Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL2687
2006-06-13 02:30:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRT/PAKTIKA PAKTITA FOUR DISTRICTS IN

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER AF 
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VZCZCXRO6384
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #2687/01 1640230
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 130230Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0802
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2602
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2756
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6038
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1427
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 002687 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE, SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
REL NATO/AU/NZ/ISAF

E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT/PAKTIKA PAKTITA FOUR DISTRICTS IN
PAKTIKA AN EARLY JUNE ASSESSMEN

KABUL 00002687 001.2 OF 004


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 002687

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE, SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
REL NATO/AU/NZ/ISAF

E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT/PAKTIKA PAKTITA FOUR DISTRICTS IN
PAKTIKA AN EARLY JUNE ASSESSMEN

KABUL 00002687 001.2 OF 004



1. (SBU) SUMMARY: An early June journey to and
assessment of four districts in western Paktika
ka
revealed districts with generally little
infrastructure and little support from the central
government. Despite certain similarities, these
districts differ in their support for the government
and their ability to stand up to insurgent
activities. The one thing they all have in common
is a need for more security from the Afghan
government. END SUMMARY.



2. (SBU) In the first week of June, PRT Sharana
conducted a four day overland trip to four of
Paktikas 23 districts. The PRTs Project team,
Information Officer, Operations Officer, PRT
Engineer, and DOS representative visited the western
districts of Khair Kot, Shaklabad, Jani Khel, and
Bak Khel, where they met with local leaders,
assessed the security situation and viewed ongoing
projects. The districts clustered on or near the
western border of Paktika Province were all
relatively poor and remote. The security situation
and perception of the Afghan government in the
districts varied from very poor in some districts to
o
relatively good in others.

Khair Khot District


3. (SBU) Khair Khot is one of Paktikas
westernmost districts and borders insurgent troubled
districts of Ghazni province. The district has 25
police, 19 AK 47 rifles, 45 to 60 rounds of
ammunition per weapon, no radios, one Thuraya phone,
and only one police vehicle, a Toyota pickup.
Despite these police equipment shortages, Khair
Kots district commissioner, Mohammad Hashim Qani,
reported that there were few security problems in
the district. The people are apparently happy with
projects under construction in Khair Khot. The
Afghan Stabilization Program (ASP) is completing a
government district center building and has already
finished a district communications building which
will bring telephone and internet service into the
district. The Coalition has funded a cobblestone

road and USAID is finishing the reconstruction of a
primary health care clinic in the district center.
Through these projects ASP, USAID, and the military
y
have employed large numbers of local people.
(Comment: The projects and the employment related to
them likely have had a positive effect on security
and the local peoples attitude toward the present
Afghan government. The recent stationing of a large
(approximately battalion sized) Afghan National Army
(ANA) presence at Khair Khot castle has also likely
significantly contributed to the positive perception
of security in Khair Khot. End Comment)

Shaklabad District


4. (SBU) Shaklabad district center, approximately
a one hour drive southeast of Khair Khot over
unimproved dirt roads, has few selling points. It

KABUL 00002687 002.2 OF 004


is a very small crossroads mud building village of
perhaps 200 people. Located on a desiccated
treeless plain with little or no agriculture other
than animal herding, Shaklabad appears to be one of
Paktikas poorest districts. The chief of police,
Mohammad Khan, stated that unemployment was very
high and that nearly all disposable income was
s
generated by local men working in Pakistan or Iran.
The district has 15 police, 15 Hungarian AK 47
rifles, 15 to 20 rounds of ammunition per weapon, no
radios, one Thuraya phone, and no vehicles for the
police or district commissioner. The police chief
and district commissioner are the only Afghan
government officials in the district. The police
chief reported few security problems but admitted
his range of influence was limited to the immediate
vicinity of the district center due to a lack of
vehicles. With only two projects in the district, a
small Coalition-funded police building in the
district center and an eight room USAID school
outside the town, Shaklabad has little
infrastructure. The reach of the Afghan government
and its security forces in Shaklabad is very
limited. (Comment: It is likely that Shaklabads
real security situation in relationship to anti-
government forces is unknown to the police. The
general population of Shaklabad at this point seems
relatively unaffected by the Afghan government.
However, it also does not appear to be overly
influenced by anti-government elements. End Comment)

