Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL3439
2006-08-01 16:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRT/SHARANA - SUMMER OF THE TALIBAN: A TALE OF TWO

Tags:  PGOV PTER AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7297
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #3439/01 2131637
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011637Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1686
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2707
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2851
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6181
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1535
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003439 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT/SHARANA - SUMMER OF THE TALIBAN: A TALE OF TWO
PAKTIKA DISTRICTS

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Marie Richards, for reasons 1
.4 b, d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003439

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT/SHARANA - SUMMER OF THE TALIBAN: A TALE OF TWO
PAKTIKA DISTRICTS

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Marie Richards, for reasons 1
.4 b, d.


1. (C) Summary: Insurgent/Taliban forces have
taken over two districts in Paktika province this
summer. The remote districts of Naka and Dila have
come under insurgent control with Afghan government
forces either surrendering their weapons or simply
leaving the districts in the face of insurgent
activity. The district government centers were
overcome by insurgents, and the government buildings
were burned to the ground. To date no regular
Afghan government forces or leadership have returned
to these districts.


2. (C) Naka and Dila, two of Paktika,s 23 (19
official, 4 unofficial) districts, at first glance
have little in common. Naka, located in the wooded
mountains of Paktika,s extreme northeast and Dila,
situated on a flat desert plain encircled by a dry
mountainous moonscape, is Paktita,s most westerly
district. Both are remote districts located in
areas of traditionally strong Taliban influence.
Dila was taken over by insurgents on 7 May 2006 with
the withdrawal of the District Commissioner and all
of the police and the subsequent burning of the
district center buildings. No Afghan government
presence has been seen in Dila since 7 May. Naka,
lost to insurgent on 15 June, was recovered in late
June by a former Taliban and Hakkani supporter
Mohammad Akbar and his thirty followers who were
deputized and paid by Governor Khpulwak for this
operation. Naka does not have any conventional
Afghan government forces in the district. End
summary.

Naka District
--------------


3. (C) Naka district lies in a high mountain valley
at 8400 feet. Heavily wooded 12,000 foot mountains
surround a bowl-shaped mountain valley where the
majority of Naka,s population lives in near-complete
isolation. Located on the southern edge of the
Zadran tribal area, Naka shares a tribal affiliation
with several often troubled districts in Paktia and

Khowst provinces to the North and East. Directly to
the east, Ziruk district, also a Zadran area, shares
a long and porous border with Pakistan. Lying along
an old Mujahideen trail running from Pakistan
through Ziruk, Naka, Sar Hawsa and into the Shai
Khot valley of Zormat district in Paktia, Naka is no
stranger to insurgent activity. On June 15, this
activity spiked when insurgents intimidated and
disarmed the Afghan National Police (ANP) stationed
in the district center and subsequently burned the
district center building, a converted school. After
being unable to persuade the ANP or the Afghan
National Army (ANA) stationed in Paktika province to
retake the district, Governor Khapulwak, in
desperation, deputized Mohammad Akbar and tasked him
with recovering it. Mohammad Akbar, a recently
reconciled former Taliban and Haqqani supporter with
a less than stellar civic record, quickly retook the
district with the assistance of thirty of his
followers, all now on the governor,s payroll as

KABUL 00003439 002 OF 003


contract police.

Dila District
--------------


4. (C) Dila district located in the extreme west
of Paktika province is a dry, unfruitful plain
dissected with deep wadis and surrounded by
extremely rocky barren mountains. Isolated even by
Afghan standards, Dila,s district center, the
village of Dila, is a four-hour drive over
nonexistent roads from the closest coalition outpost
at Waza Khwa and a bone-jarring eight-hour trek from
Paktika,s capital village of Sharana. Dila,
isolated from the center and on three sides (north,
south, and west) bordered by insurgent dominated
districts of Ghazni Province, was taken over by
Taliban elements on May 7, 2006. The police and
district government officers fled and the government
district center buildings, crude mud structures,
were put to the torch. There has been no Afghan
government presence in the district since early May.
Coalition forces have made several trips into Dila.
On one of these excursions U.S. forces killed two
Taliban during a bold daylight insurgent attack on
the coalition patrol. Despite American willingness
to travel to and through the district, the Afghan
security forces (both ANA and ANP) have not
attempted to reoccupy the district.


5. (C) On 12 July, American military forces from
PRT Sharana and the PRT DOS representative visited
Dila,s district center and spoke with local
residents. Local shop owners and farmers readily
admitted that the Taliban were openly in the
district but had not yet attempted to set up a
shadow government. According to these local sources
the Taliban in Dila have targeted only people
working for the present Afghan government and have
even instituted their own form of a reconciliation
program. According to this program, Karzai
government employees could buy their way back into
the good graces of the Taliban by turning over all
of the money earned from their work with the Afghan
government. Those successfully reconciled would be
issued a Taliban identification card and no longer
be bothered by insurgent elements.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) Naka and Dila both present problems for the
Afghan government. They have likely been under some
form of Taliban influence for quite some time as
they are extremely remote, barren, or surrounded by
Taliban lines of communication and areas of
influence. The ANSF are not yet large enough to
allow deployment of forces in such remote areas.
The unforgiving and sparsely-populated terrain make
these districts of less strategic value compared to
others in RC South and RC East. Thus does not take
much military force for the Taliban to take over
their "district centers." The Taliban, as they are
behaving elsewhere, have flowed into where GoA
influence is weakest. However, looking forward,
building governance and the ANP remain key. In Naka

KABUL 00003439 003 OF 003


a nominally pro-Karzai militia element is now in
charge of the district. Where the true loyalties of
these mercenaries lie is unknown.


7. (C) Comment cont,d: In Dila, no form of Afghan
government is in place. Although the district is in
Taliban hands, the people are not afraid to meet
with coalition forces and they are not opposed to
the Karzai government. However, at this stage the
Karzai government and the coalition are more foreign
to the people of Dila than are the Taliban. The
Taliban, as Pashtuns, are not considered a foreign
element. Taliban control of the district is not
strongly opposed as it is not a radical change from
the normal conservative lives of these very poor,
uneducated, rural people. Rather, the more foreign
elements are within the Afghan government with its
non-Pashtun employees, in the ANP and ANA officer
corps and in the American-dominated coalition
elements. Until the Afghan government demonstrates
the size and strength to provide a serious
alternative to the Taliban in Dila the local
population will continue to acquiesce to de facto
Taliban control. Upcoming Mountan Fury operations,
both kinetic and non-kinetic, will demonstrate
coalition and ANSF strength in Paktika and help
extend the reach of the GOA during late August and
September. End Comment.
NEUMANN