Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL328
2006-01-24 13:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

KANDAHAR: A GOVENOR'S INTENTIONS

Tags:  SNAR PREL PGOV PTER KCRM AF 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 KABUL 000328 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR INL/FO. SA/FO AMB QUINN
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN/KAMED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2016
TAGS: SNAR PREL PGOV PTER KCRM AF
SUBJECT: KANDAHAR: A GOVENOR'S INTENTIONS

REF: (A) 05 KABUL 05035 (B) 05 KABUL 5223

Classified By: ADCM SIMMONS AS PER E.O. 12958 REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 KABUL 000328

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR INL/FO. SA/FO AMB QUINN
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN/KAMED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2016
TAGS: SNAR PREL PGOV PTER KCRM AF
SUBJECT: KANDAHAR: A GOVENOR'S INTENTIONS

REF: (A) 05 KABUL 05035 (B) 05 KABUL 5223

Classified By: ADCM SIMMONS AS PER E.O. 12958 REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------

1. (SBU) Ambassador Neumann and senior Embassy staff had
several meetings with the Governor of Kandahar, Asadullah
Khalid, between December 26, 2005 and January 14, 2006. In
these meetings Govenor Khalid spoke about his intention to
fight illegal poppy cultivation, detailed his problem with
the misconception of the Alternative Livelihoods Program,
shared his views on law enforcement challenges, acknowledged
the security problem in his province and even commented on
being considered for the Minister of Interior position.
Embassy participants at other meetings with the Governor
included the Charge, Acting DCM, the Counter Narcotics Task
Force (CNTF) Director and Deputy Director, and the INL
Director. Of special note, is his December 26th visit with
the Ambassador where he was accompanied by MP Qayoum Karzai,
who is a newly elected member of the lower house and also a
brother of President Karzai.


2. (SBU) Partial Biography: Asadullah Khalid, also known as
Asadullah, Haji Hassad (DOB: 1968). President Karzai sent
Khalid to the province of Ghazni in April 2002 where he began
the duties of governor prior to an official appointment.
During this period he utilized several hundred troops to
disarm the province and restore order. He was officially
appointed as Governor of Ghazni in late May 2002. In July
2005 Khalid was appointed Governor of Kandahar.

--------------
Counter Narcotics
--------------


3. (SBU) The Ambassador acknowledged the earlier good work by
Khalid during his Governorship in Ghazni and congratulated
him on his appointment as Governor of Kandahar. One of
Governor Khalid,s first orders of business is to focus on
the upcoming Governor led eradication campaign. He strongly
supports the President,s call for the Governors to lead
eradication efforts in their provinces and wanted to &set an
example8 for his neighboring provincial (Helmand and

Oruzgan) Governors. Khalid demonstrated this pledge by
informing the Deputy Minister for Counter Narcotics at the
Ministry of Interior (MOI) of his plans to commence
eradication prior to the start of the Eid holidays which
began January 10th. Khalid told the Deputy Minister that he
wanted to make a &psychological statement8 by eradicating
fields in two districts &so that the farmers in the
districts can talk about it over the holidays8, sending the
message that his administration is serious about eradication.
Khalid intended to recommence eradication efforts after the
holiday expanding his eradication program to several
additional districts. Through his submitted operational plan
he requested assistance from the MOI in the form of tractor
rental fees, local transportation for the eradication workers
and police, food for them while working, and assistance from
the Poppy Elimination Program (PEP) for verification.
Interestingly, he has not requested MOI Afghan Eradication
Force personnel support at this time and said that he
believes he has sufficient local manpower to accomplish this
phase of the eradication campaign.

(Comment: Khalid appears to want to do as much as possible
on his Governor led eradication program without a lot of
visible support from Kabul. Some believe that if his program
is successful, it could garner him additional political
capital among his constituents and show him as a strong
independent Governor.)


4. (SBU) Khalid believes that Kandahar is a province where it
is crucial for eradication to succeed. He commented that
Helmand and Uruzgan are closely observing Kandahar,s
commitment to tackling eradication, and, more importantly,
are monitoring the promised level of central government
assistance to Governor Khalid.

5 (SBU) The Charge asked Khalid if he was satisfied with the
level of support from the central government for this program
and the Governor said although he received &promises8 of
assistance, he is waiting to see if they are able to deliver.
He mentioned several recent meetings with the PEP Country
Manager, Dr. Nabi Hussaini, and said he was satisfied thus
far with the proposed Poppy Elimination Program plans for
Kandahar. In spite of his concerns, Khalid appeared energized
about overcoming these potential challenges and believes his
eradication program will be successful. He stated his
personal goal is to get as close to 100% eradication as
possible.


