PRT/TARIN KOWT - GOVERNOR MONIB: FOCUSED ON

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 003538

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE, SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SCA/A, S/CRS,
SCA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
REL NATO/AU/NZ/ISAF

E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT/TARIN KOWT - GOVERNOR MONIB: FOCUSED ON
RESULTS, GOOD GOVERNANCE, AND IMPROVING SECURITY

KABUL 00003538 001.2 OF 005



1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Since he took office on March 18,
Uruzgan Governor Abdul Hakim Monib has been
confronted by a number of challenges to his
authority, most coming from former Uruzgan Governor
Jan Mohammed Khan and his supporters, but also from
a deteriorating security situation that has
undermined his position. Since his return from
Kabul on July 13, however, Monib seems to have found
a new political confidence that has allowed him to
move forward on a host of pressing security and
governance issues that are beginning to solidify his
position as governor and broaden his support base.
By reaching out to previously marginalized tribes,
educated locals, and disaffected Durrani tribesmen,
including the Populzai, Monib is assembling a
support base that should strengthen his position.
By focusing on improving governance through removing
incompetent officials and insisting on results from
the provincial government, the governor is beginning
to sway many locals to his side who simply want
honest and effective administration. With time,
Governor Monib's plans to create a viable,
inclusive, and effective government that reaches all
of Uruzgan should create a bulwark of stability
against any future Taliban pressure. END SUMMARY.

Monib, Jan Mohammed Khan, and other Power Brokers
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) Though former Uruzgan Governor Jan Mohammed
Khan had often complained about his weariness at
being governor, a position he had held since January
21, 2002, his March 2006 removal came as somewhat of
a shock to him. Over time, his initially welcoming
and supportive behavior towards Governor Monib
turned into overt opposition, as he began using his
contacts in Kabul to interfere in the central
government's budget and resource allocation for
Uruzgan. He also appears to have orchestrated
attacks by "Taliban" on Afghan National Army units
in Uruzgan and then volunteered his security forces
to defend the province. He has also actively spread
rumors that it was only a matter of time before he
was returned to power. Khan was quick to say that
Governor Monib could not guarantee security in the
province, as evidenced by the increase in Taliban
activity shortly after taking office in March 2006,
and that only he, Jan Mohammed Khan, could guarantee
security in the area. Since much of the provincial
administration and all district appointments had
been made by Jan Mohammed Khan, Governor Monib was
confronted not only by Khan's personal opposition
but also by a local administration inclined against
him.


3. (SBU) Other local political figures have
challenged Monib's legitimacy as well. Provincial
Council President, and former President of the
Provincial Shura, Mullah Hamdullah has openly
challenged Monib's political legitimacy since Monib
took office, for example he has attempted to sign
government documents that required the governor's
signature and to speak on behalf of the governor
when he was not entitled to do so. Though these
efforts were eventually beaten back, Monib's efforts
to build up his authority are an ongoing project.
Former Provincial Police Chief Rozi Khan was also an

KABUL 00003538 002.2 OF 005


initial supporter of Governor Monib but his
subsequent replacement by Monib loyalist General
Qasim soured him on the governor, and several
reports now implicate his brothers - and possibly
Rozi Khan himself - in anti-coalition and anti-GOA
activities. Subsequent Taliban activity in Rozi
Khan's Barakzai tribal area indicates either his
complicit support of the Taliban or his passivity at
confronting them - either of which could have the
effect of undermining Monib's position in the
province.


4. (SBU) Some residents of Uruzgan are wary of Monib
due to his coming from the Ghilzai branch of the
Pashtuns (most Uruzgan locals are Durranis). The
governor's tribal background is particularly
relevant because the great bulk of Taliban fighters
in Uruzgan come from Ghilzai tribes. Monib's
Ghilzai roots and background as a member of the
Taliban regime suggest to some that he remains a
Taliban sympathizer. Some say the increase in
fighting in Uruzgan following his appointment is a
sign of Monib's support for the insurgents, and
others circulate tales of his alleged collaboration
with Taliban leaders and fighters. (PRT Comment:
After months of close scrutiny, we have seen nothing
to suggest that Monib is a Taliban sympathizer. End
comment.) In addition, some locals feel that Monib
is too young and inexperienced for his position.


