PRT/TARIN KOWT: GOVERNOR MONIB'S TENUOUS GRASP ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 002178

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC AF
SUBJECT: PRT/TARIN KOWT: GOVERNOR MONIB'S TENUOUS GRASP ON
URUZGAN PROVINCE

REF: KABUL 1211

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The security situation in Afghanistan's Uruzgan
province remains acute seven weeks after the arrival of a new
governor. Unhelpful interference by the previous governor,
stepped up Taliban activity, and police forces operating
outside governmental authority impede Governor Monib's
ability to establish control. Monib faces an uphill battle
in winning support from Uruzgan's competing tribes, some of
which seek to undermine him in their jockeying for dominance.
Unable to call upon his security forces or tribal allies,
Monib has limited options and relies heavily on his new NDS
chief and coalition forces. In the past, Taliban activities
were generally confined to remote areas of Uruzgan, but
recently the insurgents have begun operating in larger towns,
perhaps even Tarin Kowt. Monib's near-term burden will become
heavier now that Gizab district (formerly part of Dai-Kundi
province) is part of Uruzgan, unless the plan includes a
permanent security presence in Gizab. Ambassador Neumann is
pressing, and will continue to press President Karzai to
support Monib and keep the former Governor under control.


2. (C) Over the next few weeks, a range of Coalition and
Afghan National Army (ANA) operations coupled with Afghan
National Police (ANP) activity will begin, and will continue
for several months. These operations, including Operation
Mountain Thrust, should significantly diminish insurgent
activity in Uruzgan and with it national and provincial
government anxiety about security in the south. CFC military
operations will be coupled with immediate follow-on
reconstruction and development projects, which CFC and
Embassy believe are the critical factors leading to
longer-term stability in volatile provinces such as Uruzgan.
These measures are laid out in paragraphs 11-12 below. Delays
in funding Afghan Police reform and a lack of available
reconstruction resources for Afghanistan, however, could
weaken the overall effect we can achieve in Uruzgan. END
SUMMARY.

NEW GOVERNOR HAS NOT CONSOLIDATED HIS AUTHORITY
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3. (C) Abdul Hakim Monib took office as governor of Uruzgan
province in southern Afghanistan on March 18 (reftel),and
has impressed us with his competence and administrative
skills. But Monib is an outsider who lacks a local power
base. He has been courting leaders of Uruzgan's major tribes
seeking allies to secure his legitimacy, but they are looking
for patronage in return. It appears that some of the power
tribes (Populzai and Barakzai) are working to undermine him,
and that he may not be getting much support from Kabul.

THE POPULZAI - A DESTABILIZING FORCE
--------------

4. (S) The Populzai--tribe of President Karzai and former
Governor Jan Mohammed--appeared to cooperate with Monib in
his first few weeks, as Jan Mohammed orchestrated a smooth
transfer to the new governor. In recent days, we have heard
from three independent sources that Jan Mohammed, now living
in Kabul but with occasional trips to Uruzgan and Kandahar,

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is actively stirring unrest in the region of Tarin Kowt, the
provincial capital. The Populzai are strongest in Tarin Kowt
and its surrounding villages, extending into southern
Deh-Rawod and Chora districts to the west and east. We
believe that Jan Mohammed is urging his tribal supporters to
finish harvesting the current poppy crop and then move toward
Tarin Kowt to cause trouble for coalition forces and the
provincial government. He reportedly is in indirect contact
with Taliban elements in order to coordinate activities. The
goal is to demonstrate that Governor Monib is unable to
govern Uruzgan, in the hope that Karzai will reinstate Jan
Mohammed as governor or appoint him to an ad hoc position
such as security chief. Jan Mohammed reportedly retains
substantial influence with some in Karzai's inner circle,
lubricated with poppy profits. While the Populzai are not
Taliban supporters (and have been fierce Taliban opponents in
the past) they certainly have the contacts with the local
Taliban structures to forge an alliance of convenience, as
well as the resources to generate instability on their own.
Ambassador Neumann has raised with President Karzai, and
separately with NSA Rassoul, the need to control Jan
Mohammed. Karzai has great (and we believe excessive) trust
in Jan Mohammed. We will keep after this from Kabul.


5. (S) Governor Monib once confided to us that Afghan
Highway Police (AHP) Chief Col. Matiollah was the only local
leader whom he trusted, but that trust is slipping.
Matiollah--cousin to Jan Mohammed--is a fighter with a
reputation for cruelty and bravery. The 300-strong Highway
Police force is essentially his semi-reintegrated militia
unit, dominated by his Populzai kin. While the AHP are not
effective at patrolling Uruzgan's roads, they are seasoned
anti-Taliban fighters. The Governor's suspicions of
Matiollah were kindled not only by reports of Jan Mohammed's
fomenting opposition to his government, but also by events
surrounding a firefight that Australian Special Forces had
with insurgents in the Baluci Pass, seven miles north of
Tarin Kowt, on 30 April. This was part of a series of
incidents marking the Taliban's intent to move closer to, and
into, Tarin Kowt. Matiollah and his AHP responded in support
of the Aussies, but the next day Matiollah had contradictory
stories and Gov. Monib realized that he had fabricated some
events. Monib told us on May 3 that he still needs Matiollah
but no longer trusts him fully.

