PRT/TARIN KOWT - SECURITY PROGRAMS GETTING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001669

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, INL, S/CRS, SCA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL
REL NATO/ISAF/AS/NZ
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV SNAR ASEC PTER MARR AF
SUBJECT: PRT/TARIN KOWT - SECURITY PROGRAMS GETTING
TRACTION IN URUZGAN PROVINCE

REF: A) KABUL 1211 B) KABUL 1328

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1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Establishing GOA authority,
particularly police authority, in Afghanistan's
Uruzgan province is very much a work in progress.
The province's two police forces are semi-reformed
militias allied to rival warlords. The PRT and
coalition forces are making some progress in
training and mentoring them, and it appears that the
March 18 arrival of a new governor (reftels) will
also contribute to their professionalization. The
police forces require significant reforms to
regularize their status, combat corruption in the
ranks, and develop effective policing tactics and
coordinated strategies. One of the greatest threats
to Uruzgan's security is the poppy economy, which
infects all aspects of public life. As part of our
effort to establish a secure environment, we must
leverage available tools against poppy cultivation.
We look forward to the PEP program's playing an
important role in the GOA and coalition security
strategy. END SUMMARY.

AHP - ALLIED WITH FORMER GOVERNOR JAN MOHAMMED
-------------- -


2. (SBU) The Afghan Highway Police (AHP) and Afghan
National Police (ANP) constitute the civilian
security forces in Uruzgan province (there are also
two battalions of Afghan National Army forces here).
The AHP are slated to have 201 personnel in Uruzgan
and are charged with maintaining security along the
province's major roads. The AHP are commanded by
Col. Matiollah, the hard-edged cousin of former
Governor Jan Mohammed Khan. Like Jan Mohammed,
Matiollah is a semi-literate former militia
commander and among the leaders of the Pashtun-
Populzai tribe here (Uruzgan's strongest). His
impulse is to deploy his men to support his tribe's
interests and/or kill Taliban rather than having any
strategic approach to highway security. The AHP's
leadership is heavily Populzai (including about
three dozen of Matiollah's kin) but lower ranks
include members of several different tribes,
excepting the Noorzai, who are fierce Populzai
rivals here. Credible accounts indicate that
Matiollah operates protection rackets, skims from
the AHP's payroll, and is involved in the illegal
narcotics trade. Matiollah is particularly adept as
a Taliban fighter and has generally cooperated well
with the PRT, regularly sending his men for Military
Police Advisory Training (MPAT) and deploying them
for missions in collaboration with coalition forces.
For this reason we may need to support his retention
as AHP Chief for the short term, in the interest of
stability, but he will need to be replaced once the
political situation in Uruzgan has become more
stable.

ANP - ROZI KHAN'S FORCE IS A COUNTERBALANCE
--------------


3. (SBU) Uruzgan's ANP are also a semi-laundered
former militia. They are led by Rozi Khan, leader
of the province's Barakzai tribe and rival to Jan

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Mohammed, Matiollah and the Populzai. Placing Rozi
Khan at the head of the ANP created an effective
counterweight to Jan Mohammed's autocratic
tendencies, but it also ensured that the AHP and ANP
could not cooperate at the senior level. Like Jan
Mohammed and Matiollah, Rozi Khan is a semi-literate
former Mujahadeen fighter reported to be involved in
illicit money-making activities. The ANP are
authorized to have 361 men in Uruzgan, but in the
past Jan Mohammed maintained de facto control over
nearly half of the force, at the expense of Rozi
Khan's authority. With the departure of Jan
Mohammed, Rozi Khan has allied himself with Governor
Monib and has even begun to outline plans to reform
the ANP. However, we understand that Rozi Khan will
be replaced by the central government as part of
upcoming police reforms - a move that we support.

NECESSARY REFORMS AND THE PRT'S ROLE
--------------

4. (SBU) The problems of the AHP and ANP are
systemic and severe: the payroll and operational
budgets are uncertain and skimmed by senior
officers; most men are untrained and without
uniforms or equipment, the rolls are inaccurate and
clogged with non-existent men, while many men who
are actually working are maintained off the books --
all of which creates real confusion on the street
about who is and is not a police officer. Meanwhile
illiteracy, tribal loyalties, and lack of training
and strategic vision at all levels prevent the
forces from developing professional esprit and
carrying out civilian policing activities.