6. (C) (Comment: Khalid,s response to the Charge differs
from earlier comments attributable to him on this same
subject. An official within the MOI stated Khalid has on
several occasions complained about the ineffectiveness of the
MCN, specifically Minister Qaderi,s ability to lead that
Ministry, and characterized MCN as being &unresponsive8 to
Kandahar,s needs. He is also quoted as criticizing the PEP
team in Kandahar as being &lazy and not knowledgeable8
about the poppy situation in his province. We are looking
into his assertions about the PEP team, however recent
meetings with the INL PEP and eradication planning team,
including the introduction of the new PEP International
Advisor, seems to have resolved whatever issues the Governor
had with the Afghan part of the PEP team.)

7.(SBU) Additionally, Khalid believes an important component
in putting together a CN strategy at the provincial level is
full commitment from local and regional leaders not to
cultivate poppy. In addition to holding various meetings at
this level, he also put together a twenty-three member
&council8 comprised of local and regional individuals from
the private and government sector. Their mission is to
function as an extension of PEP and represent the Governor as
his interlocutors and continue meeting with influential
community leaders to maintain the anti-poppy cultivation
dialogue. Additionally, this council has been tasked with
providing the Governor feedback as to the eradication
program,s effectiveness.


8. (SBU) Khalid said he recently held a series of
&unofficial8 meetings with the Governors of Helmand,
Uruzgan and Zabul (all of which surround Kandahar) to
encourage and solicit their cooperation and commitment to
enforce the cultivation ban in their respective provinces.
According to Khalid, the Governors told Khalid they are all
facing tremendous pressure from local groups to not
participate in the Governor poppy eradication campaign
because of the potential negative economic impact in their
communities, and the fear of violent resistance from poppy
growing interest groups. The Governor from Helmand expressed
his strong concerns to Khalid about the potential for
violence in his Province, and both Governors from Helmand and
Uruzgan commented that they heard instances of farmers
attempting to grow poppies intermingled with wheat. The
speculation is that this might somehow dissuade the
eradication workers from destroying both crops since one of
them is legal and it would be virtually impossible to
eradicate those poppies without also destroying the wheat.
Note: We have not heard of any other reporting of this trend
and our belief is that this would be a very inefficient way
to grow poppy and the very discussion of such a tactic
indicates farmers take the GOA,s eradication commitments
seriously.

-------------- --------------
Mis-Understanding the Alternative Livelihoods Program (ALP)
-------------- --------------


9. (U) During his meeting with the Ambassador, Khalid asked
for a clarification of the intent of the ALP during the
eradication campaign. The Governor said he was encountering
expectations from many of the district leaders that farmers
whose poppy fields would be destroyed would receive
assistance from the GOA. Khalid said he believes anyone who
grows poppies should not be rewarded with this type of
assistance and acknowledged a general lack of understanding
among his peers and local leaders as to the AL programs
intent and purpose. The Governor was advised the ALP was not
intended to reward these growers and provided examples of
what ALP was designed to do. The Governor was familiar with
the seed and fertilizer program but not so with other AID
programs that were ongoing, or ALP programs that were
completed or in the pipeline. Several examples of ALP
projects (both national and Kandahar specific) were cited by
both the Ambassador and Charge during their separate
meetings. The Ambassador said significant components of the
ALP will have mid to long term benefits for Kandahar, adding
that several were linked directly to building and/or
repairing basic infrastructures throughout the country, i.e.
power, water.


10. (SBU) Throughout the Governor,s meeting with the
Ambassador, MP Karzai interjected comments that supported and
bolstered Khalid,s plan for eradication. MP Karzai also
shared the Governor,s concerns about the false expectations
from ALP, and emphasized the importance of having viable and
visible ALP programs in their province.

