Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL2425
2006-05-29 12:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRT-QALAT - GOVERNOR ARMAN'S FIRST YEAR IN ZABUL:

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER ASEC SNAR KCRS AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0353
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #2425/01 1491243
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 291243Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0497
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0246
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2730
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2579
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6001
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1401
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASH DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 002425 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO (DAS JGASTRIGHT),SA/A, S/CR, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
OSD FOR BREZEZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC SNAR KCRS AF
SUBJECT: PRT-QALAT - GOVERNOR ARMAN'S FIRST YEAR IN ZABUL:
STRONG LEADERSHIP AND PROGRESS, BUT ALSO FRUSTRATION

KABUL 00002425 001.3 OF 005


Classified By: DCM RICHARD NORLAND FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 002425

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO (DAS JGASTRIGHT),SA/A, S/CR, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
OSD FOR BREZEZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC SNAR KCRS AF
SUBJECT: PRT-QALAT - GOVERNOR ARMAN'S FIRST YEAR IN ZABUL:
STRONG LEADERSHIP AND PROGRESS, BUT ALSO FRUSTRATION

KABUL 00002425 001.3 OF 005


Classified By: DCM RICHARD NORLAND FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (U) SUMMARY: Governor Arman has been a strong governor
and, overall, Zabul Province has improved over the past year.
However, as he well realizes, security and high-level visits
are not enough for effective government, and the GoA still
lacks the ability to provide goods and services to its
citizens here, especially in the more remote districts not on
the Ring Road. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) ZABUL PROVINCE BACKGROUND: Zabul Province is poor
and backwards even by Afghan standards. It is located in
southeastern Afghanistan, and is bordered by Helmand,
Uruzgan, Ghazni and Paktika Provinces. It also has a 161 km
border with Pakistan. The population estimates range from
258,000 (TF Warrior) up to 444,585 (World News),of whom an
estimated 30,000 live in the capital of Qalat. There were
102,000 voters registered for the September 2005 elections.
The literacy rate is reportedly 15 percent, which is much
higher than provincial officials have indicated to the
Provincial Reconstruction Team State Representative (PRTOff).
The size is almost 7,000 square miles. The province has
remained troublesome since the fall of the Taliban in late
2001 and Governor Arman came here as governor in March 2005.


3. (U) ARMAN'S APPROACH TO GOVERNMENT: Arman is a strong
governor and has served as a deputy governor, National
Security Council (NSC) staff member and mujahideen commander.
He is an engineer by training. Like most GoA officials
here, he views Zabul as more ignorant and backwards than the

rest of the country.


4. (U) While he blames Pakistan for most of the Taliban
problems here (as do all our Afghan interlocutors),Governor
Arman is objective and understands that lack of reach of the
GoA is a separate, albeit related, problem from the Taliban
threat. He admits that the GoA is weak out in the districts.
He is concerned about its weakness becoming a
self-fulfilling prophecy, if GoA forces hunker down in
district centers, and do not spread out to encounter and
oppose the Taliban. As he phrases it, if the Taliban come to
a house to demand something, it is either because the GoA is
weak there and not providing security or else because that
household is pro-Taliban. However, he sees three
simultaneous steps as being necessary: in addition to
spreading out forces, the GoA must also be providing food or
other assistance to villagers, and establishing a
relationship with them.


5. (C) He openly admits that corruption pervades the GoA
and that he is suspicious of most Afghans. Concerning drugs
(septel),he is proud of resisting pressure from Kabul to
send all large drug seizures to the capital. The procedures,
now implemented under the new law, are to send only forensic
samples to Kabul and burn the rest of the seizure locally,
which he says Kabul officials do not like since they can no
longer steal the seized drugs and resell them. PRTOff has
observed him at a shura in Shamulzai and at a meeting with
Khaki Afghan elders where he appeared visibly angry, accusing
them of collaborating with the Taliban, and asking why he
should do anything at all for them and their districts.


6. (U) The US notion of "separation of church and state"

KABUL 00002425 002.3 OF 005


is virtually unknown here and would be incomprehensible to
most Afghans. Governor Arman is personally very devout, and
many of his speeches stress the points that the GoA is an
Islamic republic and that education is in accordance with
Islam and the Koran -- the bottom line being that the Taliban
are wrong and not following Islam correctly.