Jani Khel


5. (SBU) Jani Khel, located due south of Khair
Khot and bordering Ghazni province on the west and
Shaklabad district on the east, is a district
gripped by fear of the Taliban. Remote from Afghan
or coalition forces and close to Ghaznis troubled
southeastern districts, Jani Khel presents a real
challenge to the Afghan government and its security
forces. The district had 15 police until five quit
in the last week of May after being threatened by
local mullahs. Mullahs in Jani Khel are actively
preaching that the police are helping the coalition
and that the coalition and the Karzai government are
anti-Islamic. With only 10 policemen, 20 AK 47
rifles, 20 to 30 rounds of ammunition per weapon, no
radios, one Thuraya phone, and no operational
vehicles, Police Chief Mohammad Talib admits that he
is overwhelmed. The Governor has told him to hire
more police but he claims no one from the district
will join the police force. The district
commissioner was recently transferred and has not
been replaced. This leaves the chief of police as
the sole representative of the Afghan government in
the district. Talib stated that he believed around
80 percent of the people in the district did not
support the government. This is not because the
people dislike the government but rather that they
do not believe the government is strong enough to
protect them. The people know that the police are
unable to protect them from the Taliban so they
cooperate with the Taliban out of fear of being
harmed. Twenty two of 23 schools in the district are
reported to have closed in the last week due to

KABUL 00002687 003.2 OF 004


Taliban threats against teachers and students. The
police chief pointed out that the district elders
have made only one request of him - additional
security. They want more police and they want ANA
stationed in the district. There is basically no
government infrastructure in Jani Khel. There is
only one project in the district, a cobblestone road
funded by the U.S. military, and even this is
contentious. However, work has continued on the
road, likely because it employs many local men.

Bak Khel


6. (SBU) Bak Khel, located approximately one
hour due east of Khair Khot over very difficult
unimproved roads, is one of four unofficial
districts in Paktika. As such it does not have a
district commissioner. The district has 17 police,
17 Hungarian AK 47 rifles, 45 to 60 rounds of
ammunition per weapon, 1 Thuraya phone, no
operational vehicles and the police have not been
paid in five months. Bak Khel also has no government
infrastructure other than a recently renovated small
mud building housing a primary care clinic and an
eight room primary school, both USAID projects. The
police chief, Haji Nasurla, stated that security was
good, that the people were cooperating and keeping
the peace. Haji Nasurla and all of his police are
from Bak Khel and all are from the Kasir Khel tribe.
Haji Nasurla is a tribal elder as well as police
chief and this unity, along with the fact that Bak
Khel district is predominately populated by people
from the Kasir Khel tribe, may account for the lack
of security problems and lack of Taliban influence
in the district. The people were very interested
in seeing Coalition troops and the police chief said
that it had been quite a long time since any
Coalition forces had visited Bak Khel. The people
of the area were happy about the new school and were
extremely interested in educating their children.
The contractor reported having no difficulties with
security and the school will likely be finished as
scheduled. (Comment: The strong natural leadership
evident in Haji Nasurla and the tribal unity of the
people of Bak Khel appear to explain why Bak Khel
has maintained security despite the lack of
government investment, security forces, and
attention. End Comment)


7. (SBU) Comment: These districts have one thing
in common: they all need security so they can begin
the development process, and so they can begin to
appreciate their new government. In Khair Khot,
Afghan government influence is relatively high due
to a large government investment in troops and
projects. In Shaklabad there is little government
influence but also little overt evidence of
insurgent presence. Remote, poor, and with a widely
scattered population, Shaklabad likely serves as a
transit area for anti-government elements but
nothing more. Jani Khel is home to an insurgent
population and will remain so until they are
displaced by another stronger element - either
coalition or Afghan government. Baki Khel is an
example of an older style area, where security is
maintained by the unity of the people and the

KABUL 00002687 004.2 OF 004


traditional tribal structures of this district
populated largely by a single tribe. Insurgents
likely do not use the area, as outsiders are obvious
to and are not tolerated by the traditional forces
now re-branded as Afghan National Police. Paktika
is a poor, large, remote, and undeveloped province.
The extreme poverty of the districts is
unfortunately also reflected in most of the district
government and police forces. In the nearly five
years since the Taliban were removed from power in
Afghanistan, almost nothing has been done for the
people in many parts of Paktika. If the government
is to counter Taliban influence they must improve
security and with it the lives of the people of
Paktika. Until security is gained on the
governments terms there will be little development,
education, or advancement of any kind in Paktika.

NEUMANN