, the patrols returned direct fire
on the attackers and the PRT participated in joint
operations with the local ANA battalion and U.S.
Special Force mentors to find and arrest those
responsible.

CONTINUED LACK OF PRT COHESION
--------------

10. (SBU) One area where that has been no change is
the PRT's dual command structure. The PRT is still
clearly divided into separate military and civilian
components, with the PRT commander leading the
former and the senior German diplomat leading the
latter. They have completely different chains of
command, with the commander reporting to ISAF HQ
through Regional Command (RC) North, and the
civilian leader reporting to Berlin through the
German embassy in Kabul. The PRT commander and
civilian leader are co-equals in theory, but in
practice, the commander is the focus of attention
because the PRT is a Bundeswehr facility and he
controls almost all of its assets. But even in
meetings outside the PRT, where both the commander
and civilian leader are represented, Afghan
officials tend to gravitate toward the military
commander rather than the civilian leader. Most PRT
Kunduz commanders have reinforced this tendency by
not insisting that the Afghans deal with the
civilian leader on an equal basis.


KABUL 00003934 004 OF 005



11. (SBU) There is no doubt that this bifurcated
command system creates duplication of effort and a
lack of cohesion within the PRT. Under the 10th
contingent, the civilian leader complained
frequently about being marginalized and left out of
the loop by the PRT commander. It would be ideal if
everyone operated under one chain of command, but it
is unlikely that the either the Bundeswehr or MFA
will ever agree to formally subordinate themselves
to the other. The best one can hope for is better
information exchange and coordination. There are
already mechanisms to facilitate this, but there is
clearly room for improvement. The PRT has a common
internal e-mail system and there are a thrice-weekly
evening PRT staff meetings in which the civilian
leader takes part, along with the representative of
the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and
Development (BMZ),the head of the German police
project and the U.S. DOS rep.


13. (SBU) In the past, the ISAF POLAD has
complained that political situation reports coming
from Kunduz through the military clearly have not
had the input of the civilian component. Although
the civilian leader does not fall under ISAF's
command, he should be able to share many of the
reports he submits to the embassy and Berlin with
ISAF. The civilian leader rarely shares reports he
generates with ISAF.

GERMAN DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES STILL DETACHED
--------------

14. (SBU) BMZ and the associated German development
agencies -- the German Federal Credit Organization
for Reconstruction (KfW),the German Development
Service (DeD) and the German Society for Technical
Cooperation (GTZ) -- are still located off the PRT
in their own compound. While the head of BMZ
participates in PRT staff meetings and coordinates
closely with the PRT, BMZ still operates
independently from the PRT, believing that
development is not the military's business. If the
security situation were ever to deteriorate to the
point that BMZ and its associated agencies no longer
felt safe operating in Kunduz, they are more likely
to leave altogether than come to live at the PRT.


15. (SBU) According to BMZ and MFA officials in
Kunduz, Germany has a budget of about 80 million
Euros per year for development projects in
Afghanistan. Another estimated 30 million Euros of
German government money is funneled indirectly to
Afghanistan each year through government-supported
NGOs and research institutes (like the Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung). BMZ controls about 50 million
Euros of the Afghanistan development budget. While
the other 30 million Euros is nominally controlled
by the MFA, much of it is reportedly earmarked for
certain programs like the Disarmament of Illegal
Armed Groups (DIAG) (1 million Euros) and the German
police project (12 million Euros). In addition, the
MFA development rep at the PRT has about 60,000
Euros per year that he or she can spend on small,
quick-impact projects without prior approval from
Berlin. Finally, the PRT commander has access to a
small amount of money (15,000 to 30,000 Euros) that
he can use to address immediate needs.


16. (SBU) Meanwhile, the PRT CIMIC (Civil Affairs)
teams continue to travel throughout the AOR, meeting

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local authorities and doing comprehensive
assessments of each district. However, CIMIC has
only a bare-bones budget and cannot fund even a
small percentage of all the worthwhile project
proposals it develops. BMZ does not see the CIMIC
projects as fitting within its overall development
plans, and therefore funds only about five percent
of the proposals it receives from CIMIC. The MFA
development rep and the PRT commander fund some of
the CIMIC proposals, but their own budgets are
rather limited. In the past, CIMIC counted on the
DOS rep to help fund some of its projects with USAID
QIP funds, but those funds have not been available
since early 2006. That has sent CIMIC scurrying to
other NGOs to try to make up the difference.

MUCH IMPROVED ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. REP
--------------

17. (SBU) The attitude of the PRT toward the U.S.
DOS rep has improved significantly since the early
days when Germany first took over the operation in
Kunduz. During the 10th contingent, the DOS rep was
about as integrated into the PRT as he could be
without compromising his ability for independent
action. He was included on the PRT Kunduz internal
e-mail system and he had a seat at the table for the
thrice-weekly PRT evening staff meetings. While the
commander did not seek out the DOS rep's political
advice on issues, he was always open to input.


18. (SBU) After insisting for years on an MOU to
define the U.S. role at the PRT and seeking
reimbursement for the U.S. share of PRT costs,
Germany has apparently decided to drop these
demands. DOS rep was never approached on these
issues during the 10th contingent. At the new PRT
compound, he was provided private living
accommodations and separate office space sufficient
for both himself and the political assistant. The
Germans have sought no payment or reimbursement.


19. (SBU) Because of the generally permissive
security environment in the northeast, the civilians
at the PRT usually move on their own in armored
vehicles without military force protection.
Therefore, the DOS rep did not require much active
support from the PRT to carry out his duties. Had
military force protection been routinely required,
it is not clear that the PRT would have had the
assets, or been willing, to provide the necessary
support.

COMMENT
--------------

20. (SBU) While the German-led PRT in Kunduz is far
from perfect, it is significantly better than it was
at the start and is constantly improving, especially
in terms of its approach to military operations and
its engagement with the local populace. Fortunately,
we have moved beyond the issues that previously
caused irritation in the U.S.-German relationship at
the PRT and have forged a strong partnership.

NEUMANN