Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL362
2006-01-26 13:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

KARZAI URGES SUPPORT FOR GOVERNOR-LED ERADICATION;

Tags:  SNAR KCRM PGOV AF 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000362 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR SA AMBASSADOR QUINN, INL/FO, NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
AND KAMEND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016
TAGS: SNAR KCRM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI URGES SUPPORT FOR GOVERNOR-LED ERADICATION;
HELMAND REPORTS INCREASE IN CULTIVATION

Classified By: CDA RICHARD NORLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000362

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR SA AMBASSADOR QUINN, INL/FO, NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
AND KAMEND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016
TAGS: SNAR KCRM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI URGES SUPPORT FOR GOVERNOR-LED ERADICATION;
HELMAND REPORTS INCREASE IN CULTIVATION

Classified By: CDA RICHARD NORLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: President Karzai met with governors and or
deputy governors from 19 provinces on January 24 as
governor-led eradication begins in Afghanistan. The President
stressed the GOA's commitment to sustain the reduced opium
cultivation levels of the previous year and to further reduce
cultivation in 2006. The governors/deputy governors pledged
their support and agreed to eradicate opium in their
provinces. On January 25, provincial authorities met with the
Ministry of Interior (MOI) and US and UK officials to
finalize operational plans for eradication in their
respective provinces. It was determined that all indications
are that opium cultivation in Helmand has sharply increased
and the situation is such that a special Task Force for
Operational Planning for Eradication needs to be convened for
Helmand. The first meeting of the Task Force is scheduled for
January 26. End Summary.


2. (C) On January 24, President Karzai met with approximately
13 governors and six deputy governors (and/or acting
governors) from key poppy growing areas in Afghanistan. All
seven Poppy Elimination Program (PEP) provinces were
represented. The meeting was arranged by the Ministry of
Interior to allow President Karzai, at the beginning of
governor-led Eradication (GLE),to once again impress upon
the governors, the GOA's commitment to reducing opium
cultivation and the role that the governors must play in
order to sustain the opium cultivation reduction results of
last year and reduce cultivation further this year.

"Destroy opium or destroy Afghanistan"
--------------


3. (C) The President discussed the achievements of
Afghanistan, thanks to international support, and said that
the only threat and obstacle to prosperity for Afghanistan
was opium and its trail of destruction. He discussed the
increased addiction levels and the shame that the drug was
bringing to Afghanistan, the potential loss of international
support if Afghanistan does not act, the criminalization of
the Afghan economy and the potential for bankruptcy, and the

clear linkage between drug trafficking and terrorism in
Afghanistan. At one point in his presentation (which was 25
minutes long and done without notes) Karzai said, "if we
don't root out opium, it will root us out-destroy opium or
opium destroys Afghanistan, do you understand?" At this
point, the audience of some 60 officials (from 19 provinces)
exclaimed that they understood.


4. (C) President Karzai went on to say that the world and
international community were doubtful that Afghanistan could
eliminate opium. He told the crowd that the world is very
sensitive to the problem and does not want to hear reasons
why it is difficult to eliminate opium and said, "the people
of Afghanistan have sacrificed more than a million Afghans to
save the country and reach the level where we currently
are...this is a far greater sacrifice than what it will take
to eliminate opium." Karzai concluded by saying that the
responsibility for eliminating opium begins with the
governors but is also the responsibility of the police
leaders and religious leaders as well and he implored them to
take this responsibility to heart and restore the prestige of
Afghanistan.


5. (C) After his presentation, Karzai spent an additional
hour listening to the views and problems of the provincial
representatives. The usual claims of poverty and lack of
development assistance were heard but not as much as normal.
The more prevailing comments were that the provincial leaders
agreed with the President and were taking action to support
him, including already conducting eradication operations. The
President spoke about his upcoming trip to London and said
that he would be working with potential international donors
to obtain additional development funds for the provinces. He
also said that upon his return to Kabul, he would work with
the Ministry of Finance to ensure some additional funds would
be sent to the provinces to assist with funding the operation
of the provincial councils.

