PRT QAL-E-NAW: WHY THERE IS NO DIAG IN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003629

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR
STATE PASS USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR HARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD SNAR ASEC AF
SUBJECT: PRT QAL-E-NAW: WHY THERE IS NO DIAG IN
BADGHIS

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1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The DIAG process in Badghis is
broken. Some of the reasons why are the same as
elsewhere in Afghanistan: weak local authorities,
powerful former commanders and limited reach of
government authority. However, while in southern
provinces the program struggles in the face of
security threats that represent a real disincentive to
disarm, Badghis is one of the quietest, most secure
provinces in the country. Under these conditions, the
failure of the DIAG process can be strongly attributed
to a lack of local political will and the limited
power of the central government to set a provincial
agenda. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Badghis province is one of the quietest,
safest provinces in Afghanistan. With the exception
of three high profile killings of medical personnel in
the last two years and the occasional tribal skirmish
(reftel) there are few security problems. In
comparison with other provinces, Badghis also has very
few illegally armed groups, and local commanders,
while they do exist, maintain a relatively low
profile.


3. (SBU) The provinces DIAG committee meets weekly
under the leadership of the Governor and includes the
participation of the PRT. Though members of the
committee profess commitment to the program, these
meetings can only be described as a farce.
Participants often call in suspects, generally very
old men, or poor, illiterate villagers, to accuse them
of possessing illegal arms. Invariably, the subjects
insist that they have no arms and are let go after a
few minutes of harassment.


4. (SBU) According to official records, during the
last year (June 2005 to June 2006) 2,156 arms and 83
tons of ammunition were collected through the program
in Badghis. However, as elsewhere, most of these
weapons are antiques or nonfunctioning. Officials
report that there are more than 10,000 illegal arms
(undoubtedly an underestimate) yet to be relinquished
present in the province. Not one significant
commander has been disarmed.


5. (SBU) Provincial authorities are not oblivious to
the unsuccessful nature of the program, and frequently
DIAG committee meetings turn to the question of whose
e
fault it is. The provincial National Directorate of
Security (NDS) chief typically complains that he has
no influence over the districts, whose district
administrators are in some cases commanders
themselves. Officials from the Governors office
report that district officials do not answer
correspondence requesting reports on DIAG progress in
their districts, and many of them, such as the
prosecutors never even show up to work, let alone
promote DIAG.


6. (SBU) The head of the Information and Culture
Department criticizes the police and the NSD for their
unwillingness to approach commanders, preferring
instead to hassle ordinary citizens. He also blames
the mullahs for not promoting DIAG as a religious duty
and usually finishes his rant with a call to disband
the weekly DIAG meeting altogether as a waste of time.
The chief of the DIAG committee usually attributes the

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lack of progress to a lack of resources, and
specifically, the need for metal detectors and a car.
r.
He also frequently reminds the committee that
provincial DIAG is still in Stage Two negotiated,
rather than obligatory relinquishment - which
according to him means all local authorities can do
is, ask nicely.


7. (SBU) After one particularly fruitless meeting,
PRTOff reminded Acting Governor Azizullah that GOA
President Karzai had just returned from a trip to
Japan where he reaffirmed the central governments
commitment to the DIAG program and raised millions in
new funds to support it.
Azizullah shrugged his shoulders and professed himself
powerless to push harder for progress absent,
stronger support from the central government. When
asked what additional support he is looking for,
Azizullah stated that, if this is a central
government priority, they should send some officials
up here to work on it.


8. (SBU) COMMENT: Though the usual suspects of weak
local authorities, powerful former commanders and
limited reach of government authorities are
s are
contributing to the failure of DIAG in Badghis
province, the bigger issue is lack of local political
will. In the absence of backup from Kabul, no
provincial authority wants to tussle with local
commanders who in many cases enjoy popular support in
their communities. Given that Badghis security
environment is so permissive, this may not bode well
for the future of the program anywhere in the country.
While in southern provinces officials struggle to
convince citizens to give up arms in the face of real
security threats, in Badghis, no such excuse exists.


9. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED: What is also worrisome is
the inability of the central government to extend its
policy of adherence to DIAG to the provinces. Badghis
officials were only vaguely aware of Karzais trip to
Japan, and seemed to draw no connection between his
renewed commitments on a national level to the DIAG
process at the provincial one. Local officials seem
to believe that if the program were truly important to
o
the central government, representatives from Kabul
would come to the province and run it themselves.

NEUMANN