PRT/TARIN KOWT: AUSTRALIANS LOOK KEENLY AT TARIN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000339

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DEPT FOR SA/FO AMBASSADOR QUINN, S/CT, SA/A, EUR/RPM,
EUR/UBI, EAP/ANP
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR NL AF AS
SUBJECT: PRT/TARIN KOWT: AUSTRALIANS LOOK KEENLY AT TARIN
KOWT PRT

Classified By: A/DCM ANGUS SIMMONS FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (S/NF) Summary: After Australia,s agreement in
principle to send a PRT team to Afghanistan this year,
the Australian Force Commander and his POLAD have
proposed to Canberra to embed a small number of
Australian military personnel in the Tarin Kowt PRT in
order to learn more about its operation and
function. Embedding Australian military personnel
would both improve Australia,s understanding of PRTs
as well as augment the current capacity of the PRT.
This is particularly important as Australian personnel
appear to have two serious misconceptions about PRTs
that may be preventing them from whole-heartedly
embracing the PRT concept. They have overestimated
the personnel requirements for an effective PRT and do
not yet see the indirect security that is provided to
the PRT by parallel combat missions in the area of
operation. Consequently, Australians embedded into
the U.S. PRT might play a critical role in persuading
the Australians to join in a PRT. However, these on-
the-ground efforts should be paralleled by other
efforts to fully inform Australian decision-makers in
Canberra, thereby dispeling any misconceptions they
might hold. End summary.

Status of the Australian Force in Uruzgan
--------------


2. (S/NF) The bulk of the Australian commitment to
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is concentrated in
Uruzgan Province in the form of a Special Operations
Force (SOF) of nearly 200 soldiers. The Australian
contingent is rotated every four months with a current
overall time commitment of twelve months ending in
September 2006. An Australian Base has been
established within the overall FOB Ripley perimeter
outside of Tarin Kowt (which also encompasses the PRT
and an airtrip). rom this base, the Australian SOF
operates extensively in Uruzgan and southern Dai
Kundi, particularly in the Khod Valley of the restive
northwestern District of Cahar Cineh. Australian
forces will be reinforced in the coming weeks by
approximately 100 troops and two heavy lift CH-47
helicopters (Chinooks). The helicopters will operate
out of Kandahar Air Field (KAF) and some of the
reinforcements will also be stationed in Tarin Kowt.

Growing Interest in the PRT
--------------


3. (S/NF) In recent meetings with PRToff and PRT
Commander, the Australian Commander in Afghanistan,
LTC John Gould, and his POLAD, Sarah Ford, expressed
growing certainty that Australia will partner with the
Netherlands to take over Tarin Kowt PRT or even take
sole ownership. This expectation was reinforced by
comments from the POLAD regarding the recent visit of
the Australian Chief of Defense Forces, Air Chief
Marshall Angus Houston, to Tarin Kowt. These words
have been supported by deeds in the last few months,
with Australian Forces in Uruzgan taking an interest
in more PRT-related tasks: distribution of
humanitarian assistance, participation in MED/VET
CAPs, and offers to provide assistance to the Afghan
Highway Police. POLAD indicated that the Government
of Australia would likely take a decision on whether
or not to take the PRT in the February or March
timeframe after a Dutch decision has been reached.

The Next Step - Australians Embedded at the PRT
-------------- --


4. (S/NF) In the meantime, the Australian Commander
would like to take the next step by embedding three to
six Australian officers and non-commissioned officers
(NCOs) within the U.S. PRT staff. These Australians
would live and work at the PRT and serve under the
command of the U.S. PRT Commander. By being embedded
into the staff, the Australians would gain direct
knowledge and experience of the operations of a PRT
while at the same time augmenting the PRT staff. The
Australians do not envision these embedded soldiers to
arrive earlier than March or April, thus giving both
parties time to fully vet the proposal. However,
initial informal discussions between the PRT and the
Australians yielded two tentative courses of action:

-- Course of Action One: Three Australian military
embedded:

- S2/S3 (intelligence/operations)
- Civil-Military Operations Cell
- Military Police Advisory Team

-- Course of Action Two: Six Australian military
embedded:

- Three positions listed above, plus
- Information Operations/Public Affairs
- Base Operations and Engineering
- Civil-Military Operations Cell (agricultural
specialist)

Misconceptions Needing Correction
--------------


5. (S/NF) Embedding Australian soldiers within the PRT
may prove critical to the overall effort at convincing
Australia to take over a PRT. Australian officers and
officials with whom PRToff has spoken all have two
basic misconceptions about the structure and security
of PRTs; embedded personnel would likely dispel these
misunderstandings. First, despite frequently voicing
suspicion of ISAF, the Australians appear to have
taken the ISAF approach toward manning a PRT and have
seriously overestimated the personnel requirements to
function effectively. The Australians envision a 200-
soldier complement and believe this number is
insufficient to operate a PRT. This is disconcerting
considering that U.S. PRTs function with only 80-100
soldiers. Half of the proposed Australian component
would be 100 infantrymen for force protection and the
other 100 would consist of civil affairs, engineers,
and other sectoral specialists. A U.S. PRT by
comparison operates with only 50 infantrymen for force
protection and at most 20 civil affairs and other
specialists, with the remainder devoted to base
operations. (Comment: If Australia were to take a PRT
with 200 soldiers, they would likely be able to
accomplish a great deal. It is not that 200 would be
too many, but rather that Australian officials believe
it would be too few. End comment.)


6. (S/NF) A second major misconception also
influences the Australian concern over troop numbers.
Australian officers and their POLAD are reluctant to
make the indirect security connection between combat
operations performed by their 200 SOF soldiers
currently in Uruzgan and the proposed civil-military
operations of 200 PRT soldiers. Without a doubt, the
combat missions that both U.S. and Australian SOF
currently conduct in the outer districts of Uruzgan
indirectly provide security for the PRT operating in
safer areas. U.S. Special Forces, working out of FOBs
in three of the more rugged districts in Uruzgan,
conduct frequent patrols and direct action missions
that significantly disrupt the enemy,s ability to
operate in the populated valleys where the PRT is
active.

An Absence of Civilians - A Bad Thing?
--------------


7. (S/NF) In a third aspect, the Australians again
differ in their view of the organization and function
of a PRT. They largely do not see an on-the-ground
role for their Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT) and Australian Agency for International
Development (AUSAID). At most, a Ministry of Defense
POLAD might be assigned to a PRT for internal policy
work, but no diplomat would be responsible for the
crucial external functions of the PRT. Such an
absence could leave an Australian PRT or slice of a
PRT without the ability to interact with the civilian
side of the international effort. (Comment: on the
other hand, such an outcome might provide a useful
opportunity for the U.S. Government to retain a
presence in this critical province. Indeed, the
Australian Liaison Officer and POLAD have assumed that
the U.S. Political Officer, USAID Field Project
Officer, and DynCorps Police Mentors would remain in
Tarin Kowt and continue to operate in support of
Coalition and ISAF objectives. Given the usual close
U.S.-Australian relations this is unremarkable;
however given previous reluctance by the Government of
the Netherlands to host U.S. diplomats at their
Baghlan PRT such hospitality on the part of the
Australians could be useful.)

Comment
--------------


8. (S/NF) Embedding Australian military personnel into
the PRT temporarily could be an important part of
facilitating Australian interest in taking over Tarin
Kowt or at least partnering with the Dutch. This
could be particularly useful in building Australian
confidence in the fact that they have more resources
available than they currently believe. We will follow
this closely and facilitate as required.
NORLAND