BARAKZAI MAY BE WORKING AGAINST COALITION
--------------

6. (C) Monib has even greater misgivings about the loyalties
of Rozi Khan, Chief of the ANP police force. In early March,
before Monib took office, Rozi Khan spoke frequently with
Monib by telephone and formed what appeared to be a
mutually-beneficial alliance. Khan is a leader of the large
Barakzai tribe that was marginalized during the Populzai
administration of Jan Mohammed. So an alliance with the new
governor would both provide Governor Monib with a strong ally
and elevate the Barakzai to a dominant position. That
alliance is now in tatters. We are receiving increasingly
credible reports that Rozi Khan is behind recent, specific
attacks/threats to coalition forces. He no longer sends his
ANP men to the PRT's MPAT training or to the Kandahar
Regional Training Center, and his men no longer staff the
Tarin Kowt checkpoint that they agreed to set up last month
under the governor's new security plan. One source reports
that Khan has but two dozen actual policemen, while he
pockets the salaries of the other 300 that he is allotted.

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Monib now sends Rozi Khan out of the room before discussing
sensitive topics. At this point, Rozi Khan and the ANP are
not truly under government control. We have heard that
President Karzai is poised to dispatch 200 new ANP police
under a new commander, Col. Qassam of Paktia, to replace Rozi
Khan in the coming days. If true, this is welcome news. The
Ambassador has pressed for and received assurances from the
Minister of Interior that Rozi Khan will shortly be replaced.
We will press hard to make these assurances a reality.

TALIBAN APPROACHING TARIN KOWT
--------------

7. (S) In the past, overt Taliban activities were generally
confined to specific (and largely inaccessible) areas in
Uruzgan: Caher-Cineh district, Deh-Rawod district
(particularly west of the Helmand River),the Mirabad Valley
in Chora, etc. But in recent weeks the insurgents have
become bolder, maneuvering in larger units, and operating in
larger towns, including Chora and now Tarin Kowt. Coalition
forces have been involved in a dozen combat actions in the
past month on the road from Tarin Kowt to Chora, including a
PRT convoy engaged in a brief firefight on April 14. The PRT
escorted the new Chora District Chief to his job on April 9,
part of Gov. Monib's effort to stabilize that area. While
the new chief remains alive and on the job, he has only ten
policemen and cannot confront the Taliban in the area. His
survival may well be a result of his reaching an
accommodation with the insurgents. Chora illustrates the
dynamics behind the Taliban activity: partly a function of
the annual spring campaign and partly rooted in local tribal
conflicts exacerbated by the change in governor, the Taliban
coerce local populations, winning if not enthusiastic
support, then at least grudging blind-eye collaboration.
Achieving this state of control in Chora has allowed the
insurgents to stage southwards towards Tarin Kowt.


8. (S) The recent up-tick in insurgent activities near the
Baluci Pass (the main chokepoint on the road from Tarin Kowt
northward to Chora and Gizab districts) and the May 1 suicide
vehicle (SVBIED) attack on a PRT convoy in Tarin Kowt
demonstrated the Taliban's intent to operate in what was,
until recently, Uruzgan's most secure area. The Governor's
reaction to the SVBIED was aggressive but unworkable: he
hoped to cordon off the entire town and conduct a
house-by-house search for weapons, Taliban, and opium. But
without the participation of the untrustworthy ANP or AHP,
such an operation was not feasible. The Taliban have set up
a network of operatives in the Tarin Kowt bazaar who provide
advance warning of movements by coalition or Afghan security
forces. Two mid-level Taliban commanders were arrested this
week by NDS agents in the center of Tarin Kowt - though
President Karzai apparently called from Kabul and ordered the
release of at least one, who was caught with a list of
Taliban contacts. In addition, local officials who work with
the PRT on reconstruction projects are receiving credible
death threats, which suggests that if the security
environment does not improve, the PRT's work may be impacted.


