PRT/TARIN KOWT - HANDOVER TO DUTCH COULD MEAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003440

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT/TARIN KOWT - HANDOVER TO DUTCH COULD MEAN
SHORT-TERM DROP OFF IN OPERATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann, for reasons 1.4 b, d.


1. (C) Summary: The assumption of control of the
Tarin Kowt Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) by
the Dutch from the U.S. on August 1 immediately
following the transfer of the PRT from OEF to ISAF
on 31 July has revealed some challenges that may
take several months to resolve, although none are
expected to detract from long-term effectiveness.
Two factors in particular could lead to an initial
drop in PRT activity: an anticipated vehicle mix
that is not well suited to the environment, and the
delayed arrival of the full force protection
element. The Dutch are attempting to work out short
term mitigation plans for vehicles with the
Australians or Canadians while working to find a
long-term solution. End Summary.

The Deployment Task Force: Behind in Preparations
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2. (C) The Dutch Deployment Task Force, which is
preparing the main Dutch base in Uruzgan Province at
Forward Operation Base (FOB) Ripley in Tarin Kowt
and a smaller one at FOB Tycz in Deh Rawud, is
behind in its preparations. The physical facilities
of the Tarin Kowt base are not yet ready for the
roughly 1,500 Dutch troops that will be housed there
and similar challenges exist at FOB Tycz, which will
house nearly 300 troops. The soldiers are still
living in tents left over from previous U.S.
deployments and the bullet-proof and bomb resistant
shipping containers that all Dutch troops will
eventually live in have not yet been constructed -
it is unclear whether they are all in country yet.
Only three of the 11 expected rifle platoons are in
Uruzgan, in part because of a lack of facilities to
receive them, but also because the internal
perimeter is still under construction though the
exterior perimeter, one that preexisted the Dutch
commitment to Uruzgan, is built and manned.

Transportation: Lacking Adequate Vehicles, Mission
Frequency May Decrease
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3. (C) The Dutch now have three types of military
vehicles for Uruzgan, none of which is practical for
the operating environment. The basic tactical
vehicle the Dutch use is a Mercedes-Benz truck that
is unarmored, lacks ballistic glass, and has an open
top. While it has two machine guns at the ready, in
contrast to the single 240 Bravo or the 50 caliber
machine guns the U.S. humvees are usually armed
with, and is faster due to its lack of armor, that
lack of armor could make it an attractive target for
insurgents. The Dutch also have tracked and wheeled
armored personnel carriers (APC). The tracked APC
cannot be used in Tarin Kowt because it would
destroy the newly paved roads, and its use on PRT
missions into surroundings villages would not send
the right message to local villagers. There are
unfortunately echoes of the Soviet occupation if
tracked APCs are used in Uruzgan. The second type
of APC, the Patria, is a large, six-wheeled vehicle.
It, too, could have image problems, and it is also

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too large and cumbersome to handle large swaths of
Uruzgan,s terrain. One Patria was lost in May when
it could not navigate itself out of a ravine and had
to be destroyed. Dutch commanders are quite aware
of the limitations of their vehicles and have
ordered twenty-five Nyalas - armored APCs with four
wheels that stand several feet off the ground - but
these are not yet in country (though news reports
say the Dutch plan to borrow ten of them from the
Canadians). The Nyalas are much more appropriate
for Uruzgan,s operating environment, but until they
arrive the lack of mobility will likely impact Dutch
PRT activities.

The Dutch PRT: Ready to Work
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4. (C) Though its facilities at FOB Ripley are not
yet ready, the Dutch PRT has easily integrated
itself into the operations of the U.S.-led PRT and
is expected to temporarily establish itself at the
U.S. PRT after U.S. personnel have left for Nuristan
Province. The PRT,s physical infrastructure will
continue to be "owned" by the Combined Joint Special
Operations Task Force (CJSOTF). Five Dutch soldiers
have been part of the PRT for the last several
months, and all of them have gone on missions.
Additionally, the handover has gone particularly
well with respect to Civil-Affairs projects. PRTOff
has been working closely with the incoming commander
and his staff to improve their situational awareness
and to establish a strategy for the province.


5. (C) The Dutch team is led by Lieutenant Colonel
Nico Tak, who comes from the Dutch military,s armor
community; his staff have worked for him for over
two years. The Dutch PRT will have three four-man
civil affairs teams, one of which will be based at
FOB Tycz in Deh Rawud, and a robust staff element
that includes a Political Advisor, Development
Advisor, and a Tribal/Cultural Advisor. Unlike the
U.S. PRT, the Dutch PRT will not have an organic
force protection element but will be supported by
the Dutch Battle Group at FOB Ripley. Because the
Battle Group currently only has three platoons,
which will be largely preoccupied with protecting
their perimeter and constructing its physical
infrastructure, Dutch PRT operations will be limited
until addiQonal forces arrive. In addition to a
lack of direct control of force protection assets
and the fact that their use could be vetoed by
another Lieutenant Colonel who controls them, the
Dutch PRT Task Force Commander must also approve
each request for force protection for the Dutch PRT.
Another difference from the U.S.-led PRT is that
most of the personnel of the Dutch PRT will rotate
out at six and four months intervals. This stands
in contrast with the usual year-long deployments of
U.S. personnel.

Comment
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6. (C) While the Dutch PRT will largely be ready to
operate by August 1, its overall effectiveness is
expected to be limited due to inadequate vehicles

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and force protection. As improvements at FOB Ripley
continue and the Dutch Battle Group gets up to its
full strength and receives appropriate vehicles for
the province, the PRT,s operations will
significantly increase due to larger staff
resources. It is unclear how long this will take.
One hopes the transportation dilemma can be
temporarily solved by mounting joint
Dutch/Australian missions; the Australians have
properly armored vehicles and will have an
approximately 320-man element attached to the PRT.
Whether such joint missions would be politically
possible for the Dutch remains to be seen. However
the Dutch remain keen to succeed in their commitment
and are actively looking for workarounds to solve
these short-term logistical problems.

NEUMANN