7. (C) WORKING RELATIONSHIPS: President Karzai calls Arman
fairly frequently and occasionally summons him to Kabul. The
Governor argues his case directly with President Karzai, if
he is not satisfied with the Ministry of Interior (MoI)
(which has authority over the provincial governors). During
his recent meetings in Kabul to address Afghan National
Police (ANP) pay arrears of four months, he implicitly
threatened to resign, stating he would not go back to Zabul
without anything for his ANP officers. That MoI/National
Security Council (NSC) meeting resulted in a partial fix of
payment of two months, back pay for the ANP officers in the
provinces bordering Pakistan.


8. (C) Governor Arman cultivates excellent relationships
with the PRT and maneuver battalion. He strongly supports
Coalition Forces (CF),both philosophically and for the
development and assistance that they bring to Zabul. He is
very concerned about International Security Assistance
Force's (ISAF's) taking over the maneuver battalion. He
fears they will be more defensive-oriented, and not go out
actively looking for the Taliban in districts like Day Cho
Pan.


9. (C) He is cordial to the members of the Provincial
Council (PC),but does not have much faith in them.
(Comment: Objectively, we concur. End Comment.) At one
point, he was considering undercutting them by working with
select village and district elders, but PRTOff and others
recommended against that since the PC members were, after
all, democratically elected.


10. (C) His relationships with the various directors run
the gamut. On one hand, Arman is very pleased with the new
Director of Courts, Judge Qasim, for trying to keep judges
and prosecutors honest. He has shown his support by inviting
Judge Qasim to help officiate or make speeches at high-level
public meetings and ceremonies. (Note: The judge advised
PRTOff recently that he had personally transferred two judges
he felt were dishonest; as is usual, no one was fired, but
they were transferred to other districts where they do not
have any influence. End Note.) On the other hand, the
Governor has repeatedly expressed his desire to see the
Director of Prosecutors removed. Among other things, Arman
believes the Director released a Taliban, who had killed a
female teacher and sought bribes from prisoners in order to
be released.


11. (U) SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS: Governor Arman believes
that overall the Taliban is on the run, but has repeatedly
pushed his idea for 200 "auxiliary" police in each district
for the next year or two; he claims they would not degenerate
into militias. Arman respects Colonel Rizak, the ANA kandak
commander for the province, as both a mullah and commander
(Rizak's nickname is "the fighting mullah," as a mullah who
joined the mujahideen and then became an ANA commander).
Nevertheless, Arman does not hesitate to offer his own ideas

KABUL 00002425 003.3 OF 005


on how to improve district security, which combine military
and political approaches. Most are very practical, like
having sub-district centers in remote, large districts, and
having additional patrols and checkpoints along known Taliban
infiltration routes.


12. (C) PERSONNEL ISSUES: Governor Arman has replaced
district governors in Day Cho Pan, Mizan, Shajoy, Shinkay,
Shamulzai, Atghar, Arghandab and Suri. He has chastised the
Nabahar district governor for spending too much time in Qalat
and not enough in his district. (Note: Suri and Nabahar are
not yet officially recognized as separate districts of Zabul.
End Note.) He has tried to get local input on appointments,
using both a carrot and stick approach. If he believes the
elders are supportive of the GoA, he will listen to their
preferences. If he believes they are dealing with the
Taliban, he will read them the riot act, but hint that, if
they become supportive of the GoA, he may later replace the
district governor with someone preferred by the district
elders.


13. (C) Arman prefers to move carefully and deliberately
when having officials replaced in order to avoid exacerbating
problems. When the previous provincial chief of police (CoP)
was reassigned last December, the MoI intended to replace him
with an allegedly dishonest officer. The Governor could not
block the appointment, but secured an agreement from
President Karzai that the individual would come by himself,
without bringing any cronies with him as his staff. As a
result, the individual subsequently declined the appointment,
and the Afghan Highway Police (AHP) Chief between Kandahar
and Ghazni, General Nabi, became the CoP. He has proven to
be an excellent CoP and, in fact, the Governor has lately
threatened to resign if General Nabi is replaced. Arman
moved a trusted deputy to the Afghan National Border Police
(ANBP) in Zanjshir on the Pakistani border several months
before having the chief there replaced (Chief Sbeen, whose
replacement was one of our PSA recommendations). The
Governor encountered resistance to this change, as the ANBP
is not actually under his control, but he somehow made it
stick.


