NDS DIRECTOR SALEH ON INSURGENCY - CAUSES AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 002970

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

S/CT FOR PALMER/KILCULLEN
SCA/FO, SCA/A, SCA/RA, SCA/PB
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS AF PK
SUBJECT: NDS DIRECTOR SALEH ON INSURGENCY - CAUSES AND
SOLUTIONS

REF: KABUL 2703

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(D)


1. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Summary: NDS Director
General Amarullah Saleh told visiting S/CT Deputy
Coordinator and Chief Strategist on June 27 that the
Taliban insurgency is now focused largely on Zabul,
Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan. For the moment it
is still a "measurable problem," he said. Saleh
asserted that the Pakistani ISI had the capability
to round up Taliban leadership on its side of the
border and do more to prevent infiltration, but
lacked the political will to do so. End Summary.


2. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Asked for his assessment of
the current situation, Saleh took exception to media
reports asserting that Afghanistan was losing
ground. He praised GOA-Coalition coordination in
Operation Mountain Lion and in Paktika, Paktia and
Khost provinces. He said meaningful Taliban
activity was now largely confined to Zabul, Helmand,
Kandahar, and Uruzgan. On the Pakistan side of the
border, he declared, the insurgency in Baluchistan
was mostly just "criminality," with the insurgents
attacking energy and other government facilities
rather than trying to destabilize the government.
He noted that the terrorists who are directing
insurgent operations in Afghanistan have diversified
their funding from charities and foreign sources
(although these are still a factor) by effectively
taxing narcotics dealers, poppy growers, and local
businessmen.


3. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Saleh attributed the Taliban
push in Durrani tribal areas (the four southern
provinces) to a desire to embarrass and distract the
President, who as a Durrani (Popalzai) himself feels
a special sense of responsibility for casualties
there, many of whom are his kinsmen. Saleh said
that the insurgent leaders are deliberately
concentrating on Karzai,s home territory in order to
cause a crisis of leadership in Kabul, by putting
this tremendous pressure on Karzai.


4. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Saleh pointed out, however,
that there are underlying reasons as well for why
the insurgency is stronger in the south. These are
rooted in the lack of governance there. Noting that
there are no political parties or jihadi groups in
the south, he said that the Taliban in that area
used to function as an umbrella over tribal
differences. When the Taliban collapsed, the tribes
were reinstated, initially based on power sharing
between the tribal heads. But then reform removed
the power brokers (i.e. warlords),and the vacuum
has been filled by the Taliban. In the areas where
they are now trying to amass support, Taliban are
promoting a program consisting of Taliban politics,
Koranic law, recruitment of tribes, and a drug
economy. This appeals to villagers, Saleh claimed,
who have trouble understanding a modern polity that
is more sophisticated but less immediate in solving
their problems.


5. (S/Rel Aus and GB) The problem is less pressing

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in other parts of the country, he claimed. In Loya
Paktia (Paktia, Paktika, and Khost),the Ghilzai
tribal leaders are less susceptible to Taliban
Durrani influence. The Haqqani network has been
largely contained. In Khost and Paktia the GOA/CF
have good intelligence sources and good security.
On the other side of the border, in Waziristan,
Pakistan has deployed troops. Saleh pointed out
that literacy rates are also higher in that area,
especially in Khost. Many Afghans from that region
have overseas ties, with relatives working in the
Gulf and elsewhere. That gives them a better
perspective of the world and they are less likely to
be taken in by Taliban ways of thinking. Jalalabad
is similar: Ghilzai, with a relatively good economy
and higher literacy rates. Saleh pointed out that
the Taliban were never strong in the Jalalabad area.
Konar and Nuristan, on the other hand, could become
worse if the Taliban shifted their efforts there.
There is a strong Wahabi undercurrent in those
provinces which could be used by the Taliban to
their advantage. However, at the moment the Taliban
have chosen to concentrate on the south for the
reasons described above.


6. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Saleh attributed current
instability in Afghanistan both to the GOA,s
slowness in asserting government authority but also
to interference from Pakistan, and specifically from
ISI. Asked why Pakistan should want to destabilize
Afghanistan, Saleh quickly ticked off a few
possibilities: "geopolitics, a desire for a monopoly
on natural resources, a desire to dominate
Afghanistan, or a sense that a strong Afghanistan
would undermine Pakistani national unity." He
claimed that, contrary to what many people think,
the Pakistan government does not feel threatened by
Islamic extremists inside Pakistan. He said that
Pakistani leaders from Benazir Bhutto to the present
have used the threat of an Islamic takeover to get
what they wanted from the West, but that there was
never any real possibility of it, and that hasn,t
changed.


7. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Pressed as to which officers
or branches of the ISI might be complicit in
allowing Taliban/AQ infiltration into Afghanistan,
Saleh replied, "The ISI is a very disciplined,
nationalistic service." (Comment: the implication
was that the ISI was acting on orders, not
functioning as a rogue entity. End comment.) He
said the ISI,s Afghanistan desk, including its
training and supplies division, was still active.
Saleh dismissed GOP operational coordination. "We
give them actionable intelligence, primarily on the
Quetta shura," he said, including for example
recently geospatial coordinates for Mullah Dadullah,
"but no action is ever taken." Saleh said he
attended the meeting at which President Karzai
passed the dossier on several Quetta-based Taliban
leaders to President Musharraf, but there had been
no follow up. "When we give them target lists, we
are always told the phone numbers are incorrect and
a day or two later we find they have been
disconnected." Saleh said the ISI had turned over
only "two or three" Taliban operatives, none of whom

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proved significant after interrogation.


8. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Saleh professed ignorance of
President Musharraf,s FATA Plan. When the S/CT
visitors outlined it for him, he asserted repeatedly
that plans like this were meaningless -- "it is a
question of political will." He said that the
Pakistanis have enough resources to contain the
Taliban or to reduce it to the level of criminality,
but that "they will use the excuse of lack of
resources to justify failure, as they have done in
the past." Saleh decried the lack of strategic
consultations with Pakistan on issues of mutual
concern such as the border, water, and ethnic
problems. When asked whether the Government of
Afghanistan was ready to agree to strategic
discussions on the political level, he replied:
"From what I have heard from President Karzai, there
is willingness. But when he wants to engage
Musharraf at a strategic level, Musharraf talks at
the tactical level." If the U.S. wants to initiate
a high-level strategic forum similar to the
Trilateral Military Commission, Saleh asserted, "It
will make a difference."


9. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Saleh said the members of the
international community need to reassure Karzai of
their nation,s commitment to Afghanistan. He said
that Karzai fears the international community,s -
and particularly the U.S. - commitment to
Afghanistan is decreasing for two reasons: because
of what he reads in the Western media and, more
importantly, because the ANA is still not able to
function independently. Karzai is frustrated with
the rate of growth of the ANA, Saleh said.
Moreover, he has the perception that when there is a
security incident, GOA authorities cannot be
deployed immediately to restore order. (CFC-A note:
The ANA can and has deployed ANA forces immediately,
particularly during the May riots. End note.) Saleh
said that recently the President became angry when
he asked Defense Minister Wardak to send a platoon
to Dai Kundi and was told that all ANA moves have to
be coordinated with LTG Eikenberry. (CFC-A note:
ANA movements do not need to be coordinated with LTG
Eikenberry. End note. Embassy comment: It may be
that Saleh was referring to the ANA,s lack of
airlift capability. End comment.)


10. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Saleh also argued for
reinstatement of deployment pay for the Afghan
National Army (ANA). ANA desertions had begun to
decrease, he said, but since the $2/day hardship
allowance was discontinued, they have increased
again. (Note: CFC-A/CSTC-A note: ANA desertion
rates have remained relatively constant for the last
six months.) Finally, Saleh complained about the
lack of ANA airlift capability. (CFC-A Comment: The
current airlift fleet consisting of a few AN-12s and
AN-32s, plus Soviet helos, is inadequate for the
growing ANA. But the Afghans are doing the best
they can with old aircraft that are terribly
difficult to maintain. By late Fall, they will
achieve Presidential airlift capability. But in
order to achieve the air mobility effects the ANA
needs, an increase in the size of the fleet, and

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modernization to sustainable airframes, is needed.
End comment.)


11. (S/Rel Aus and GB) With regard to the Afghan
National Police (ANP),Saleh complained progress was
too slow. He said he strongly supported the use of
"arbakei" (community police) in some Pashtun areas
where they are a traditional institution. The
arbakei are practically responsible for law and
order at the most local level, he said. In the
years before the wars, they used to do neighborhood
protection and would safeguard the king,s forest.
Using them now for community protection would give
the local tribes prestige and would be consistent
with traditional practice. Saleh claimed that the
arbakei are effective because they are locally-based
and rooted in Pashtun culture. For example, if a
member of the arbakai is killed, "badal" (a
Pashtunwali concept of compensatory justice)
requires revenge; if an ANP patrolman is killed it,s
not the same. "To the local people the ANP
patrolman is just a name. He does not have a face
and does not need to be avenged."


12. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Pressed by polmiloff, Saleh
acknowledged that militia were inappropriate in
areas where arbakei did not traditionally exist,
such as the southern Pashtun provinces, but said
something similar should be created there, at the
local, tribal level. He also said that the arbakei
must be put under "central command and control" to
prevent abuses. The Ministry of Interior made a
tactical error, he asserted, by announcing support
for community police without first working out the
details. "It,s easy to bring the arbakei into a
unified command structure. The MOI should have
designed the structure and presented it to the
international community." (Comment: Despite Saleh,s
comment, it is not at entirely clear how the
arbakei, who are recruited by, and responsible to,
local tribal jirgas, could be brought into a unified
MOI command structure. End comment.)

Comment
--------------


13. (S/Rel Aus and GB) Saleh,s primary theme in this
wide-ranging talk was, "We must not allow confidence
in the regime to erode," and therefore we must
strike at the root causes. While his analysis of
the underlying domestic reaons for recent Taliban
activity was in itself thought- provoking, he was
particularly interested to push for recognition for
what he saw as Pakistan,s support for - or at least,
insufficient prohibition of - the insurgency,s
leadership, training, and financial networks on the
other side of the border. This tracks with Karzai,s
recent public position that the international
community needs to "go to the root of the problem,"
which he defines privately as getting tougher with
Pakistan. Several months back Karzai described to
General Abizaid the fiasco of trying to share intel
with Pakistan in almost exactly the same words as
Saleh used with us. While we recognize that the
view is very different from the other side of the
border (that particular incident is an excellent

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example),Saleh is one of the sharpest, most
perceptive analysts in the Afghan government, and
his views are influential within leadership circles.


14. (S/Rel Aus and GB) On the issue of community
police, there is indeed a difference between arbakei
and the other forms of militia that have been
floated by Karzai recently. In a speech in Baghlan
late last week, Karzai said he does not support
militias, and that he wants to work within the
national police and army to meet the country,s
security needs. That said, we have indications that
in some districts the arbakei are working in close,
positive cooperation with the ANP. We cited an
example in reftel, where arbakei in a remote part of
Logar province are securing the area as part of
their tribal duty, in coordination with the ANP, and
not for pay. But arbakei do not exist in all parts
of the Pashtun area - the Durrani tribes in Helmand,
Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul have never had this
tradition - so their limited use does not change our
view on militias (a broader category than community
policy) as potentially destabilizing and going the
wrong direction. From his public statement last
week as well as his private discussions, Karzai
appears to be coming around to this position. End
comment.


15. (U) S/CT Deputy Coordinator Palmer has cleared
this cable.
NEUMANN