Broadening the Base: Tribal Inclusion and Reaching
Out
-------------- --------------


5. (SBU) Since his return from Kabul on July 13th,
Governor Monib has worked aggressively and
decisively to broaden his support base, improve
governance, and enhance provincial security -
efforts that are beginning to bear tangible results.
He has been actively reaching out to previously
marginalized tribes and making allies among the
majority Durrani Pashtun by delivering on his
promises and practicing good governance. On July
20th, Governor Monib convened a series of meetings
with village elders from Mirabad, Drushan, and Sar
Marghab (areas in Chora and Tarin Kowt districts
with security problems) to discuss the security
situation in their areas and their development
needs. What is notable about this meeting is that
these elders had never met former Governor Jan
Mohammed Khan when he was in power. Khan regularly
victimized the villagers, who mostly come from
Ghilzai tribes. Khan's oppression of Uruzgan's
Ghilzai minority had the predictable effect of
alienating them from the GOA and making them
sympathetic to the Taliban, which justified Khan
used to rationalize his further persecution of them.
By contrast, the elders felt comfortable talking
with Governor Monib not only because he is an
outsider to the tribal conflicts in the area but
also because he is a fellow Ghilzai. Governor Monib
has also been reaching out to tribesmen in the
remote district of Caher Cineh, which is largely
populated by the Noorzai subtribe of the Ghilzai.
Governor Monib hopes to bring the Noorzai tribal
leader Arif Noorzai, who is also a member of

KABUL 00003538 003.2 OF 005


Parliament, to the area later this month to help
select a District Chief and to bring the Noorzai
closer to the GOA. Since 2002, all the District
Chiefs and most of the Police Chiefs of Caher Cineh
had been appointed by Jan Mohammed Khan from his own
Populzai tribe.


6. (SBU) The governor is also making a point of
visiting each district for up to five days at a time
to consult with village elders and to get a sense of
the community's needs and on how their district and
village leaders are doing, and the PRT has worked
closely to support him with logistics and
transportation for these visits. He also uses these
meetings to gain a better understanding of the local
political and tribal situation and uses this
information in his decision of who he would like as
a District or Police Chief in the area. This type
of local consultation was utterly lacking during Jan
Mohammed Khan's administration, as he imposed his
policies and appointees on an unwilling population.
Additionally, Governor Monib is planning to hold
elections for the position of Mayor of Tarin Kowt
and will likely expand this idea to other major
villages. (Note: the constitutional implications of
this are unclear, and could be disputed by Monib's
opponents. End note.)

Good Governance: Promoting Accountability, Providing
Structure
-------------- --------------


7. (SBU) Another legacy of former Governor Jan
Mohammed Khan's administration is the lack of local
government structure and the absence of
accountability and results from public officials.
Governor Monib has made it his express intention to
provide this badly needed structure and has
systematically removed incompetent or corrupt
officials while retaining and promoting educated,
competent, and honest civil servants. In April,
Governor Monib fired the illiterate and corrupt
Director of Agriculture and promoted the only
trained employee of the directorate to director. On
July 20, he arrested the Director of Health, Dr.
Khan Agha, for selling government-purchased medical
supplies in Tarin Kowt and is actively recruiting a
new director and getting local doctors, many of whom
had been alienated by Dr. Agha, to join the Health
Directorate. He has also replaced the Director of
Education with a more competent administrator and is
in the process of finding suitable replacements for
the Directors of Communications and Public Works,
both of whom are incompetent (and are Jan Mohammad
cronies). On July 25, Governor Monib replaced the
corrupt and incompetent Mayor of Tarin Kowt, Mullah
Obaidullah, with the Director of Irrigation Engineer
Kabir. Mullah Obaidullah, a member of the Populzai
tribe and long-time friend of Jan Mohammed Khan, was
appointed by the former governor in August 2004 and
his replacement is yet another sign of a shift
towards a more honest and effective administration
at the local level.