14. (U) Arman has complained that he lacks direct authority
over the directors, who report to their respective ministers
in Kabul. He also believes strongly that he and other
governors should have operational control over the Afghan
Highway Police (AHP) and ANBP forces that are stationed
within their provinces.


15. (U) NASIR-SHAMULZAI LAND DISPUTE: The Governor has been
trying to broker an agreement between the Nasir and the
Shamulzai tribes. The Shamulzai took over the Nasirs' land
when the latter fled to Pakistan. The Nasirs (about 15,000
people) want to leave Pakistan and return to their land
which, legally, they have the stronger claim on. However, to
avoid future bloodshed, the Governor wants both sides to
negotiate and agree themselves to a resolution, rather than
refer the case to the Supreme Court.


16. (U) FRUSTRATIONS: The Governor's biggest frustration is
the lack of reach by the GoA. Even if the Taliban did not
exist, there would still be a virtual vacuum of GoA authority
and provision of services once off the Ring Road. Arman

KABUL 00002425 004.3 OF 005


values visits to the districts to show support and establish
a relationship, but also realizes that visits need to be
followed up by deliverables of goods and services to enhance
GoA authority.


17. (U) Governor Arman is also frustrated by the lack of a
permanent UN presence, which he believes is necessary to
convince NGOs that the province is safe enough for their
operations. As a result of the security reputation of Zabul,
it is difficult to hire PRT contractors in some districts and
UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS) projects have virtually
come to a standstill. The Governor and the PRT have been
trying since October to convince the UN to establish a
permanent presence in Qalat. (Note: They already have a
compound here. End Note.) After that, he would like to have
a conference of NGOs in order to convince them to establish a
presence in Zabul.


18. (U) SOME PROGRESS: The Governor noted that, when he
first assumed office, he visited Shinkay District. He met
with only eight people and they covered their faces to avoid
being seen talking with him. Recently, Shinkay hosted a
large shura with representatives from several southern
districts and warmly greeted Arman, along with five GoA
ministers and LTG Eikenberry. Arman also notes the presence
today along the border of 70-80 ANBP officers, which did not
exist a year ago. He is also proud of his weekly
inter-agency security meetings and believes they would be a
useful model for neighboring provinces to adopt. Zabul now
leads by far in drug seizures (septel),which Governor Arman
has made a priority. However, he laments that Kabul does not
acknowledge just how much contraband has been seized here or
the fact that provincial officials have received threats from
drug traffickers as a result.


19. (U) In the Governor's estimation, the Ring Road is 80
percent safe and most of the districts in the province are
now safe. He is very proud of high-level visits as they
demonstrate the relative safety of the province, plus GoA
interest in the province. Since last October, President
Karzai and five ministers have visited Zabul, the first ever
high-level GoA visits to the province. Ambassador Neumann,
LTG Eikenberry, and numerous other US and CF officials have
also visited Qalat.


20. (U) VISION FOR THE FUTURE: The Governor's emphasis is
on roads. His master plan for the next few years, which is
being implemented through the PRT,s master CERP plan, is to
have a gravel road loop north and west from the Ring Road in
Shajoy, through Khaki Afghan and Arghandab, and then
intersect with the Mizan Road (already constructed) which
connects back to the Ring Road in Qalat. In the southern
part of the province, the master plan is to extend the gravel
road from the Ring Road to Shinkay (already constructed)
through Shamulzai to the Pakistani border at Zanjshir. That
would allow commercial trucking from Pakistan to enter
directly at Zanjshir, rather than having to go from Quetta to
Spin Boldak and then through Kandahar in order to get on the
Ring Road to Qalat and points north, such as Ghazni and Kabul.


21. (C) COMMENT: Arman has improved Zabul, although serious
challenges remain. The PRT expects the Governor to
ultimately continue on to a higher office, either the

KABUL 00002425 005.3 OF 005


governorship of a larger province or a cabinet appointment.
There had been some speculation he would be reassigned
shortly, but now we are hearing that he will remain in Zabul
following the next shuffle of governors, which is a good
thing for the province. END COMMENT.


22. (U) Dushanbe minimized considered.

NEUMANN
NEUMANN