Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL3481
2006-08-04 17:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

KOREAN RALLY: MOI/MOD CONTINGENCY PLANS

Tags:  CASC PGOV ASEC PREL PHUM AF KS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1046
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #3481/01 2161720
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041720Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1765
INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0049
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2721
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2865
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6198
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1549
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003481 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: CASC PGOV ASEC PREL PHUM AF KS
SUBJECT: KOREAN RALLY: MOI/MOD CONTINGENCY PLANS

REF: A) KABUL 3320 B) KABUL 3455 C) KABUL 3456 D)

STATE 125681 E) KABUL 3479

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Marie Richards for reasons
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003481

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: CASC PGOV ASEC PREL PHUM AF KS
SUBJECT: KOREAN RALLY: MOI/MOD CONTINGENCY PLANS

REF: A) KABUL 3320 B) KABUL 3455 C) KABUL 3456 D)

STATE 125681 E) KABUL 3479

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Marie Richards for reasons 1.
4 b, d.


1. (C) CSTC-A Commander MG Durbin called a meeting
on Aug 4 afternoon to brief Emboffs on MoI planning
and MoI-MoD coordination (CSTC has embedded mentors
in both Ministries) with regard any demonstration or
rally held by the Koreans now in Afghanistan. MG
Durbin emphasized that although Minister of Interior
Zarar Moqbil had not shared planning details with
DCM in their August 2 meeting (ref b),MoI Deputy
Minister Khalid and his senior staff have developed
a comprehensive and detailed contingency plan.
CSTC-A noted that MoI and MoD have worked together
successfully to establish roles and responsibilities.
MoD accepts its supporting role, while actively
assisting at all levels. Under the present plan that
there will be no role for ISAF except in extremis -
a position also held by ISAF - but ISAF remains tied
into this planning effort and has a FRAGO in place
to allow action if needed. Since ISAF has
international force responsibility for Kabul, CFC
remains in monitoring mode unless otherwise called
on.


2. (C) The MoI plan sets organizations for patrols,
security checks and traffic control. It places all
security elements on "alert," prepared to handled a
major event, and places a security "umbrella" around
hospitals, banks, electrical services, and the
airport. The plan assigns participating forces as
follows: reserve security (900),Quick Reaction
Force, anti-narcotics force, and police academy
staff and cadets. In view of the original
expectation of an event at the Olympic Stadium, it
assigns 150 police to be stationed at that
location. In addition, Chiefs of Police in
neighboring provinces have been directed to prevent
Korean nationals from entering into Kabul province,
and the Director of the Anti-crime division of the
Kabul City Police has been directed to investigate
visa status and escort the individuals to point of
entry. (Note: this has already begun; see septel.
End note.) MoD has put the 201 Corps on alert and
fully staffed the National Military Command Center
24/7 to monitor events. MoI has also been working
with other elements of the GOA interagency to bring
in those agencies having a security role.


3. (C) Comment: MG Durbin pointed out that while
the plan looks good - a huge improvement in
readiness from the time of the riots on May 29 - we
have yet to see the quality of execution. Since at
this point it is very unlikely that any
demonstration or public event will take place
(incidents the plan was intended to address),it may
not be possible to evaluate execution. Whatever
happens, CSTC-A expects to produce in coordination
with both MoI and MoD an after-action report that
will analyze GOA capability to respond to crisis
events that may occur in the future. Durbin added
it is already clear that while MoI and MoD are
working together well, coordination has been less
good between MoI and NDS. Emboffs agreed to follow
up through RAO contacts to encourage NDS to fully
participate in this and future planning efforts.

KABUL 00003481 002 OF 002


NEUMANN