ASSESSING THE PASHTUN BELT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 002841

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO, S/CT, SCA/A,
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76
TREASURY FOR APARAMESWARAN, ABAUKOL
STATE PLEASE PASS USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PREF PTER USAID MASS PINR AF
SUBJECT: ASSESSING THE PASHTUN BELT

REF: ISLAMABAD 11430

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Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (U) This is a joint Embassy Kabul-Embassy
Islamabad-CFC cable.


2. (C) Summary: On June 7, Ambassador Neumann,
Ambassador Crocker, CFC Commanding General Eikenberry,
and their senior staffs met at Embassy Kabul for the
first of a series of planned periodic inter-Embassy
meetings prompted by common recognition that
developments in the Pashtun Belt pose a common and
growing threat to Afghanistan and Pakistan, their
respective futures, and US national interests in both
countries and regionally. The Embassies and CFC plan
a follow-up meeting in September. The Pashtun Belt
sits astride the Afghan-Pakistan border, and parts of
it are largely beyond the control of either
government; these areas provide sanctuary and abundant
recruiting potential that has allowed the Taliban to
target both countries with growing effectiveness. Our
June 7 meeting allowed us to assess the situation in
the Pashtun Belt and to reach some tentative
conclusions about its strategic implications. We also
developed a list of measures that our embassies and
CFC could undertake jointly, Pakistan and Afghanistan
could adopt bilaterally, and Washington agencies
should consider supporting. End Summary.


3. (S) Joint Embassy-CFC Assessment: When OEF swept
the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies into Pak-Afghan
border areas, much of the surviving leadership found
sanctuary on the Pakistan side of the Pashtun Belt,
mostly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) but also in Peshawar to the east and Quetta to
the south. Over time and in safe havens provided by
the terrain and isolation of the Pashtun Belt, the
Taliban have gradually reconstructed their command and
control functions and have found plentiful recruitment
in an easily co-opted and uneducated tribal
population; they have also re-established funding
links, including to foreign and narco-money sources.
The Taliban's reconstitution has been facilitated by
terrain, cross-border tribal bonds, weak governance,
the unprecedented but largely ineffectual entry of
Pakistan military forces into the area, low levels of
investment, and a security environment which
complicates efforts to bring needed economic
development. The environment on the Afghanistan side
of the border is better, given that the GOA has had a
four-year head start with the help of the
international community, but conditions similar to
those in the FATA still prevail in many areas, i.e.,
inadequate governance and law enforcement
capabilities, spotty security protection, and limited
government resources for reconstruction and
development. This permissive environment has not only
allowed the Taliban to grow in strength, but also in
ambition. In Afghanistan, while the situation remains
militarily manageable, the Taliban once again operate
in larger formations. In Pakistan, the Taliban
increasingly threaten even nominal government control
in some FATA agencies by killing moderate officials,
mullahs, government supporters, and Pakistan Army and
Frontier Corps troops. Last year, the Pakistan
military lost more soldiers in the FATA than did
Coalition and Afghan forces combined in Afghanistan.
The GOP recently has refocused its military, political
and economic development efforts to fight al Qaeda and
Pakistani Taliban in the FATA, but this is only one of
several major security issues that the GOP faces,

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including a separatist insurgency in Balochistan, and
sectarian terrorism in Karachi and other parts of
Pakistan. Meanwhile, the Taliban continues to harden
its psychological, political, and military opposition
to our own goals in both countries, and is operating
with growing effectiveness not just in Kandahar,
Oruzgan, Zabul and Helmand, but also in North and
South Waziristan.


5. (S) Strategic Implications: While failure of the
two governments to eliminate safe havens for the
Taliban and other anti-coalition militia in the
Pashtun Belt threatens the success of the OEF campaign
in Afghanistan, Pakistan Army operational coordination
with Coalition and Afghan forces has been significant.
For example, during the recent CFC-A Operation
Mountain Lion, Pakistani blocking maneuvers in the
border area prevented insurgents from reaching their
traditional sanctuaries and frontier safe havens.
However, until Pakistan is successful in disrupting
the resident senior Taliban leadership, it will be
difficult to defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan. At
a minimum, we will need to extend not just our time on
the ground in Afghanistan but also our resource
expenditures and our expectations for the pace and
development of governance. If unchecked, trends in
the FATA could challenge Pakistan's long-term
stability more broadly, with attendant consequences
for U.S. national security. Finally, while Pakistan
has been a key partner in the campaign against Al
Qaeda and other "foreign fighters" on its territory,
the largely ungoverned spaces on its side of the
Pashtun Belt pose a potential strategic threat to the
United States as they threaten to degenerate into a
permissive environment for international terrorism
analogous to the Afghan environment that triggered the
9/11 attacks and the subsequent OEF intervention in
Afghanistan. Pakistan's leadership is very aware and
deeply concerned about this threat, but has so far
exhibited little ability to harness its resources and
tactics to meet the challenge of stabilizing the FATA.