11.(SBU)(Comment: A lack of understanding of USAID programs,
specifically Alternative Livelihood Programs, has been a
reoccurring theme we have encountered with many of the
Governors involved with the operational planning phases of
the upcoming Governor led eradication program. Part of the
problem may be the title of the program itself. It is often
interpreted by Afghan government officials to be a crop
substitution program for the poppy growing farmers. In fact,
many of the Governor led poppy eradication plans submitted to
the MOI contained statements and requests that ALP be
immediately available to those growers whose poppy fields are
eradicated. We have been very engaged with both the MOI and
MCN to ensure their message to the Governors is consistent
and firm, that these growers will not be rewarded by any ALP
programs as a result of their poppy crops being destroyed.
Our CNTF Public Information strategy through their various
media campaigns, reinforces this message and distinction.
USAID is providing the CNTF Public Information team with
specific information -- past, ongoing and projected rural
development projects (many of which are ALP) that will assist
our PI team in crafting messages that more accurately explain
the ALP. In the very near future we will provide all of the
Governors with detailed descriptions of both USAID & ALP
sponsored projects in their areas. We will also develop
talking points that should enable the Governors to better
explain to their constituents what USAID, and more
specifically what ALP is doing in their provinces; See Reftel
A.)


12. (U) Ambassador Neumann emphasized the importance of
soliciting input from local leadership throughout Governor
Khalid,s province for the type of ALP assistance they think
they need. He added that input from these levels needs to be
processed through the District and Provincial Councils and
eventually his office for review, prior to submission to
Kabul. The Ambassador commented that he has observed
instances of decisions made by Kabul regarding rural
development projects that did not take into account input
from those local leaders whose communities would be directly
(sometimes negatively) affected. Khalid also said that
unfortunately, that was his experience as well. The
Ambassador acknowledged many of these initial requests would
likely be voluminous and would likely fall into the wants,
versus needs, category. The inclusion of their requests
at this point in the planning process, however, is a critical
component in developing best practice governance as it would
demonstrate these voices at that community level are heard.


13. (U) The Ambassador cautioned it was important their
requests be prioritized for needs and feasibility and that
these requests from those local level participants are
accurately translated, and sent to Kabul in a timely
manner. Even though in the end these requests may not be
approved for implementation, he stressed the importance of
letting these local voices know that they were heard. The
Ambassador later said he would discuss an idea of a pilot
project in Kandahar to ensure more local level inclusion in
the request and development stage for ALP and other USAID
projects with the Director of AID at Post.

14. (SBU) Khalid said he had been seeking additional
financial support for CN and various development projects in
his province and mentioned he recently met with Hanif Atmar,
Minister of Reconstruction and Rural Development. At this
meeting he said he sought an update about an earlier Canadian
Embassy commitment to provide funding and we advised it was
our understanding that the Canadians would assist, and told
him the funds would likely come out of an $8 million
assistance package the Canadians agreed to provide. The
Governor was told that we understood this commitment of funds
was forthcoming.

--------------
Law Enforcement & Corruption
--------------


15. (C) Khalid described the structure and function of law
enforcement in Kandahar as out of date, very inefficient, and
plainly &doesn,t work8. He attributes many of these
problems to the current acting Minister Zarar,s management
of that Ministry and his inability to prioritize police
assignments to high need areas. He cited examples in his
province where districts had a total of 40 police officers,
however in his estimation the need was for considerably more;
in some instances 100. He commented that for police resource
allocation to the provinces, the MOI was working off of very
dated statistical data that does not take into consideration
population growth in new areas within the various provincial
districts. Khalid believes Helmand has these same problems.
(Note: By in large, police are apportioned equally to all
districts within the Provinces without taking into account
law enforcement needs and priorities.)


16. (C) On his own, Khalid states he is attempting to
restructure police resources in his Province, accounting for
the changes in demographics and law enforcement needs. One
of his ideas has been to create what he calls quick
reaction forces, - mobile teams that are able to respond to
various parts of the district rather than stay almost
permanently based in one location. He is also experimenting
with a system once utilized years ago in several Provinces
whereby local non-government community leaders were
authorized (deputized) to make arrests for simple crimes and
bring them to the police for continued investigation. This
individual would also act as a spokesperson for the police.


17. (C) Another law enforcement program the Governor stated
he is focusing on, &because the MOI is not8, is the issue
of highway control. Khalid sees a need to do more law
enforcement operations along the known smuggling routes. He
implied that corruption within the ranks of the highway
police was a major contributing factor for their lack of
success, but also acknowledged that corruption within police
institutions in general is a very serious problem that needs
to be aggressively addressed. Again, he cited lack of
visible actions by the MOI on this front. The Governor said
he is currently attempting to develop evidence against police
officials in his Province, whom he believes are corrupt, for
prosecutions. He did not provide any further specifics on
this last point.

