Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL329
2006-01-24 17:00:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

LONDON CONFERENCE SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE

Tags:  OVIP PREL ECON EAID SNAR AF 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000329 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A
NSC FOR THARRIMAN, KAMEND
LONDON FOR S CONTROL
TREASURY FOR APARAMESWARAN
COMMERCE FOR AADLER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP PREL ECON EAID SNAR AF
SUBJECT: LONDON CONFERENCE SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE

------------------------
Compact with Afghanistan
------------------------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000329

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A
NSC FOR THARRIMAN, KAMEND
LONDON FOR S CONTROL
TREASURY FOR APARAMESWARAN
COMMERCE FOR AADLER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP PREL ECON EAID SNAR AF
SUBJECT: LONDON CONFERENCE SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE

--------------
Compact with Afghanistan
--------------


1. (SBU) President Karzai arrives in London for the January
31 ) Feb 1 Afghanistan Conference with a two-fold agenda:

-- To present to the world the face of a reborn and newly
confident Afghanistan that, with the seating of its first
parliament in 32 years, has successfully fulfilled the last
major task set out in the 2001 Bonn Agreement; and

-- To present to you and to the broader international donor
community a post-Bonn vision of integrated political,
economic and social development so compelling that we will
commit to provide Afghanistan the support needed to see it
through the next five years.

An Afghanistan Compact that lays out these accomplishments
and this vision is the centerpiece of the London Conference
and will be endorsed there by over 60 national delegations.
The Compact is a political commitment on the part of both
Afghanistan and the international community to work towards a
series of five-year benchmarks measuring performance in
security; governance, rule of law and human rights; economic
and social development; and counter-narcotics.


2. (SBU) In your October meeting with President Karzai in
Kabul, and in subsequent visits by Vice President Cheney and
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, we delivered the message that the
United States is here to stay as long as needed, dispelling
persistent Afghan fears that increased following our December
announcement of reductions in U.S. troop numbers. President
Karzai hopes to hear you make this same commitment clearly
and publicly during your London Conference remarks.
Privately, President Karzai also needs to hear from you that
decisive actions on counter-narcotics and good governance are
essential to his country's continued progress.


3. (SBU) We have invested major resources and have made
significant progress in rebuilding Afghanistan since the fall
of the Taliban. But failure to maintain forward momentum
risks losing all that we have attained. Despite the seating
of a new parliament in December, government institutions in

Afghanistan are still extremely fragile, riddled with
corruption, and unhealthily dependent on the ability of just
one man -- President Karzai -- to maintain a balance of
ethnic and tribal power. Most Afghans still live in
conditions not far removed from the Middle Ages, creating
tensions that the Taliban insurgency has been increasingly
able to exploit. The United States cannot afford failure in
Afghanistan and so we must sustain our effort on Afghan
reconstruction and support the Karzai administration,s
efforts to govern effectively. Your presence at the London
Conference reaffirms our political and financial commitment
to this effort.

-------------- --
Public and Private Messages to Convey in London
-------------- --


4. (SBU) The most important message you can convey to
President Karzai in London is that our commitment to
Afghanistan remains unwavering. Regardless of the planned
transition from Coalition to ISAF forces in the coming
months, the United States-Afghanistan strategic partnership
will continue to move forward. We will keep on working with
and mentoring Afghan military and police forces in order to
combat the lingering insurgency and to provide the security
needed for Afghanistan to move forward to become a secure,
economically sustainable nation.


5. (SBU) The Afghanistan Compact: The key principle of the
Compact is Afghan leadership of - and accountability for -
its reconstruction and development process. It identifies
three interdependent areas: Security; Governance, Rule of
Law and Human Rights; and Sustainable Economic and Social
Development; plus a crosscutting counter-narcotics agenda
that need to be tackled over the next five years. The
Compact sets out over 90 high-level benchmarks to measure
progress and creates a UN and GoA-led monitoring and
coordination board to ensure appropriate GoA and
international community engagement. The GoA has pushed hard
over the past months to give the Compact the flavor of a
binding commitment on the part of the international community
to provide Afghanistan adequate resources. Instead, major
donors, including the U.S., Germany and Japan, have insisted
that the Compact text be worded to document a political
rather than a legal commitment to support GoA security,
political, and economic development efforts. The GoA has
taken ownership of this document, with the text approved by
the full cabinet.


6. (SBU) The Afghan Economy: In the four years since the
Taliban's defeat, post-conflict Afghanistan has achieved a
remarkable degree of macro-economic stability that is laying
a foundation for economic growth, development and job
creation. Yet progress is fragile and, with an average
longevity of only 47 years, life for millions of Afghans has
not advanced much beyond the Middle Ages. Sustaining a
viable Afghan nation will require the GoA to continue
structural reforms encouraging private sector development;
work hard to enhance customs and tax revenue generation;
target its limited budget resources at pro-poor spending and
productive investment; and contain wage costs. Until that
point -- perhaps a decade down the road -- when the GoA can
generate sufficient domestic customs and tax revenue to cover
its recurring budget expenses, Afghanistan will require a
steady, reliable and well-coordinated flow of assistance from
the United States and from the broad international donor
community. This is Afghanistan's reality.