6. (S) Way Forward: Leaders in both capitals
acknowledge that they share a common enemy in the
Pashtun Belt and that this threat cannot be addressed
through military means alone. Pakistan's new FATA
strategy (reftel) recognizes the solution must also
include governance and economic development. However,
both Pakistan and Afghanistan will require substantial
resources to effectively implement this multi-pronged
strategy. Given the significant U.S. interests at
stake, it would be prudent to review U.S. assistance --
diplomatic, military, and economic -- and consider
additional steps we can take to support both
countries' respective efforts and coordinate our work
on both sides of the border. Both governments
acknowledge that an effective approach to the Pashtun
Belt will require coordinated action by Pakistan and
Afghanistan.


7. (S) Working on an embassy-embassy basis, there are
several steps we are jointly considering and will
refine in our next meeting in September in Islamabad.
Among them:

- Where possible, coordinate and link our
respective assistance programs in the Pashtun
Belt across all USG agencies, particularly, roads
but also smaller infrastructure so that there is
a better cross-border balance of assistance
inside discrete tribal areas.


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- Use USG resources to catalyze contributions from
other donors and the two host nations.

- Address asymmetries in size and types of USG
assistance for each country.

- Encourage expanded government-government ties,
including contacts among respective National
Security Advisors, trade officials and
legislators.

- Where some third party impetus is needed,
consider "tri-lateralizing" fora along lines of
the successful Tripartite Military Commission.
The two embassies have agreed to explore with the
GOP and GOA the possibility of a joint briefing
on USG assistance and road building in the border
areas which we would offer under the auspices of
the Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Economic Committee
(JEC). Other areas of possible trilateral
engagement under the JEC include Pak-Afghan trade
and economic cooperation, OPIC/TDA programs,
ROZs, and measures to attract investment to
Afghanistan and Pakistan.

- Other econ/trade possibilities: develop
communication links from Pakistan to Afghanistan
to reduce international telecom costs; U.S.
assistance to boost Pak-Afghan and regional
trade, including transit trade, to encourage
trade via Pakistan vice Iran; coordinate design
of Gwadar Port road and rail links to reduce
time/cost of transport to Kabul; and promote
energy discussions, including support for non-
Iran pipeline options and for the planned
Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan electricity
transmission line.

- Both embassies agreed to look at expanding the
U.S. Geological Service survey of mineral
resources, which is being carried out from
Kandahar, to both sides of the border. This
would lay the groundwork for joint
exploration/development.

- Consider bilateral ties between FATA and
neighboring Afghan Provinces at Governor level
(Note: given deep sensitivities in both
governments, now is not the time to encourage
tribal and other unofficial linkages that might
be perceived as blurring the legitimacy of the
existing border.)

- Increase communication between counter-narcotics
officials (with the eventual goal of undertaking
joint cross-border operations). DEA could set up
frequent meetings between officials of each
country's vetted unit (ANF/SIC and NIU),to
include helping them develop means of
communication. Also, DEA and NAS will set up a
meeting in a neutral location, such as Dubai,
between the senior CN official from each of the
two countries.

- Embassies are encouraging refugee camp closures
on schedule as some refugee settlements in
Pakistan pose a criminal and terrorist threat.

- Encourage GOA public recognition of the $250
million in GOP assistance pledged to Afghanistan
(of which approximately $105 million has been
spent on roads, railway studies, trucks/buses,

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and health facilities).

- Brief President Karzai on road construction and
other development activities we are undertaking
on both sides of the border; objective would be
to obtain buy-in and stimulate senior-level
interest in closer cross-border cooperation.

There is considerable scope for progress here and we
will pursue it aggressively; but there are limits to
what can be achieved through creativity and energy in
the field, beyond which Washington's role will be
critical. Clearly there is a need for greater
reconstruction and development assistance to
facilitate the transformation of the Pashtun Belt and
to provide economic prospects for its inhabitants that
make Taliban ideology unattractive. Additionally,
greater political pressure must be brought to bear on
both governments to keep their disputes out of the
media and project an image of partnership in pursuit
of mutual interests in the Pashtun belt.


8. (S) Conclusion: We must be prepared at the
national level to consider how to adapt to changes in
the strategic environment here; failure to do so risks
meeting goals that are out-dated and no longer
sufficient to satisfy national objectives. This
ambitious vision requires a significant investment,
including resources sufficient to meet emerging
threats with a robust response. It projects
Afghanistan and Pakistan as reliable and stable
partners over the long term and as participants and
proponents for greater South-Central Asian economic
and security cooperation.
NEUMANN