8. (SBU) The governor also convenes regular weekly
meeting of his directors, security officials, and
development officials and expects participants to

KABUL 00003538 004.2 OF 005


have reports ready for discussion. Each meeting has
an agenda, which is followed, and the proceedings
are well run. The governor is adamant that
participants bring paper and pen to take notes and
aggressively questions his officials about how many
employees they have (often a source of corruption
with payrolls being padded),the nature of their
work, the resources they have at their disposal, and
their plans for the future. Monib has also been
reclaiming the stolen public property that many
officials took with them after they were removed.
The governor even tasks the PRT to deliver on its
promises and gives the commander deadlines for
information, resources, and assistance. The
administrative coherence Monib is giving to local
administration and his insistence that people do
their jobs is a fresh departure from the
administrative wreckage Jan Mohammed Khan left
behind.

Improving Security: Professionalizing the Police
-------------- ---


9. (SBU) With the removal of Provincial Police Chief
Rozi Khan in May, the rudimentary force that was
called the Afghan National Police (ANP) completely
disappeared in the province. Smaller police units
in the districts, which were largely beholden to
their respective commanders and nominally under the
control of Rozi Khan, melted away at a time when
district Police Chiefs were being replaced and the
threat from the Taliban increased in late spring.
Due in part to the security vacuum this created, the
Taliban were able to significantly step up their
attacks in the province. To counter this threat and
to begin the process of creating a professional
police force for Uruzgan, Governor Monib has
undertaken a process of recruiting competent Police
Chiefs and police, training them at the Kandahar
Training Center, outfitting them with the right
equipment, and constructing checkpoints in key
villages and along the Tarin Kowt - Kandahar Road.


10. (SBU) Using one hundred standby police given to
him by the central government as a stabilizing force
in Tarin Kowt, Governor Monib set out to bolster the
Police Chiefs of Chora. In southern Chora district,
in a region called Chenartu, he provided the Police
Chief, Akhtar Mohammed, with 10,000 rounds of AK-47
ammunition, 600,000 Afghanis (approximately USD
12,000) to recruit new police and increase the pay
of existing police, and foodstuffs to feed the
additional men. In northern Chora, the governor
arrested District Chief Obaidullah for cooperating
with the Taliban and installed a new Police Chief,
Mohammed Gul, who is well thought of locally, and
provided him with ammunition and money as well. He
has also done the same thing for the Police Chief of
Deh Rawud, Haji Abdul Ghani. Governor Monib told
the PRT he has received money from Kabul to recruit
two hundred additional police from the local
community, which he intends to use, and that he
plans to send these men to Kandahar to receive
training. (Note: the MoI has not yet worked out a
procedure for training auxiliary police like these.
End note.) As a stopgap measure, though, he plans
to use another two hundred additional police that he

KABUL 00003538 005.2 OF 005


expects receive soon to maintain security while the
local security forces are trained. Monib is also
planning to construct three checkpoints in the
problem villages of Mirabad, Drushan, and Sar
Marghab and provide the police there with radios,
heavy weapons, and vehicles. He is also hoping to
construct eight checkpoints along the Tarin Kowt-
Kandahar Road.

Jan Mohammed Khan: A Diminished but Enduring Power
-------------- --------------


11. (SBU) While some village elders will continue to
meet in Kabul to try and convince President Karzai
that Monib must be replaced by Jan Mohammed Khan,
the former governor seems to have already become
resigned to the fact that he will not be returning
anytime soon. Jan Mohammed Khan has moved his
entire family to Kandahar and left a son to watch
his compound. Meanwhile his local militia leader
(former Tarin Kowt District Police Chief Haji Ali
Ahmed) has also evacuated his family after being
removed from his position. With the replacement of
his last political ally in Tarin Kowt, Tarin Kowt
Mayor Mullah Obaidullah on July 25, the former
governor has few friends left in official government
positions. While Afghan Highway Police Commander
Matiollah might be a source of instability for
Governor Monib, their on-again off-again
relationship seems to have stabilized with Matiollah
supporting Monib (thanks largely to President's
Karzai's intervention). Additionally, Governor
Monib has split the Populzai community through his
active political and material support of Chenartu
District Chief Maleem Faez Mohammed and Aktar
Mohammed, both of whom are Populzai tribesmen and
former bodyguards to President Karzai. This too
should weaken Jan Mohammed's support base in
Uruzgan, and mitigate against any attempted
comeback.

NEUMANN