7. (SBU) Parliament: The new parliament faces a number of
challenges, among them a divided and inexperienced
membership, some of whom have dubious backgrounds of human
rights abuses or criminal activity. Yunus Qanooni, an ethnic
Tajik and a leader of a loose group of "opposition" political
parties prior to the elections, was elected speaker of the
lower house (Wolesi Jirga) on a second ballot. To date,
parliamentary debate has concentrated almost entirely on the
organization of parliament. Wolesi Jirga speaker Qanooni and
Meshrano Jirga (upper house) speaker Sebghatullah Mojaddedi
(a conservative mullah and a former president of Afghanistan)
have shown positive signs of pragmatism in these discussions.
Qanooni has publicly renounced his self-appointed position
of leader of the opposition and many MP's have stressed to us
the need for working together in harmony. You should take
the opportunity during your remarks at the London Conference
to acknowledge any parliamentary representatives in the GoA
delegation and encourage this spirit of cooperation.


8. (SBU) Counter Narcotics: Last year President Karzai
declared a jihad against drugs. Efforts following that
declaration have had some impact: The UNODC estimated that
poppy cultivation has dropped 21 percent since last year,
while a USG-funded survey reported a 48 percent drop. (The
actual numbers of hectares under cultivation were similar in
both reports; the latter used a higher baseline for the
previous year.) However, the most recent UN estimates show a
sharp increase in poppy cultivation in some provinces, and
the GoA knows that it must begin an eradication program soon.
Karzai has continued to say the right things in public and
private and has accepted our insistence that specific
references to poppy eradication be included in Afghanistan
Compact. The next few months are critical; they determine
the success or failure of the program. Your message to
Karzai must be direct: Opium cultivation remains the single
most significant threat to his government and to
Afghanistan's successful reconstruction and he must bring the
full prestige of his office to bear in this effort.


9. (SBU) Corruption: It is time for the Afghan Government
to finally fight widespread, endemic corruption at the
national, provincial and regional levels. Corruption is
disliked by the Afghan people, hampers counter narcotics
efforts, diminishes respect for rule of law and slows the
development of a viable economy due to significant diversion
of government revenues. In the short term, President Karzai
must remove a number of high-profile corrupt officials and
individuals and appoint a tough, competent Minister of the
Interior. In the longer term, a combination of civil service
reform (e.g., better pay for members of a downsized police
force) and prosecution of egregious cases need to be pursued.
President Karzai recently got rid of two ineffective
governors (of Helmand and Takhar provinces) by appointing
them to the upper house of parliament.


10. (SBU) Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups: The
disbandment, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program has
disbanded over 63,000 former official combatants by offering
them incentive packages and training. The next phase of the
process is the disbandment of illegal armed groups (DIAG).
This process is more politically sensitive than DDR as many
of the former commanders retain significant influence within
various government ministries or ethnic groups, and have
nothing to gain by surrendering their weapons. Some of these
commanders have been elected to parliament and need to be
monitored closely and expelled if they continue in their old
ways. Government officials with links to illegal armed
groups also must be put on notice and sanctioned if they do
not sever these ties. A recent public opinion poll put
disarming commanders as the top security concern of the
Afghan people. The international community is working with
Afghan security ministries, but the process lacks competent
afghan leadership and strong support from Karzai. Warlordism
is a part of the nexus of corruption, narcotics and
ineffective governance which must be urgently addressed.


11. (SBU) Security Situation/Staying the Course: Karzai is
concerned that NATO lacks the will to fight, that we will
withdraw too much too soon, and that Afghan forces will not
be ready to stem greater violence. Our long-term staying
power is crucial to winning the political war in Afghanistan.
The security situation is evolving, with more recorded
incidents of IEDs and suicide attacks in recent months.
There has also been an increase in the number of targeted
assassinations/ambushes. The insurgency remains resilient
and not likely to go away soon. A key underlying factor of
continuing engagement is the reality that Afghan security
institutions are still in their infancy. It will take
several years and international support for those
institutions to fully take the lead in fighting terrorism,
extremism and narcotics. On the regional front, you should
thank Karzai for his willingness to postpone his trip to
Iran. Karzai is deeply skeptical that Pakistan can be
enlisted in the fight against terrorism, particularly given
the recent increase in attacks in the South ) you should
remind him of the importance of trying to find ways to
cooperate effectively on this issue.
NORLAND