--------------
Secure Province or the Wild West?
--------------


18. (SBU) Governor Khalid was asked by the Charge to give his
informal assessment on the security situation in his
Province. He responded by saying he had noted some overall
security improvements which he attributed in part to the
operations and presence of the coalition forces. Khalid
believes the influence of the Taliban throughout the
districts is not as strong as it used to be, but was still of
concern.


19. (SBU) The conversation then shifted to the recent spate
of suicide bombings in Kandahar and he was asked to give his
assessment on the situation. Khalid said the vast majority of
people living in Kandahar province are Sunni Muslim and that
suicide for any reason is against their view of Islam,
implying that he was doubtful these bombers were from
Afghanistan. He cited a recent suicide bombing where the
police determined the bomber was from Pakistan and had
studied at a Madrasa; NFI. Khalid said, &From what body
parts remained, I examined the head of this bomber and it was
clear he was not Afghan.8 He also said he intends to utilize
local Mullahs to talk throughout the communities about how
suicide is wrong and added that their message on this subject
would have more impact than if were it to come from a Kabul
based Mullah.


20. (C) The Governor acknowledged that security during the
eradication operations would be important and he was taking
this into account as an important part of his eradication
planning process. MP Karzai added they had an unclear picture
of the Taliban,s alleged role with threatening farmers if
they did not grow poppy, and admitted that it was also not
entirely clear if these actions were instigated by Taliban
members, Taliban wannabes or, possibly traffickers
themselves. He mentioned the overall security situation in
the southern parts of Kandahar was &out of control8 , like
the & wild West 8 , and half jokingly said he recently told
his brother President Karzai, that &We might as well give it
to the Pakistanis if we are not going to exercise any control
over that area. 8

--------------
Possible MOI Candidate?
--------------


21. (C) The Charge said there was talk of the Acting
Minister of Interior being considered for the permanent MOI
position, and that recently Khalid,s name was also mentioned
as a possible candidate. Although the Governor was cautious
in his response, he gave indications that he was being
considered by the President for the position. He said the
President will make a decision upon his return from the
London conference. (Note: GOA palace insiders have recently
stated that the Governor is not a serious contender for the
MOI position.)

22.(SBU) As though opining about what the Minister should do
in that position, Khalid said it was critical that the MOI
get out to the Provinces as much as possible to show a strong
central government law enforcement presence. The Governor
also said the Minister should reach out, and acknowledge and
thank the veterans of past wars in the Provincial districts
for their service to Afghanistan. He strongly believes this
act would help in developing and strengthening relationships
between and with these groups and that they could be
influential in developing community support for the police.
Khalid also acknowledged there was a serious problem of
corruption within the ranks of the MOI and said this should
definitely be the priority for anyone who assumes that
position. During a conversation about eradication he said he
was pushing for the Minister of Interior to visit Kandahar at
the beginning of the eradication season to show his support
to his administration for this initiative, and to demonstrate
that that Kabul is serious about this problem.

--------------
Final Thoughts and Impressions
--------------


23. (SBU) Governor Khalid is relatively young for his
position and is in charge of the more important Provinces in
regards to counter narcotics, security, etc. He has earned a
reputation of getting things done through his own initiatives
and does not appear to wait for Kabul to come to the rescue.
So far his actions, at least on the CN front, are louder than
words and we applaud him for his self-starting and aggressive
initiative. Like other nascent Provincial administrations, he
is also hampered by inexperienced staff not familiar with CN
operations, but they are showing an ability to quickly learn.


24. (SBU) The Governor led eradication plan Khalid submitted
to the MOI and MCN, one that we believe his staff authored
under his direct supervision, was by far the most
comprehensive plan submitted. The fact that he has already
started eradication is encouraging and shows strong
initiative, but his efforts are a little ahead of the overall
game plan and our ability to fully support those efforts. We
believe he intentionally started the eradication early to
show it was his decision and that he was able to start
without &forces8 from Kabul. He understands that he will
only get credit and therefore financial support for
operational expenditures for those fields that we can verify
and knows this will be a non-negotiable requirement for all
future fields he eradicates.


25. (SBU) We have scheduled a follow on eradication
operational planning meeting with the Governor. The CNTF
Director, along with INL program managers will meet with the
Governor and his staff to finalize the operations plan, and
demonstrate the technical methods to be used for eradication
verification, as well as other PEP related topics.
NORLAND