MONIB SEES THE PROBLEMS BUT NEEDS SUPPORT
--------------

9. (C) Unable to call on his security forces or tribal
allies, Gov. Monib faces limited options. He has come to
rely heavily on Abdul Rauf, his new NDS intelligence chief.
Rauf arrived here from Kabul on April 23, replacing an

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incompetent predecessor. He is serious and an outsider like
the Governor and has become Monib's consigliere. Rauf is
overseeing the expansion and improvement in the NDS unit
here. Monib even hopes to tackle Uruzgan's enormous opium
problem. This week he ordered farmers cultivating lush poppy
fields just outside his governor's compound to remove their
crops within three days, and he is setting up a regular Poppy
Coordination Meeting. At this point it appears that Monib is
not involved in the poppy trade that was a key element of his
predecessor's administration. Yet a Monib confidant told us
Monib has received only USD 10,000 in funding from Kabul
since taking office two months ago--a small fraction of Jan
Mohammed's monthly budget. Monib is reportedly not making
his payroll and is considering resigning if more funding is
not forthcoming this month. The Embassy is taking this
matter up with authorities in Kabul.

GIZAB DISTRICT TO URUZGAN
--------------

10. (S) President Karzai recently ordered that Gizab
district, now a part of Dai-Kundi province on Uruzgan's
northern border, be transferred to Uruzgan. This makes
sense: Gizab is more Pashtun and less Hazara than the rest
of Dai-Kundi, and it has become a supply route for insurgents
entering Uruzgan from the north. But Uruzgan authorities are
not able to stabilize their existing five districts, so the
burden of a new, untamed district will weigh heavily on their
resources. Establishing effective government in Gizab and
cutting the Taliban lines there is key to securing the
region, but merely making an administrative transfer of the
district will not get the job done.

COMMENT
--------------

11. (S) Installing Governor Monib was a necessary, but not
sufficient, measure for establishing security in Uruzgan.
Other key components necessary to meet this objective include
the provision by the GOA of strong resource and human
capacity support to the province--for example, through the
deployment there of effective GOA ministry
representatives--especially critical in law enforcement,
e.g., Provincial and Highway Police chiefs. The Afghan
Government is already taking several steps to enhance
security in the province:

-- Law enforcement: Currently, a major re-distribution of
Afghan National Police Forces is underway that will move
large numbers of police to the south, including to Uruzgan
(see Kabul 2154). The Interior Ministry is also planning to
move a stand-by police battalion to RC-South and to transfer
Highway Police personnel to Uniformed Police in Uruzgan and
elsewhere in RC South;

-- Military Operations: The ANA is exploring the idea of
adding Forward Operating Bases in Uruzgan Province based on
how they support the overall security challenge in RC South.
An ANA battalion is currently deployed over several locations
in Uruzgan.


12. (S) Vigorous Coalition and NATO/ISAF activity in
Uruzgan will significantly reinforce GOA and the Governor's
efforts to stabilize the province:

--A Dutch Maneuver Battalion is currently deploying into
Uruzgan Province with 12 helicopters. Ground forces will

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total up to 1400, supplemented by an additional 240
Australian troops to support the Dutch PRT (the Dutch will
assume command from the U.S. in late July). Australia
currently deploys 179 Special Forces troops in Uruzgan. The
Dutch PRT Commander will have 500,000 to 1 million euros
available for immediate ("CIMIC") economic assistance, and
will have access to some portion of between 5-10 million
euros in EU funding that must meet stricter criteria for
implementation.

-- Coalition/ANA Operation Mountain Thrust will begin in
mid-May and continue into July. During that period, it will
feature a major infusion of military force into Uruzgan and
the central regions of Helmand and Kandahar Provinces.
Forces will include the ANA 205th CORPS, Afghan National
Police, Afghan Border Police, Combined Joint Special
Operations Task Force, and Coalition forces. The operation
will concentrate on traditional Taliban sanctuary areas in
Uruzgan and Northern Helmand and border interdiction
operations on key Taliban infiltration routes into RC-South.
With Mountain Thrust's conclusion in mid-July, Civil-Military
operations will continue in support of infrastructure
improvement and humanitarian assistance projects targeted on
immediate and longer-term quality of life improvements.

-- Coalition Special Operations Forces (CSOF) will conduct
joint missions with the Afghan National Army (ANA) to degrade
and defeat the Taliban in Uruzgan Province. CSOF forces are
currently training ANA units in combat operations. These
forces will be used in Mountain Thrust and will also support
a long-term presence for Afghan National Security Forces in
Uruzgan and elsewhere in the south.


13. (C) This combination of Afghan and international
resources should enhance the Governor's ability to get on
with the business of building a stable province marked by
economic development and the rule of law. In the
Ambassador's meeting with the Dutch Foreign Minister May 8
the latter committed the Dutch to work strongly in support of
Monib. Standing up good governance from the shambles left by
the previous Afghan administration is going to be a long
project with periodic slippage. We are slowly getting
traction with the GOA. CFC-A and the Embassy are determined
at the highest levels to keep after this until we succeed.
END COMMENT


14. (U) Tarin Kowt PRT Commander has reviewed this report.
NEUMANN
NEUMANN