5. (SBU) The PRT has several activities aimed at
strengthening the AHP and ANP:

-- MPAT.
Three US Military Police (MPs) attached to the PRT
provide MPAT Training to the AHP and ANP. The
training is an 8-hour module for 20 students for one
week covering ethics, first aid, search and arrest
of suspects, and checkpoint and vehicle searches.
While the training is basic, it is often the only
formal training the participants have ever had. It
also presents us with an opportunity to record basic
biodata and to photograph each participant. To
date, roughly half of the AHP and ANP police have
taken the course. This course could usefully be
expanded to two weeks, though more fundamental
training is constrained by participants' low
literacy levels.

-- POLICE MENTORS.
Beginning in late 2005, INL contracted two (expanded
to four in March 2006) Dyncorps police mentors to
provide guidance to the forces' senior leadership.
These mentors are police officers from the U.S. who
undergo 10 days training in the U.S. and 10 days in
Kabul before deploying to the field. Hampered by
logistical glitches (their radios and bodyguards
only arrived in Uruzgan in March 2006, some five
months late, their vehicles were redirected in order
to meet security needs elsewhere and arrived only
recently, and they are still without their own

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housing, meals, computers and interpreters),the
mentors have been slow off the mark and have yet to
become fully effective. However, the mentors have
been able to provide informal support to the PRT's
MPAT training program and, in the absence of their
own vehicles, have taken advantage of PRT visits
throughout the province to observe and engage with
the AHP and ANP. The PRT has also redirected some
of its planned missions to support the mentors'
activities in order to make them minimally
effective. As their administrative issues are
resolved, the mentors will be able to provide
critical high-level advice to the police and
provincial leadership and -- with buy-in from a new
governor and police chiefs -- guide them toward
much-needed reforms.

-- COORDINATION.
Beyond the MPAT and mentoring programs, the PRT
seeks to strengthen Uruzgan's security forces by
developing a more strategic view of their
operations. We facilitate regular meetings to
exchange information and develop operational plans
among the AHP, ANP, ANA, NDS, the coalition forces,
and the governor. Governor Monib has used these
efforts as a launching point to develop a
coordination center that brings together the various
forces and to set up checkpoints around Tarin Kowt,
essentially the provincial capital's first effort at
a sustained physical security presence. In order to
both strengthen Afghan forces and to ensure that
they are the face of operations, the PRT and
coalition forces include a contingent of local
forces in every operation, whether it be MED/VETCAP
(revolving medical and veterinary clinics),visits
to USAID reconstruction projects, or kinetic
operations against insurgents.

POPPY EFFORTS KEY TO LONG-TERM SUCCESS
--------------


6. (SBU) The poppy economy in Uruzgan is ubiquitous:
it infects all aspects of public life here,
corrupting public officials, distracting farmers
from food crops, fueling violence, and drawing
significant portions of the province out of the
government's sphere of authority. Thus a key
element in strengthening the security sector here is
to conduct effective campaigns against poppy
cultivation. With GOA eradication efforts this year
focused on neighboring Kandahar and Helmand
provinces, we need to work closely with the governor
and local actors to leverage available means -- such
as PEP -- to address the burgeoning poppy threat.


7. (SBU) Until recently, the Poppy Elimination
Program (PEP) here was plagued by the same
logistical glitches as the police mentor program.
Miscommunication and uneven coordination with the
PRT regarding housing, equipment, and security
delayed the program's rollout. However, with the
arrival of a new embassy PEP Advisor in March 2006,
the program has gotten firmly back on track and
should soon be showing results. A constructive
dialogue among the PRT, the PEP Advisor, and the

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Governor has now been established, so that we can
work through logistical challenges and get the PEP
presence, both in downtown Tarin Kowt and their
secure living quarters at the PRT, up and running.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (SBU) Uruzgan is a challenging environment that
teaches hard lessons. As our MPAT, police mentor,
and other security programs get traction, it is
imperative that they be dovetailed to provide
maximum results. The timing could not be better,
because a new governor and impending changes of
other provincial leaders offer a clear opportunity
to institute reforms and make progress across the
board on issues such as registering the ANP and AHP,
cleaning up their personnel and payrolls, and
cultivating a closer relationship between all of
Uruzgan's forces. We also look forward to the
resolution of administrative problems related to the
mentoring program in order to take advantage of this
window of opportunity. Uruzgan needs a lot of work
and a lot of help, but the alternative is a descent
into greater instability that would threaten US and
coalition interests here.
Norland