PRT/KANDAHAR - DEALING WITH THE TALIBAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001821

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
RELEASABLE TO NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, SCA/PAB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC MARR PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PRT/KANDAHAR - DEALING WITH THE TALIBAN
"SPRING OFFENSIVE"

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1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The "spring offensive"
announced by Taliban leaders in southern Afghanistan
a month ago appears to be picking up momentum.
During the previous four months the Taliban engaged
primarily in small hit and run attacks and
improvised explosive bombings, and this remains
their primary tactic. The increased number of
suicide attacks remains deeply disturbing. However,
in another move, they recently amassed a force of 50
to 100 fighters in a cluster of villages along
Highway One about 25 miles from Kandahar City,
reportedly to prepare for attacks in Kandahar. On
the orders of Governor Asadullah Khalid, the Afghan
National Police (ANP) launched a pre-emptive attack
on April 14 which resulted in a report of up to 41
Taliban and four ANP killed. (Note: In a later
meeting with Embassy officials, Asadullah revised
the number down to about 25. End note.) Canadian
forces were called in after the battle became
protracted and the ANP began to take casualties.
While the initiative of the Afghan authorities in
tackling the Taliban is admirable, this battle
showed that adjustments will have to be made to deal
more effectively with the Taliban "spring
offensive." END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Kandahar Provincial Governor Asadullah
Khalid told Regional Command South on April 11 that
he had received reports that a significant Taliban
force had moved into the area around Sangisar in
preparation for attacks on targets in Kandahar (he
did not know which targets had been selected by the
Taliban). This area was once one of Mullah Mohammed
Omar's headquarters and has long been suspected as
being a center of remaining Taliban support. Khalid
mentioned that he planned to have the ANP search the
villages in question and arrest any suspected
Taliban later in the week. He said that he would be
in contact with Canada's Task Force Orion to request
back-up support. However, this was not done in
advance; the Coalition forces were called in only
after the operation was under way.


3. (SBU) On the morning of April 14, the ANP
launched the mission and came under fire almost
immediately. According to the initial count by the
ANP, the firefight, which lasted into the early
evening, resulted in the deaths of 41 Taliban and
four ANP deaths - although the number of Taliban
killed was later revised downward to around 25.
Further inquiry by CFC-A revealed the final number
is likely much less than 25. Similarly, although the
press reported that the Zherai district chief of
police was killed and the district administrator was
wounded, our information indicated that both were
wounded. Canadian forces, which were operating
nearby, were called in by Afghan authorities and
surrounded the villages. The Canadians then fired
on several compounds.


4. (SBU) On Saturday, April 15, the Taliban
launched a series of hit and run attacks on several
police posts along Highway One (part of the national
"ring road"). This stretch of road has historically
been a hotspot for Taliban activity, and Taliban

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leadership have expressed an intent to increase
activity further in this region in an attempt to
isolate it from the surrounding areas. No ANP were
either killed or wounded in these quick hit and run
attacks. Afghan officials told us they believed the
attacks were a face-saving effort by the Taliban,
who had taken a humiliating defeat in one of their
historic areas of support.


5. (SBU) Subsequent to the April 14 battle, the
Commander of Task Force Orion met with the Governor
and top police officers to discuss the need for
closer coordination in advance of such operations.

Comment
--------------


6. (SBU) There are some noteworthy good news items
in these events. First, people in Kandahar are
increasingly willing to provide the provincial
authorities with information on Taliban activities.
Second, the Afghan authorities and ANP are willing
to assume primary responsibility for providing
security. Third, the capabilities of the ANP are
improving - they had pinned the Taliban down before
calling in the Canadian forces. Fourth, so far this
year, the Taliban do not appear to have the
capability to recruit or field as many fighters as
they did last year.


7. (SBU) Beyond the good news, however, the GOA
will need to make significant adjustments to its
tactics. First, the ANP and ANA, which currently
lack an effective Quick Reaction Force, will have to
plan for larger pitched battles. This winter the
Taliban preferred to fire a few shots and flee
rather than stand and fight when confronted with
significant Afghan or coalition forces. While this
remains their primary tactic, they are now more
frequently challenging the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) as they present softer targets.
Second, Governor Khalid and the Afghan authorities
will have to coordinate more through the nascent
Provincial Coordinating Center that has been set up
to help coordinate intelligence and the activities
of Afghan security forces and Coalition Forces in
Kandahar Province. Finally, inadequate supplies of
ammunition and weapons at police outposts along the
ring road may make them tempting targets to the
Taliban who have no doubt heard of these shortages.
Increased weapons and communications equipment for
the police outposts are likely to be top priorities
on the list of security improvements that Governor
Khalid and the other governors are planning to put
together at the April 25 Southern Governors'
Conference in Kandahar (other priorities are, or
should be, addressing corruption and irregular pay
for the ANP). The primary purpose of this
conference is to develop a common set of security
plans and requirements which the governors intend to
present in Kabul at the ministerial level as soon as
they can make appointments. End Comment.

NEUMANN