Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL2827
2006-06-22 06:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

DIAG CHAIRMAN OUTLINES NEEDED STEPS BY GOA

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER ASEC AF 
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VZCZCXRO6902
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #2827/01 1730602
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220602Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0974
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2625
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2775
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6072
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1450
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002827 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, SCA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL
REL NATO/ISAF/AS/NZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC AF
SUBJECT: DIAG CHAIRMAN OUTLINES NEEDED STEPS BY GOA
LEADERSHIP

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002827

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, SCA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL
REL NATO/ISAF/AS/NZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC AF
SUBJECT: DIAG CHAIRMAN OUTLINES NEEDED STEPS BY GOA
LEADERSHIP

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) At the June 16 DIAG Forum, Chairman Nuristani
said he recognized that the DIAG process was in
serious difficulty. He outlined several points on
which action needed to be taken, either by the
international community or, in more cases, by
elements of the GOA.


2. (C) Nuristani started by stating his agreement
with the international community view, expressed
most strongly by Japanese Ambassador Okuda, that
President Karzai has not up till now made DIAG a
serious issue. As a result, GoA ministries have
offered only token support. Nuristani said that
President Karzai needs to make a strong public
statement in support of DIAG, and that he should
hold ministers accountable for its implementation.
He said the DIAG Commission has submitted a letter
to the President,s office and hope for an answer
after Karzai has returned from China. (Note:
Ambassador Okuda has been pressing for a
Presidential statement for some time, adding that it
must be made in advance of the Tokyo Conference in
order for the conference to have any chance of
success. End note.)


3. (C) Secondly, Nuristani noted that several
members of Parliament have either come out against
DIAG or at least expressed skepticism with the
process. He noted a statement by Meshrano Jirga
Speaker Mojadidi several weeks ago criticizing DIAG.
He said that the GOA needs to mount an information
campaign to educate MPs, and also needs to convince
Mojadidi to retract his statement.


4. (C) Nuristani (who is also Deputy Minister of
Defense) expressed his concern with Karzai,s
apparent support for community police/ tribal
militias, which he noted ran counter to the DIAG
process and has serious command and control
implications. He said that the President needs to
clarify what actions have been taken in this regard
and why they are necessary, in a public information
campaign targeting audiences ranging from GOA
ministries to the international community to the
Afghan people.


5. (C) Finally, noting that DIAG has reached a
serious deadlock in Kapisa province, with the
Negotiated Compliance Phase about to expire, he said
the Afghan National Security Council needs to
determine a strong course of action required for the
Enforced Compliance Phase. He noted that the
willpower and leadership of the GOA with regard to
the DIAG program are at stake.


6. (C) UNAMA DSRSG Alexander responded to the
Chairman,s remarks saying that his honesty was most
welcome. He expressed the consensus of the
international representatives in saying that while
DIAG is facing serious difficulties (see septel),we
must continue to press ahead - while realizing that
the road will be longer and harder than originally
anticipated.

KABUL 00002827 002 OF 002



Comment
--------------


7. (C) DIAG has currently lost momentum. Although
Nuristani shares the concerns of the international
community, it is by no means certain that he will be
able to convince the President and GOA leadership to
take the steps described above. It will be harder
still to convince people around the country to carry
out meaningful DIAG activities when there are
concerns about security. The feeling of frustration
becomes more palpable with each DIAG meeting. Given
the lack of progress on the ground, it remains an
open question whether, absent effective action on
the part of the GOA, even Karzai,s scheduled
participation in Tokyo will be enough to convince
some donors to recommit to the program.


8. (C) It is also important to realize that DIAG now
faces two issues. One is longstanding: GOA
unwillingness to use strong political pressure to
force former commanders, including senior GOA
officials, to disarm. The newer element is the
unease generated by the security situation in the
south, the use of tribal elements for security, and
the resulting pressure in the north and west of the
country to keep their arms if southern Pushtuns are
armed or re-armed. Getting a firm handle on the
latter issue may be a prerequisite to dealing with
the former.
NEUMANN