Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL3317
2006-07-27 10:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRT/KUNDUZ: BRINGING DOWN A PROMINENT WARLORD --

Tags:  PTER PGOV PREL PINR AF 
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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1543
INFO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6175
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/US TREASURY WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003317 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, S/CT, SCA/A
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76
TREASURY FOR APARAMESWARAN, ABAUKOL
STATE PLEASE PASS USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
REL NATO/ISAF, AUS, NZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PINR AF
SUBJECT: PRT/KUNDUZ: BRINGING DOWN A PROMINENT WARLORD --
AND KEEPING HIM THERE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEWMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003317

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, S/CT, SCA/A
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76
TREASURY FOR APARAMESWARAN, ABAUKOL
STATE PLEASE PASS USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
REL NATO/ISAF, AUS, NZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PINR AF
SUBJECT: PRT/KUNDUZ: BRINGING DOWN A PROMINENT WARLORD --
AND KEEPING HIM THERE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEWMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Amir Gul, a former Taliban commander and one
of Baghlan's most prominent warlords, was arrested after a
large arsenal of incriminating bomb-making material, weapons
and ammunition was found at his compound during an Afghan
National Army (ANA) cordon-and-search operation in Baghlan on
July 16. The evidence indicates that he may have been
responsible for many of the recent attacks against ISAF,
including perhaps last month's suicide car bomb attack in
Kunduz. Now that Gul has been turned over to the National
Directorate of Security (NDS),Post will work closely with
Afghan authorities to ensure he is not released. NDS
Director Saleh has assured Ambassador that the investigation
will be complete and that he will not be released on the
basis of influence. We hope that the ANA operation against
Gul will start to serve notice to local warlords that they
can no longer carry out criminal and anti-regime activities
in the northeast with impunity. END SUMMARY.

AMIR GUL ARRESTED IN JULY 16 ANA OPERATION
--------------


2. (C) Amir Gul, a former Taliban Commander who has long been
suspected of being involved in improvised explosive device
(IED) attacks against ISAF, was arrested July 16 along with
nine of his associates during an early-morning
cordon-and-search operation at his compound in Baghlan. The
operation, which was carried out by the Afghan National Army
(ANA) battalion based in Kunduz (1st Kandak, 209th ANA Corps)
under the guidance of a US Special Forces detachment, netted
a large arsenal of incriminating bomb-making material,
weapons and ammunition. Much of the seized material was
relatively new and from China or Pakistan; it was not the
typical mujaheddin leftovers from the Soviet period. The new

German Operational Military Liaison Team (OMLT),which is
scheduled to take over the training of the 1st Kandak from
the current US Embedded Training Team (ETT) in early August,
played a key part in the operation by coaching the ANA on
formation of the outer cordon. Gul attempted to flee when
the ANA first arrived, but thanks to the well-executed
cordon, could not get away.

PLANNING FOR SUICIDE CAR BOMB ATTACK?
--------------


3. (C) The material seized indicates that Gul, age 44, has
been not only orchestrating many of the recent IED attacks in
the northeast, but also that he may have been responsible for
the June 27 suicide car bomb attack in Kunduz and could have
been planning another. Among the items found were a 95-pound
home-made plastic explosives bomb primed with commercial
detonation cord and a white Toyota Corolla like the one used
in the June 27 attack. The car, which was found hidden in a
locked metal shipping container, tested positive for
explosives residue and had wires running from the battery to
the front grill. Experts from the Combined Explosives
Exploitation Cell (CEXC) at ISAF HQ believe a front bumper
pressure switch had been originally attached to these wires.
This would have allowed the suicide bomber to detonate the
device by ramming the car into the intended target. The
explosive material and other items were removed from the car,
probably right after the first suicide attack, when there was
a very heavy police and ANA presence looking for a second
white Toyota Corolla, which intelligence sources indicated
would be used in a follow-on attack.

HEAVY PRESSURE FOR GUL'S RELEASE
--------------


4. (C) Within a few hours of the operation, Gul's nine
associates were transferred to the Kunduz NDS. There are
conflicting accounts of how long the Kunduz NDS detained the

KABUL 00003317 002 OF 003


nine before releasing them. The understanding of the US
Special Forces detachment in Kunduz is that the nine were
released by the morning of July 17, less than 24 hours after
the turnover. Baghlan NDS Director Mohammed Wali confirmed
to PRTOff that the Kunduz NDS "was under serious pressure" to
release the men and decided to let them all go after "just a
few questions." He claims the Kunduz NDS did not ask him for
any possible derogatory information about the nine until
after they were already released. Kunduz NDS Director
Kamaludin Gulalai insisted, however, that the men were held
for two or three days and were only released after provincial
elders gave assurances that they would not flee. Gulalai
claims that he received no pressure from the central
government to release the men. The only pressure was from
local elders, family members and friends of the men in
Baghlan.