Operational plans for GLE Developed
--------------


6. (C) At the conclusion of the meeting with the President,
the provincial authorities were bused to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs where they continued meeting with officials
from the Ministry of Interior (MOI),Ministry of Counter
Narcotics (MCN),the UNODC, the US and the UK.
Representatives from the North, South, East, West and
Northeast of Afghanistan expressed their views regarding the
opium situation in their respective provinces and spoke of
their commitment to reducing opium cultivation through
eradication. Deputy Minister Daud (to the chagrin of the
UNODC representative in attendance) outlined the summary
findings of UNODC's Rapid Assessment Survey (RAS) of opium
cultivation in Afghanistan. (UNODC was slightly uneasy
because the survey will not be officially released until
after the London Conference). There was general acceptance
that there was increased opium planting this year and
aggressive GLE is essential to reduce the same. The meeting
concluded, in the late afternoon, by obtaining agreement that
each provincial team (Governor, provincial council leader)
would meet the next day with the MOI, the US and UK to
complete the opium eradication operational plan for their
respective provinces.


7. (C) On January 25, each provincial team met with MOI
officials, including Deputy Minister Daud and Afghan
Eradication Force (AEF) General Amiri, INL Eradication
Specialist Mick Hogan, UK Eradication Specialist James Hardy,
DynCorp AEF and PEP Support Team and CNTF Director Doug
Wankel. The meetings went on all day and were very fruitful
with most provinces having their operational plans approved
or assistance provided to enable them to finalize the same
and present to the US/UK eradication specialists within the
next 3-5 working days. The US and UK eradication specialists
were very satisfied the results of the meetings. The CNTF
will provide additional details about the plans within the
next week.

Bad, but not unexpected, news from Helmand
--------------


8. (C) One major problem surfaced during the operational
planning session when Deputy Governor Amir Mohammed Akhunzada
of Helmand Province announced that opium planting in Helmand
province far surpassed the level of planting last year.
Deputy Governor Amir (brother of former Governor Sher
Mohammed) said that planting this year could be as much as
double the level of last year in Helmand. (NOTE: UNODC
reported that last year's level was 26,500 hectares--25
percent of total cultivation and the USG reported that 38,500
hectares or 41 percent of all cultivation occurred in
Helmand). Deputy Governor Amir's claims mirror those that
UNODC has informally voiced to CNTF Director Wankel this
week. Wankel stopped the planning session and said that such
level of planting, if true (and Wankel said that he did not
dispute it),changed the operational planning needs required
to address eradication planning and resource requirements in
Helmand. He went on to say that if the cultivation situation
is such in Helmand, Afghanistan could not succeed this year
in sustaining the cultivation reduction results of last year
and would not be able to obtain further cultivation reduction
unless there was significant eradication in Helmand. In other
words, if we fail in Helmand this year, we will fail in
Afghanistan. This assessment was agreed upon by Deputy
Minister Daud and the others at the planning session. To
further complicate the issue, the Deputy Governor stated that
the security situation in Helmand was such as to make
eradication difficult and dangerous and there would need to
be significant security enhancement to the Helmand police and
security force. It became apparent that the situation in
Helmand was such that there was the need for a Helmand
eradication planning Task Force.


9. (C) Near the conclusion of the meeting, General Daud
telephoned Governor Engineer Daoud in Lashkargah and
discussed with the governor the thoughts that had just been
presented and invited the governor to travel to Kabul on the
next day (January 26) to meet with the MOI, US, UK, MCN, NDS,
Ministry of Defense, CFC-A, PRT and others to discuss the
very serious situation in Helmand regarding opium cultivation
for 2006 and to discuss options and needs for conducting
eradication operations in Helmand. Governor Daoud agreed to
travel to Kabul to participate in the Task Force meeting and
said he would bring his Police Chief and his Chief of the
National Directorate of Security as well. The PRT was able to
assist by providing transportation on the PRT plane from
Lashkargah to Kabul on January 26.


10. (C) Comment: What is apparent is the need for additional
eradication resources and planning to ensure that the level
of eradication effort (i.e. the requirement for a larger
eradication force, the need for extended duration of effort,
the probable need for additional security and the intensive
care needed to manage the effort) is made available and
supported by the GOA, the USG and the UK. This needs
assessment and planning effort will also have to take into
account that any enhanced and extended eradication operations
could result in security strains or issues in the province
and region and it is important that the MOD and CFC-A be
included in all future discussions. This eradication planning
and needs assessment for Helmand will be a difficult problem
to deal with and will take considerable thought and
resources. The good news is the stakeholders realize it, have
their sleeves rolled up and have time to resolve the problem.
End Comment.
NORLAND