COULD CAUSE "BIG HEADACHES"
--------------


5. (C) Gul was not transferred to Kunduz NDS, although the US
Special Forces detachment reports that the Kunduz NDS made
repeated requests that he be turned over. Instead, Gul was
eventually sent to Bagram for further processing and possible
interrogation. On July 22, the Coalition transferred Gul to
a NDS representative in Kabul, where he remains in custody.
Baghlan NDS Director Wali told PRToff, however, that Gul
still apparently has access to his cell phone (he has called
his family),which is not standard procedure for someone held
under these circumstances.


6. (C) There remain concerns that Gul could use his political
connections in Kabul to escape prosecution for his alleged
crimes. Almost immediately after the operation, the US
Special Forces detachment in Kunduz heard through its chain
of command that high-level officials in Kabul, including
President Karzai himself, sought Gul's release. Though
Karzai subsequently changed his mind based on evidence
provided by the coalition and provincial officials, local
elders with connections to Gul reportedly continue to press
the President and those around him to release this notorious
warlord. Gul and Karzai apparently know each other well.
During his June 27 visit to Baghlan (ironically, the same day
as the suicide car bomb attack in Kunduz),Karzai was
photographed warmly embracing Gul and riding a horse that Gul
had just given him. Baghlan NDS Director Wali fears that Gul
will escape accountability because of his service near the
end of the war with the Taliban, when he suddenly switched
sides to help the Northern Alliance. Wali reports that Gul
has close, ongoing relationships with at least two former
Northern Alliance generals.


7. (C) If Gul does manage to be released without charge, Wali
thought he could cause some "big headaches" in Baghlan. He
thought Gul would be emboldened to carry out even more
criminal and anti-regime activities than before. This time,
however, he felt Gul would be more careful about operational
security and hiding his ammunition and weapons. Since Gul
has some 12 different houses in Baghlan, it would be easy for
him to move things around and evade authorities.


8. (C) Meanwhile, Gul's supporters in Baghlan have been
stirring up trouble. The ANA base in Pol-e Khomri (Karkar)
was mortared July 21, presumably in retaliation for Gul's
arrest and detention. There were also reports that someone
called the office of the Baghlan governor, threatening him
with IED attacks if he did not secure Gul's release.


9. (C) Kabul actions: German Ambassador, US Ambassador, ISAF
senior generals and CFC-A have all engaged with various
senior levels of the GOA. We believe the message has gotten
through. However, we will keep our concerns obvious to the
GOA. NDS Director Saleh has twice assured us there will be

KABUL 00003317 003 OF 003


no release of Gul based on influence.

BACKGROUND ON GUL
--------------


9. (C) Despite having reportedly gone through the
Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) process a
couple of years ago, Gul has remained one of Baghlan's most
prominent warlords. According to multiple sources, he has
been involved in a number of criminal activities, including
extortion, robbery and drug trafficking. Several ANP
uniforms were found during the July 16 search of Gul's
compound, raising the possibility that his men may have
impersonated police officers in carrying out their illegal
activities. Over the last couple of years, Gul has been
engaged in a well-documented rivalry with his former mentor
and fellow Pashtun warlord Bashir Baghlani, which has
occasionally broken out in violence and may account for some
of the recent IED attacks. During the jihad period, the two
men were close associates, with Gul serving as Baghlani's
operations officer.


10. (C) Later, Baghlani and Gul were both members of Hezb-e
Islami and supporters of the Taliban, but they reportedly
fell out at the end of the Taliban period when Gul informed
the Taliban that Baghlani had several secret weapons caches
that he had no intention of giving up. Baghlani was arrested
by the Taliban and ended up spending time in a Kandahar
prison. Despite being loyal to the Taliban almost to the
end, Gul was able to rehabilitate himself fairly quickly
after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, serving at one
point as the commander of the highway police in Baghlan. The
July 16 ANA search of Gul's compound uncovered several
letters and other correspondence indicating that Gul had been
actively seeking a governmental position in Baghlan, probably
to facilitate his illegal activities. Just last month, he
succeeded in getting Baghlan Governor Rasikh to nominate him
as a provincial district administrator, but this appointment
was rejected by the Ministry of Interior.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Now that Gul has been turned over to the NDS, Post
will work closely with Afghan authorities to ensure that he
remains in custody and that a thorough investigation is done.
While there is some concern that Gul's arrest could
engender transient instability by upsetting the current
balance of power among rival warlords in Baghlan, the
longer-term effects of taking Gul out of commission will
almost certainly be positive. END COMMENT.

NEUMANN